State v. Aguirre

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Petitioner,

v.

ENRIQUE AGUIRRE, Respondent.

No. 1 CA-SA 26-0176
FILED 07-28-2026

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV 2026-000755
The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Rebecca Banes, Edward F. Novak, Jennifer Rethemeier (argued)
Co-Counsel for Petitioner

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Robert R. McCright, Laura L. Roubicek
Co-Counsel for Petitioner

The People’s Law Firm PLC, Phoenix
By Jesse Santana Wulsin, Stephen D. Benedetto (argued)
Counsel for Respondent

STATE v. AGUIRRE
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass1 and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

G A O N A, Judge:

¶1 Our constitution commands the legislature to “direct by law
in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state.”
Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 18. More than 40 years ago, the legislature
exercised this power by requiring persons intending to sue any Arizona
public entity for damages to first file a notice of claim (“NOC”). 1984 Ariz.
Sess. Laws, ch. 285 § 5 (2nd Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1225). Claimants must ensure
their NOC contains certain information and file it within 180 days of the
claim’s accrual. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). But just last year, the legislature
enacted a new pilot-program statute that authorizes those erroneously
convicted of a crime to file a claim against the State for special damages,
subject to a new statute of limitations period and new procedures, and to
do so “[n]otwithstanding any other law.” A.R.S. § 13-4296(A). The narrow
question here is whether a claimant under § 13-4296 must first file an NOC
under § 12-821.01(A).

¶2 Respondent Enrique Aguirre sued the State seeking
compensation under § 13-4296, and the State moved to dismiss because
Aguirre didn’t first file an NOC. The superior court denied the State’s
motion, finding that § 13-4296 exempted Aguirre’s claim from § 12-821.01’s
NOC requirement. The State seeks special action relief from that order.

¶3 Because, as we explain below, “notwithstanding any other
law” is an “expansive” clause the legislature commonly uses to “make[]
clear that [one statute] controls over other, potentially conflicting state

1 Judge David B. Gass was a sitting member of this court when the
matter was assigned to this panel of the court. He retired effective June 30,
2026. In accordance with the authority granted by Article VI, Section 3, of
the Arizona Constitution, and under A.R.S. § 12-145, the Chief Justice of the
Arizona Supreme Court has designated Judge David B. Gass as a judge pro
tempore in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of participating in the
resolution of cases assigned to this panel during his term in office and for
the duration of Administrative Order 2026-87.

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Opinion of the Court

laws,” City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Electronics, Inc., 242 Ariz. 139, 144 ¶¶ 16,
17 (2017), the superior court got it right. We accepted special action
jurisdiction and denied relief in separate orders, noting that a written
decision would follow. This is that decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶4 In 2021, a Maricopa County jury convicted Aguirre of
discharging a firearm at a non-residence. The court sentenced him to 5 years
in prison with credit for 173 days of presentence incarceration. We reversed
his conviction and sentence on appeal because “no evidence support[ed]
Aguirre’s conviction.” State v. Aguirre, 255 Ariz. 89, 94 ¶ 21 (App. 2023). On
remand, the superior court dismissed the charge against Aguirre with
prejudice. All told, Aguirre spent 632 days in jail and prison.

¶5 In January 2026, Aguirre filed an action under § 13-4296, a
statute passed in 2025 allowing certain individuals whose convictions are
reversed or vacated to seek compensation from the State. The State moved
to dismiss, arguing Aguirre didn’t file an NOC before filing in superior
court. After considering the parties’ briefing, the superior court denied the
State’s motion, concluding that the “180-day notice of claim requirement
under A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) is inapplicable to claims brought under
A.R.S. § 13-4296.” The State’s special action petition followed.

JURISDICTION

¶6 “As a general rule, special action is not an appropriate vehicle
for review of a denial of a motion to dismiss.” Vo v. Superior Ct., 172 Ariz.
195, 198 (App. 1992). Yet both the State and Aguirre urge us to accept special
action jurisdiction. They say the proper interpretation of § 13-4296 is a
question of first impression and statewide importance, and that resolving
this threshold issue now is the most efficient path forward in Aguirre’s case.
The State further identifies an urgent need for clarity because § 13-4296
provides claimants two years from January 1, 2026 to file claims based on
convictions overturned before that date, at least a dozen other claims for
compensation are currently pending, and it anticipates future claims.
Because § 12-821.01(A) requires that an NOC be filed within 180 days from
the date when a cause of action accrues, determining whether § 12-
821.01(A)’s NOC requirement applies to § 13-4296 requires us to resolve the
issue promptly for potential claimants.

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Opinion of the Court

¶7 Because this matter involves interpreting a new statute2 and
the efficient management and disposition of this and other cases arising
under § 13-4296 is an issue of statewide importance, we accept special
action jurisdiction. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(3), (4), (7).

DISCUSSION

¶8 This special action’s outcome turns on statutory
interpretation, meaning our review is de novo. State v. Luviano, 255 Ariz.
225, 227 ¶ 7 (2023). “When interpreting statutes, we begin with the text.”
Franklin v. CSAA Gen. Ins., 255 Ariz. 409, 411 ¶ 8 (2023). We apply a “plain
meaning analysis” under which “[c]lear and unequivocal language
determines a statute’s meaning.” Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257
Ariz. 137, 142 ¶ 15 (2024). “[W]e look first to the language of the provision,
for if the statutory language is clear, judicial construction is neither required
nor proper.” Id. (cleaned up). We use “alternative methods of statutory
construction”—like examining a statute’s “historical background” or
“spirit and purpose”—only if the statute’s language is ambiguous. Id. at 142
¶ 17.

I. About 41 years after Arizona began requiring those who want to
sue a public entity to file a timely NOC, the legislature enacted
§ 13-4296—the erroneous conviction statute at issue.

¶9 We begin with § 12-821.01, which requires those “who have
claims against a public entity” to first file an NOC “with the person . . .
authorized to accept service for the public entity” no later than 180 days
“after the cause of action accrues.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). The NOC must
contain (1) “facts sufficient to permit the public entity . . . to understand the
basis on which liability is claimed” and (2) “a specific amount for which the
claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount.” Id. This
requirement applies to “all causes of action that accrue on or after July 17,
1994.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(F). And only after a claimant files a valid NOC and
the public entity either denies it, or 60 days pass, can they sue the public
entity subject to the general one-year statute of limitations. See A.R.S. §§ 12-
821.01(A), (E), -821. “Claims that do not comply with A.R.S. § 12-821.01.A
are statutorily barred” and subject to dismissal. Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 97 v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 295 ¶ 6 (2007); see also Donovan v. Yavapai
Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 244 Ariz. 608, 610 ¶ 7 (App. 2018) (“A notice of claim

2 Section 13-4296 will sunset within the next year absent legislative
action. See 2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 230 § 5 (1st Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1500)
(repealing § 13-4296 “from and after June 30, 2027”).

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that satisfies A.R.S. § 12-821.01 is a necessary prerequisite to filing a lawsuit
against a public entity.”). The legislature has required those asserting
claims against any Arizona public entity to file an NOC in some form since
1984. See 1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 285 § 5 (2nd Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1225); City
Of Phoenix v. Fields, 219 Ariz. 568, 571 ¶¶ 8–9 (2009) (describing the NOC
requirement’s evolution).

¶10 In 2025, the legislature passed § 13-4296, titled “Erroneous
convictions; compensation; pilot program.” The statute authorizes certain
individuals whose felony convictions are reversed or vacated (or who
receive a pardon for innocence) to file an action seeking compensation from
the State. A.R.S. § 13-4296. It says they can file these actions
“[n]otwithstanding any other law.” A.R.S. § 13-4296(A). The statute
contains its own two-year limitations period, requires the claimant to serve
the attorney general, presumptively requires the attorney general to
respond to the claim within thirty days, and sets forth various other
procedural requirements. A.R.S. § 13-4296(B)–(V). The statute says nothing
about an NOC and doesn’t reference § 12-821.01.

II. Because § 13-4296 contains a “notwithstanding any other law”
provision, that section is exempt from § 12-821.01’s NOC
requirement.

¶11 Turning to the dispute in this special action, the State
contends that § 13-4296’s “silence” about § 12-821.01’s applicability is
“meaningful” because the statutes “can be read in harmony,” and that the
superior court erred “by reading an implied repeal” of the NOC
requirement into § 13-4296. The State says the superior court’s
interpretation of § 13-4296 is “atextual and illogical” because nothing
prevents claimants like Aguirre from filing a § 13-4296 action after they go
through the NOC process. And it argues the superior court’s order
disregarded Boyd v. State, 256 Ariz. 468 (App. 2023), in which it claims we
“resolved an analogous statutory interpretation issue.” We address each of
the State’s arguments—none of which persuade—in turn.

A. Section 13-4296’s prefatory clause “notwithstanding any
other law” is not ambiguous.

¶12 To start, we agree that § 13-4296’s “silence” about (or more
appropriately, its lack of a specific reference to) § 12-821.01 and its NOC
requirement is “meaningful”—just not in the way the State urges. Section
13-4296 begins as follows: “Notwithstanding any other law, a claimant may
bring an action in superior court seeking compensation from this state[.]”

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Opinion of the Court

A.R.S. § 13-4296(A). The statute then prescribes when and how a claimant
may bring such a claim.

¶13 “Notwithstanding” means “without prevention or
obstruction from or by,” “any” means “one or some indiscriminately of
whatever kind,” and § 12-821.01 is a “law.” Glenayre, 242 Ariz. at 144 ¶¶ 17–
18 (cleaned up). And because nothing in § 13-4296 carves out § 12-
821.01(A)’s NOC requirement from its “notwithstanding” clause, that
clause “applies broadly and inclusively to all other statutes,” addressing
how and when claims and actions can be brought, Glenayre, 242 Ariz. at 144
¶ 18, including § 12-821.01. In other words, the use of “notwithstanding any
other law” made any mention of § 12-821.01 to preempt the filing of an NOC
unnecessary. Interpreting the statute otherwise would render that opening
clause meaningless, at least as to § 12-821.01.

¶14 Similarly, accepting the State’s reading would also ignore the
legislature’s choice to create a separate claim process under § 13-4296,
directing (among other things) that: (1) the claimant not name any
defendants; (2) the claimant “serve the attorney general with a copy of the
claim”; (3) the attorney general “respond within thirty days”; and (4) the
court make findings allocating fault to unnamed city or county employees.
A.R.S. § 13-4296(A), (B), (D), (E). Considering that § 12-821.01(A) bars “[a]ny
claim that is not filed within [180] days after the cause of action accrues,”
the context of both statutes confirms our reading of § 13-4296. See In re
Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 5 (2024) (context is part of determining a
statute’s plain meaning).

B. Because the legislature chose to exempt § 13-4296 from “any
other law,” that statute operates independently of—and
trumps—§ 12-821.01.

¶15 The State reads Glenayre narrowly and seeks to counter
Aguirre’s view that it stands for the broad proposition that the clause
“notwithstanding any other law” is a sign of the “legislature’s express
intent that the statute operate independently of, and take precedence over,
conflicting requirements in other laws.” Glenayre involved the City of
Phoenix’s third-party indemnity claims arising from construction projects.
242 Ariz. at 141 ¶ 1. The defendants argued that A.R.S. § 12-552(A)’s eight-
year statute of repose barred the City’s indemnity claims because that
statute says that, “[n]otwithstanding any other statute,” certain contract
actions can’t be brought more than eight years after the project’s substantial
completion. Id. at 142 ¶ 7. The City responded that A.R.S. § 12-510 exempted
governmental entities from statutes of limitation. Id. at 143 ¶ 14. Our

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Opinion of the Court

Supreme Court held that § 12-552’s use of “notwithstanding any other”
meant it displaced § 12-510’s general exemption and, in doing so,
interpreted that clause according to its plain meaning to apply “broadly and
inclusively to all other statutes.” Id. at 144 ¶¶ 16–18. The court noted it
“d[id] not require the legislature to employ magical passwords to
accomplish its manifest intent.” Id. at 144 ¶ 18 (cleaned up).

¶16 According to the State, Glenayre is distinguishable because
our Supreme Court there resolved a conflict between two “irreconcilable”
statutes: an eight-year statute of repose (A.R.S. § 12-552) and another statute
exempting governmental entities from limitations periods (A.R.S. § 12-510).
This distinction, argues the State, is critical because “there was no way for
the court to give effect to both statutes,” unlike the statutes before us here.
But that distinction has nothing to do with our Supreme Court’s plain
language interpretation of the clause “notwithstanding any other law” as
“appl[ying] broadly and inclusively to all other statutes,” Glenayre, 242 Ariz.
at 144 ¶ 18 (emphasis added), not just those that may be “irreconcilable.”
The legislature did not draft § 13-4296(A) to say, “notwithstanding any
other limitations period,” as the State argues. And “[o]ur task in statutory
construction is to effectuate the text if it is clear and unambiguous.” State v.
Gordon, 261 Ariz. 128, 131 ¶ 12 (2025) (cleaned up).

¶17 We pause here to note just how common the clause
“notwithstanding any other law” is in Arizona’s statutory scheme. Of the
47 operative titles that make up the Arizona Revised Statutes, at least 37
contain at least one statute that includes the clause (with some, like Titles
15 and 36, containing many examples). See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 1-611; 4-116.01;
5-398.01; 6-559; 8-341.02(B); 9-471.03(A), (B); 11-357(A); 12-910(F);
13-824(A); 15-393(N), (P), (T); 16-204(B), (E), (F), (G); 17-302.01; 18-305(A);
19-117; 20-1693.05(A); 22-122(C); 23-212(F); 25-355; 26-105(B); 28-5244(A),
(B); 30-805(A), (B); 31-251(E); 32-1997(A), (C), (D); 33-2401(A); 34-603(K);
35-196.04(A), (B); 36-2986(B), (E); 37-315(A); 38-671(A); 40-360.22(Q);
41-1001.02(C), (D); 42-5009(K), (M), (P), (R); 43-1751; 44-134(A), (B);
45-563.03(A); 48-1019(A); 49-191(A).3 Adopting the State’s proffered
“irreconcilability” standard could thus have serious ramifications for the
operation of everything from the taking of wolves to protect life or property

3 A caveat: our opinion today doesn’t interpret any of these other
statutes. We reference them only as examples of other legislative uses of
“notwithstanding any other law.” How that clause operates within each
statute will turn—as it does here—on statutory context.

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(A.R.S. § 17-302.01) to the confidentiality of medical records of patients
enrolled in our State’s Medicaid program (A.R.S. § 36-2986(E)).

C. By enacting § 13-4296 “notwithstanding any other law,” the
legislature didn’t impliedly repeal § 12-821.01—it created a
narrow statutory exception to § 12-821.01’s general NOC
requirement.

¶18 Next, we reject the State’s contention that applying § 13-4296’s
plain language results in a disfavored “implied repeal” of § 12-821.01.
Section 13-4296(A) doesn’t “repeal” § 12-821.01 in any way. Instead, § 13-
4296 exempts the specific claims it authorizes from § 12-821.01, just as it
exempts those same claims from “any other law” that might work to limit
them in any way.

¶19 Our reasoning isn’t just a judicial declaration of the law. The
manual governing legislative drafting describes “notwithstanding” clauses
as “stat[ing] an exception to existing law.” Ariz. Legis. Council, The
Arizona Legislative Bill Drafting Manual 2025–2026 § 4.22; Planned
Parenthood Ariz., Inc., 257 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 24 (citing an earlier version of the
manual with approval). Put differently, § 12-821.01 continues to operate in
full force as to all other claims against Arizona public entities and can
“coexist peacefully” with § 13-4296 because both operate independently of
each other. Associated Minority Contractors of Ariz. v. City of Phoenix, 262 Ariz.
43, 54 ¶ 64 (App. 2026). Implied repeal thus “does not apply.” Id.

¶20 Finally, interpreting § 13-4296(A)’s “notwithstanding” clause
to exempt claims arising under that statute from § 12-821.01’s NOC
requirement aligns with Boyd. There, we interpreted a statutory
amendment creating an exception to § 12-821’s general one-year statute of
limitations for minor victims of sexual abuse. 256 Ariz. at 470 ¶ 1. The
amendment created a one-time-only exception for those whose claims may
have otherwise been barred:

Notwithstanding any other law, a cause of action for damages
described in subsection A, paragraph 1 of this section that
involves sexual conduct or sexual contact and that would be
time barred under section 12–514, Arizona Revised Statutes,
as added by this act, or that would otherwise be time
barred because of an applicable statute of limitations, a claim
presentation deadline or the expiration of any other time limit is
revived and may be commenced before December 31, 2020.

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Id. at 472 ¶ 11 (emphases in original). Relevant here, the plaintiff in Boyd
argued the amendment “supersede[d] all of § 12-821.01(A)’s notice of claim
requirements.” Id. at 473 ¶ 15. Interpreting this amendment, we found
otherwise, noting the legislature specifically identified claims that would
“otherwise be time barred because of . . . a claim presentation deadline.” Id.
at 472 ¶ 11. We reasoned that “[i]f the legislature had used the phrase ‘claim
presentation requirements’ instead of ‘claim presentation deadlines,’ then
[plaintiff]’s argument would be more compelling.” Id. at 473 ¶ 15. In the
end, we held that the plaintiff needed to file an NOC for his revived claim.
Id.

¶21 The amendment at issue in Boyd looks nothing like § 13-4296.
True, both begin with “notwithstanding any other law.” In Boyd, however,
that broad language modified, among other things, “a claim presentation
deadline.” 256 Ariz. at 473 ¶ 15. The “notwithstanding” language in § 13-
4296, in contrast, modifies the normal process for suing the State and
implements a new one solely to address erroneous conviction claims. See
A.R.S. § 13-4296(A), (B), (D). We cannot ignore this material textual
difference. Far from disregarding Boyd as the State posits, our and the
superior court’s interpretation of § 13-4296 follows Boyd’s central lesson: we
must give effect to the “words the legislature chose to use.” Boyd, 256 Ariz.
at 471 ¶ 9.

¶22 Because § 13-4296’s plain language is unambiguous, “we go
no further.” RLI Ins. v. Nat’l Constr. & Dev., Inc., 258 Ariz. 504, 509 ¶ 14 (App.
2024). We thus need not address the State’s alternative argument that the
policies underlying the NOC requirement support requiring an NOC here.
At bottom, Aguirre wasn’t required to file an NOC before filing his claim
under § 13-4296, and the superior court didn’t err when it denied the State’s
motion to dismiss.

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CONCLUSION

¶23 Whether and when to require those with claims against public
entities like the State to first file an NOC is a policy decision our constitution
entrusts to the legislature. Because the legislature enacted § 13-4296 and
authorized eligible claimants to file claims with the inclusive clause
“notwithstanding any other law” without further qualification, we
presume the legislature meant what it said. We thus accept special action
jurisdiction, deny relief, and award Aguirre his costs under A.R.S. § 12-341
subject to his compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure
21(b).

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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