Boettcher v. Boettcher

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

JEFFREY BOETTCHER, Petitioner,

v.

BETTY BOETTCHER, Respondent.

No. 1 CA-SA 26-0121
FILED 08-14-2026

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2022-050153
The Honorable Paula A. Williams, Judge

SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

COUNSEL

Babione Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale
By Laura V. Babione
Counsel for Petitioner

Stanley David Murray, Scottsdale
Counsel for Respondent

OPINION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

BOETTCHER v. BOETTCHER
Opinion of the Court

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Under Arizona law, the superior court may impose sanctions
for contempt when a party violates a court order. We confront here whether
violation of an enforceable parenting plan incorporated by reference into
the consent decree signed by the court can support a contempt finding. It
can. But a court may not use the vehicle of contempt sanctions to modify
parenting time and legal decision-making authority without meeting the
statutory requirements for such modifications.

¶2 Jeffrey Boettcher (“Father”) seeks special action review of a
contempt order granting Betty Boettcher (“Mother”) sole legal
decision-making authority, reducing Father’s parenting time to three
supervised hours per week, and ordering him to undergo a psychological
evaluation and attend a parenting class. We hold that the superior court did
not abuse its discretion by holding Father in contempt but did abuse its
discretion by modifying the parties’ legal decision-making authority and
Father’s parenting time. We therefore accept special action jurisdiction,
grant relief in part, and deny relief in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 Mother and Father are divorced and have three minor
children. They have a contentious co-parenting relationship, which the
superior court found is “largely due to Father’s temper, unreasonableness,
and inability to let any slight, perceived or real, go.”

¶4 In December 2022, Mother and Father entered into a consent
decree of dissolution of marriage and filed a parenting plan and a
settlement agreement. The decree provided for joint legal decision-making
authority over the children “as set forth in the parties’ Joint Legal
Decision-Making Parenting Plan attached hereto and incorporated herein
as Exhibit A.” The parenting plan provided that “the parents stipulate and
agree that this Parenting Plan shall be binding upon each parent and
submitted to the court for its approval, and shall become a court order,”
and provided for joint legal decision-making authority and roughly equal
parenting time. The plan also included general terms of conduct that
prohibited both parents from interrogating the children, arguing in front of
them, making negative or disparaging comments about the other parent, or
interfering with each other’s parenting relationships in any other way.

¶5 In March 2024, Mother moved to modify the terms of the
parenting plan, claiming Father had violated them repeatedly, including by

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BOETTCHER v. BOETTCHER
Opinion of the Court

verbally abusing the oldest child at a sports practice. In September 2025, the
court held an evidentiary hearing and reaffirmed the joint legal decision-
making authority, although it granted Mother final say should the parties
fail to reach an agreement in good faith. By that time, Mother had already
obtained a no-contact order of protection against Father.

¶6 In November 2025, Mother petitioned to enforce the
parenting plan and hold Father in contempt for his abusive behavior after
Father aggressively disparaged Mother on a call with their oldest daughter,
making the daughter cry. Mother provided the court with a recording of
the call. Mother asked the court to order a behavioral health evaluation,
supervised parenting time, and parental education classes.

¶7 In March 2026, after an evidentiary hearing, the court found
Father in contempt for knowingly and willfully violating the specific
restrictions imposed by the consent decree and parenting plan. The court
found that the evidence called into question Father’s mental health and
ordered him to submit to a forensic psychological evaluation and complete
a parenting class. The court also awarded Mother sole legal
decision-making authority and reduced Father’s parenting time to three
supervised hours per week.

¶8 Father moved to dismiss the civil contempt finding, arguing
there was no valid court order to support the finding. The court denied
Father’s motion, noting an agreement incorporated by reference in a decree
is enforceable via contempt under Arizona Revised Statutes Section 25-317
and LaPrade v. LaPrade, 189 Ariz. 243 (1997). The 2022 consent decree
incorporated the parenting plan by reference, and the court reviewed and
approved both, entering them separately into the record.

¶9 Father then petitioned this Court for special action relief from
the contempt order. Findings of contempt and resulting civil sanctions are
not appealable, Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 401, 411, ¶ 35 (App. 2001), so
Father does not have an “equally plain, speedy, and adequate” remedy by
appeal, RPSA 12(a). We therefore accepted jurisdiction and granted relief
in part in an earlier order, promising a decision to follow. This is that
decision.

DISCUSSION

¶10 Father contends the superior court both lacked jurisdiction to
hold him in contempt and abused its discretion by finding him in contempt.
He also contends the court imposed improper sanctions.

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BOETTCHER v. BOETTCHER
Opinion of the Court

A. The Contempt Finding

¶11 We review civil contempt findings and any resulting
sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Stoddard v. Donahoe, 224 Ariz. 152, 154,
¶ 9 (App. 2010). We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal and accept the
superior court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 154–55, ¶ 9.

¶12 The superior court may use civil contempt sanctions to
compel compliance with a court order. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 92(a)(1). The
process begins with a petition, such as the one Mother filed, followed by an
evidentiary hearing, like the one held here. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 92(b)–(d).
The petitioner must establish that (1) the court entered a prior order, (2) of
which the alleged violator had notice, and (3) with which he failed to
comply. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 92(d)(2). If the court finds the violator in
contempt and orders any sanction, it must set conditions allowing the
violator to remove or “purge” the contempt. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 92(f)(1).
The violator must have the present ability to comply with the conditions.
Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 92(f)(2).

¶13 Father argues the court never ordered him to comply with the
parenting plan and, absent a valid court order, he cannot be held in
contempt. He argues that the plan was not merged into the decree or
approved by the court but concedes that the plan was incorporated into the
decree.

¶14 At the time of filing, a consent decree involving children must
include a parenting plan covering legal decision-making authority and
parenting time. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 45(c)(1). When the parties incorporate
a parenting plan into the decree by reference, the plan retains its
independent contractual status and thus can be modified by the parties.
LaPrade, 189 Ariz. at 247, 249. Whereas, if the plan merges into the decree,
only the decree controls, and, with limited exceptions, only the court can
modify it. Id. at 247. But the “[t]erms of the agreement set forth or
incorporated by reference in the decree are enforceable by all remedies
available for enforcement of a judgment, including contempt.” A.R.S. § 25-
317(E). In other words, the superior court retains its power to enforce the
provisions of a parenting plan regardless of whether they are merged into
the decree. See Ball v. Ball, 250 Ariz. 273, 276, ¶ 7 n.2 (App. 2020). Father thus
cannot avoid enforcement through the court’s contempt authority of the
terms of the parenting plan to which he agreed, and which was explicitly
incorporated into the consent decree signed by the court.

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Opinion of the Court

¶15 We pause to note that, both in the superior court and here,
Father included the following purported quote: “The court cannot hold a
party in contempt for violating a parenting plan that was never ordered.
Without a valid court order, contempt is legally impossible.” He cited two
cases for the quote, neither of which contains that language. And we could
not find it in any Arizona case. We strike the apparently false quotation.
Matter of Est. of Acciavatti, 1 CA-CV 25-0606 PB, 2026 WL 2041963, at *2, ¶ 9
(App. July 15, 2026). But because we identified no additional citation
concerns, and opposing counsel raised none (including this one), we
decline to impose sanctions. Id. at *4, ¶ 18 (“citing a hallucinated case in a
legal filing is sanctionable conduct.”).

¶16 Father had notice of the terms of the parenting plan and that
it had been incorporated into the consent decree signed by the court. His
conduct violated specific terms in the parenting plan. And our legislature
authorized the superior court to enforce such a plan through its contempt
authority. A.R.S. § 25-317(E).

¶17 The court did not err in finding Father in contempt.

B. The Sanctions

¶18 Father next claims the sanctions were improper permanent
restrictions irrelevant to his conduct at issue and the court should have
included a purge condition that would allow him to avoid the restrictions.
The court sanctioned Father by reducing his parenting time, awarding
Mother sole legal decision-making authority, and ordering Father to
undergo a psychological evaluation and attend a parenting class.

¶19 Father already consented to the psychological evaluation and
the parenting class. Thus, he has waived any challenge to those sanctions,
and we can offer no relief. But Father is correct in challenging the court’s
parenting time and legal decision-making authority sanctions.

¶20 Several family law provisions set the stage for our
consideration of these sanctions. Under Section 25-414, if a court finds a
party violated a visitation or parenting time order, it may hold the party in
contempt, order visitation or parenting time to make up missed sessions,
order parent education, or any other remedy that promotes the child’s best
interests. A.R.S. § 25-414(A)(1)–(3), (7). Section 25-411(J) allows the court, on
its own motion, to modify parenting time “whenever modification would
serve the best interest of the child” although restricting parenting time
requires the court to find “that the parenting time would endanger
seriously the child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health.” Section

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25-411(M) prohibits a court from modifying legal decision-making
authority unless a party files a modification petition, and the court holds a
modification hearing. And whenever the court modifies parenting time or
legal decision-making authority, it must consider and make specific
findings on all relevant factors listed in Section 25-403(A) and explain why
the modification is in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 25-403(A)–(B). The
court abuses its discretion if it fails to make required findings. Owen v.
Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 421–22, ¶ 12 (App. 2003).

¶21 Finally, a civil contempt sanction must fit the circumstances
of the contempt. Stoddard, 224 Ariz. at 157, ¶ 24. The court may consider the
parent’s contemptuous conduct in deciding if a modification is in the child’s
best interests but cannot use a modification to punish the parent for the
contempt. Stapley v. Stapley, 15 Ariz. App. 64, 70–71 (1971) (“[P]unishment
of a parent for contempt is not to be visited on the children and custody is
not to be used as a reward or punishment of parental conduct.”). And the
court must include a purge condition allowing the violator an opportunity
to avoid the sanctions. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 92(f).

¶22 The court’s parenting time and legal decision-making
authority sanctions here are inconsistent with these requirements. Section
25-414 did not authorize the modifications because Father did not violate a
parenting time or visitation order. There was no pending modification
petition, and the evidentiary hearing was not a modification hearing, as
required by Section 25-411(M). That is important because it means the court
did not take testimony on or make the best-interests findings necessary
under Section 25-403 for a modification. Nor did it make the findings
required in Section 25-411(J), which would otherwise allow the court, on its
own motion, to restrict parenting time. See Cruz v. Garcia, 240 Ariz. 233, 238,
¶ 18 (App. 2016).

¶23 The court also failed to include a purge condition. See Ariz. R.
Fam. Law P. 92(f). Father could do nothing to prevent the parenting time
and legal decision-making authority modifications from taking effect.

¶24 The court erred by imposing these improper sanctions.

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BOETTCHER v. BOETTCHER
Opinion of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶25 We accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief in part
by vacating the modifications to legal decision-making authority and
parenting time. We otherwise deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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