Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Goddard v. Superior Court, 956 P.2d 529.

42 citing documents.

  • State of Arizona v. Ronald David Castillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
  • State of Arizona v. Ronald David Castillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
    See §§ 13-3407(A)(1), (2), (B)(1), (2), 13-3408(A)(1), (2), (B)(1), (2), 13-901.01(C); Foster, (differentiating “non-commercial” from “commercial or potentially commercial” possession); ¶¶ 9-10 (App. 1998) (noting legislative distinction between possession and possession for sale), disapproved on other grounds by Green
  • State v. Hernandez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • State v. Hernandez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 69 (“Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings.”); Goddard v. Superior Court (Romley), ¶ 8 (App. 1998).
  • State of Arizona v. David Lee Green 459 P.3d 45 Ariz. 2020
  • State of Arizona v. David Lee Green 459 P.3d 45 Ariz. 2020
    -05 ¶¶ 7-8, 14 (App. 1998) (holding that convictions for possession of drugs for sale count as strikes under § 13-901.01 despite language explicitly excluding possession for sale in subsection (C)); ¶ 6 (App. 2000) (reasoning that it is illogical to apply § 13-9
  • State v. Green 431 P.3d 599 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
  • State v. Green 431 P.3d 599 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
    State v. Thomas , , ¶ 1, ; Goddard v. Superior Court , , ¶ 9
  • Villasenor v. Evans 386 P.3d 1273 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Villasenor v. Evans 386 P.3d 1273 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    must be consistent with both the general intent of the claims statutes and the intent of the specific statute involved.”); Goddard v. Superior Court (Romley), ¶ 8 , (“Although the statutory language, read in isolation, is susceptible to that construction, we decline to interpret the statute in a manner so contrary to common sense.
  • State of Arizona v. Daniel Diaz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State of Arizona v. Daniel Diaz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
    Citing Goddard v. Superior Court, 191 Ariz. 402, P.2d 327 (App. 1980), the state urges that we look beyond the language of the statute to avoid this outcome.
  • In Re Reymundo F. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
  • In Re Reymundo F. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
    the system of related statutes of which it forms a part.’” (alteration in Rodriguez); see also State ex rel.
  • Raney v. Lindberg 76 P.3d 867 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
  • Raney v. Lindberg 76 P.3d 867 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
    County of Maricopa, ¶ 2 , ¶ 2 , , ¶ 1 , Baker, 190 Ariz. at 338 , 947 P.2d at 912 ; Bolton, 190 Ariz. at 202 , 945 P.2d at 1333 .
  • State of Arizona v. Victor David Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
  • State of Arizona v. Victor David Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
    the system of related statutes of which it forms a part.”
  • State v. Christian 47 P.3d 666 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
  • State v. Christian 47 P.3d 666 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
    § 13-901.01(B), (G); ¶ 14
  • State v. Ossana 18 P.3d 1258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
  • State v. Guillory 18 P.3d 1261 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
  • State v. Ossana 18 P.3d 1258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
  • State v. Guillory 18 P.3d 1261 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
  • In Re Moises L. 18 P.3d 1231 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
  • In Re Moises L. 18 P.3d 1231 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
    ¶ 8 , (declining to interpret statute in “a manner so contrary to common sense”).
  • State v. Pereyra 18 P.3d 146 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
  • State v. Pereyra 18 P.3d 146 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
    Foster, 196 Ariz. at 233, ¶7 , 995 P.2d at 275 ; Goddard v. Superior Court (Romley), ¶ 9
  • Keenen v. Biles 17 P.3d 111 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
  • Keenen v. Biles 17 P.3d 111 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
    We interpret the statute “by reference to its stated purpose and by reference to the system of related statutes of which it forms a part.” ¶ 8 , (citations omitted).
  • State v. Estrada 4 P.3d 438 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • State v. Estrada 4 P.3d 438 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
    The trial court, however, believed itself bound to impose a
  • Park Central Mall, LLC v. Maricopa County 4 P.3d 1075 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • Park Central Mall, LLC v. Maricopa County 4 P.3d 1075 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
    ¶ 8 , ¶ 8 (1998) (“Statutes relating to the same subject ...
  • Foster v. Irwin 995 P.2d 272 Ariz. 2000
  • Foster v. Irwin 995 P.2d 272 Ariz. 2000
    -05 , -32 (App.1998) (noting distinction made by drafters and voters between possession for use and possession for other purposes).
  • Stubblefield v. Trombino 4 P.3d 437 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • Stubblefield v. Trombino 4 P.3d 437 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • Gray v. Irwin 987 P.2d 759 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • Gray v. Irwin 987 P.2d 759 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
    See, -05 , -32 (App.1998), review denied (May 19, 1998), (holding that convictions for possession of drugs for sale may be considered when sentencing pursuant to A.R.S.
  • Mejia v. Irwin 987 P.2d 756 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • Mejia v. Irwin 987 P.2d 756 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
    -05 , -32 (App.1998) (holding that a person twice convicted of possession of drugs for sale did not fall within the scope of A.R.S.