Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
WILLIAM RHODES-HAMBY, Petitioner,
v.
ANYA ASKEW, Respondent.
No. 1 CA-SA 26-0064
FILED 07-23-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. DO2021-00049
The Honorable Ted S. Reed, Judge
JURISDICTION ACCEPTED IN PART; RELIEF GRANTED IN PART
COUNSEL
Berkshire Law Office, PLLC, Tempe
By Keith Berkshire, Alexandra Sandlin, Elizabeth Nañez, Alicia Derr
Counsel for Petitioner
Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff
By Chad Joshua Winger
Counsel for Respondent
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.
RHODES-HAMBY v. ASKEW
Decision of the Court
J A C O B S, Judge:
¶1 William Rhodes-Hamby (“Father”) asks us to exercise our
discretionary special action jurisdiction to review the superior court’s
temporary order granting Anya Askew (“Mother”) temporary sole legal
decision-making authority and near-exclusive parenting time. He first
argues that despite Mother’s previous acts of domestic violence, the
temporary order fails to cite evidence rebutting the statutory presumption
that awarding sole legal decision-making authority and exclusive parenting
time to Mother is contrary to the child’s best interests. See A.R.S. § 25-
403.03(D). Father then argues the court’s temporary order improperly
allows the court-appointed therapist to determine the frequency and
duration of his exercise of parenting time.
¶2 This Court issued a memorandum decision on April 10, 2026,
exercising our discretionary special action jurisdiction over both issues
because the well-being of a child is at issue and because the harm
complained of could only be prevented by resolution before an appeal.
Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(4), (6). We decided both issues in Father’s favor
and granted relief by vacating the superior court’s temporary order.
Having considered Mother’s fully briefed motion for reconsideration, we
grant the motion for reconsideration in part, vacate our prior decision, and
issue in its place this memorandum decision declining jurisdiction over the
legal decision-making authority issue but affirming our decision regarding
the parenting time issue because we agree with Father that the court erred
by delegating its judicial decision-making authority to the court-appointed
therapist.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Father Obtains an Order of Protection Against Mother for
Domestic Violence, and Mother and Father Divorce.
¶3 Father and Mother married in March 2019 and had one child
born in September 2019. Father filed for divorce in February 2021. Before
the divorce was final, Father sought an order of protection against Mother
based on allegations of domestic violence. In December 2022, the court
issued a two-year order of protection prohibiting Mother from contacting
Father, finding “reasonable cause to believe that [Mother] may commit an
act of domestic violence or has committed an act of domestic violence
within the past year.”
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Decision of the Court
¶4 Mother and Father were divorced in February 2024. Their
consent decree kept the order of protection in effect, awarded Mother and
Father joint legal decision-making, and gave Father final legal decision-
making authority. In a separate order, the court awarded Mother and
Father equal parenting time.
B. Father Obtains a Second Order of Protection Against
Mother Because of a Criminal Trespass Conviction.
¶5 In May 2024, Mother was found guilty of criminal trespass in
connection with one of the incidents supporting the order of protection.
Mother was placed on probation for 18 months and was prohibited from
contacting Father, and the crime was considered domestic violence under
A.R.S. § 13-3601(A).
¶6 In January 2025, the superior court granted Father’s petition
for an additional two-year order of protection, which prohibited Mother
from contacting Father other than through a co-parenting app. The court
again found “reasonable cause to believe that [Mother] may commit an act
of domestic violence or has committed an act of domestic violence within
the past year.”
C. Mother Requests Modification of Legal Decision-Making,
Parenting Time, and Child Support.
¶7 In October 2025, Mother filed a Petition to Modify Legal
Decision-Making, Parenting Time, and Child Support, an Emergency
Motion for Temporary Orders under Family Law Rule 48, and a Motion for
Temporary Orders under Family Law Rule 47. Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 47, 48. In
her petition, Mother alleged that since entry of the decree, Father had
exercised his final decision-making authority as though he had sole legal
authority, excluding her from medical and mental health decisions. She
alleged that Father unilaterally hospitalized the six-year-old child in a
psychiatric unit at Phoenix Children’s Hospital, directed his transport to the
hospital without parental accompaniment, and excluded her from
participation in his care. Mother further alleged Father committed four
separate incidents of abuse while the child was in his care: one involving
bruising to the child’s torso, a second involving restraint-like bruising to
the child’s wrists, a third involving hitting the child in the stomach, and a
fourth in which school personnel observed multiple bruises and reported
that the child stated Father held him down in the car. Although prior
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) investigations had been inconclusive
or unsubstantiated, Mother asserted that the pattern of injuries, behavioral
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dysregulation in Father’s home, and Father’s unilateral psychiatric
hospitalization of the child justified awarding her sole legal decision-
making authority and modifying parenting time to reflect
recommendations of a court-ordered custody evaluator.
D. Following an Evidentiary Hearing, the Superior Court
Issues Temporary Orders Modifying Legal Decision-
Making and Parenting Time.
¶8 After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court issued a
temporary order awarding Mother sole legal decision-making authority
and limiting Father to “therapeutically supervised parenting time with the
minor child.” The court concluded the child remaining in Father’s custody
“present[ed] an immediate risk of serious emotional harm or physical harm
to the minor child,” because: (1) the “perpetual conflict” between Mother
and Father was adversely affecting the child’s welfare; (2) the child was
displaying alarming behavior in Father’s care; and (3) the child had suffered
unexplained bruising and stated that Father was “hitting him,” which was
the subject of an ongoing DCS investigation.
¶9 In addition to granting Mother’s request for sole legal
decision-making, the court’s temporary order limited Father to
therapeutically supervised parenting time, the frequency and duration of
which were to “be determined by the provider” and not to exceed “more
than twice per week for a maximum of two hours per visit.”
¶10 In a subsequent order, the court designated a Safe Haven
Family Therapist and ordered that Father exercise parenting time in family
therapy “until further court ordered, and as recommended by” the
therapist. The court also ordered that if the therapist “determines [Father]
and the child no longer need to participate in family therapy, [Father] is
entitled . . . to request a change in parenting time.” The order further
provided that the therapist “shall not make any recommendations
regarding legal decision making or parenting time,” and that a
“recommendation of no longer needing to participate in ‘family therapy,’ is
not considered a parenting time recommendation.” Father’s petition for
special action review followed.
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Decision of the Court
DISCUSSION
¶11 We review the superior court’s parenting time orders for an
abuse of discretion. Gish v. Greyson, 253 Ariz. 437, 444 ¶ 31 (App. 2022). The
superior court abuses its discretion when its ruling is “manifestly
unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable
reasons.” Quigley v. City of Tucson, 132 Ariz. 35, 37 (App. 1982). A legal
error is necessarily an abuse of discretion. Voice of Surprise v. Hall, 255 Ariz.
510, 513 ¶ 11 (2023).
I. We Exercise Our Special Action Jurisdiction.
¶12 We exercise our discretionary special action jurisdiction
because the well-being of children is an issue of statewide importance.
Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(4). Our review also implicates the welfare of a
child where the harm complained of can only be prevented by
consideration before appeal, given that the temporary order at issue can’t
be appealed. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(6).
II. The Superior Court Improperly Delegated Its Judicial Decision-
Making Authority to the Therapist.
¶13 Father argues the provisions of the court’s temporary orders
allowing the therapist to both limit the frequency and duration of his
therapeutically supervised parenting time and conclude that Father and
child no longer needed to participate in family therapy improperly
delegated the court’s sole decision-making authority. In addition to
arguing waiver and judicial estoppel, Mother argues the court did not
abuse its discretion because the order at issue is temporary and not a final
parenting time decision. Father is correct.
¶14 The court’s order allows the therapist to decide how much
parenting time Father receives each week, between zero and four hours.
The order also allows the therapist to unilaterally decide that
therapeutically supervised parenting time is no longer needed, in which
case, due to the structure of the temporary order, Father will be required to
move the court to modify the temporary order to exercise any parenting
time. This improperly delegates the court’s judicial authority. See
DePasquale v. Superior Court, 181 Ariz. 333, 336 (App. 1995) (The superior
court “may consider expert opinion in making [its] decisions,” however, it
can “neither delegate a judicial decision to an expert witness nor abdicate
its responsibility to exercise independent judgment.”). Our law doesn’t
prevent the court from “establishing milestones for [Father] to receive
additional or unsupervised parenting time . . . . But unless the milestones
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are self-effectuating, the court, not a behavioral health professional, must
determine whether a requirement has been met.” Gish, 253 Ariz. at 447 ¶ 48.
The therapist’s independent judgment is not a “self-effectuating . . .
milestone,” so making it the deciding factor in Father’s parenting time
going forward is an impermissible delegation of ultimate judgment to the
therapist.
¶15 By granting the therapist sole discretion over the duration
and frequency of Father’s parenting time, the court abdicated its
responsibility to exercise independent judgment as to the child’s best
interests. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A) (“The court shall determine legal decision-
making and parenting time . . . in accordance with the best interests of the
child.” (emphasis added)). This is not a permissible delegation, as Mother
suggests, because the court did this through a temporary order rather than
a final parenting time decision. As we made clear in DePasquale, “[t]he best
interests of the child—even on an interim custodial basis—are for the court
alone to decide.” 181 Ariz. at 336 (emphasis added).
¶16 We appreciate that the court recites in its temporary orders
that the therapist “shall not make any recommendations regarding legal
decision making or parenting time,” and that a “recommendation of no
longer needing to participate in ‘family therapy,’ is not considered a
parenting time recommendation.” Unfortunately, those contrary recitals
do not negate the practical effect of the other provisions of its orders, which
amount to an improper delegation of exclusive judicial decision-making
authority, for the reasons we have explained. The court erred by granting
the therapist discretion over the frequency, duration, and conclusion of
Father’s exercise of therapeutically supervised parenting time.
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Decision of the Court
CONCLUSION
¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we exercise our discretionary
special action jurisdiction, vacate the parenting time provisions of the
superior court’s temporary order, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this decision. In our discretion, we deny both parties’
requests for attorneys’ fees. Because Father obtained relief in this special
action, we award him $2,085.46 in costs pursuant to ARCAP 21 and A.R.S.
§ 12-341.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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