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Opinions in Arizona that cite Circle K Stores, Inc. v. Apache County, 18 P.3d 713.

38 citing documents.

South Point v. Ador Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
South Point v. Ador Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
See Circle K Stores, ¶ 13 (App. 2001).
Smith v. Stick Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Smith v. Stick Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
See Circle K Stores, ¶ 18 (App. 2001) (“By declining to define a statutory term, the legislature generally intends to give the ordinary meaning to the word.”).
Vangilder v. Pinal County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Vangilder v. Pinal County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Because the term “modified rate” appears nowhere else in Arizona’s tax code, we will apply the “natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning as understood and used by the people.” Circle K Stores, ¶ 11 (App. 2001) (citing Airport Props.
General Motors Corp. v. Maricopa County 350 P.3d 841 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
General Motors Corp. v. Maricopa County 350 P.3d 841 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis 290 P.3d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis 290 P.3d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Circle K Stores, ¶ 7 , (stating that this Court is not bound by the superior court’s interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision).
State of Arizona v. John David Franklin, Sr. & John David Franklin, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State of Arizona v. John David Franklin, Sr. & John David Franklin, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
See Circle K Stores, (if plain language of constitutional provision “clear and unambiguous, we generally subscribe to that meaning” and “may not use extrinsic evidence to vary a provision‟s apparent meaning”).
State v. Rios 237 P.3d 1052 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State v. Rios 237 P.3d 1052 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Fell, 210 Ariz. at 560-61, ¶ 25 , 115 P.3d at 600-01 ; Circle K Stores, ¶ 22 , ( , ).
Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 211 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 211 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Dowling v. Stapley 179 P.3d 960 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Dowling v. Stapley 179 P.3d 960 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
See Lake Havasu City v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., -54, ¶ 16 , -04 (App.2002) (utilizing common dictionary definitions when no statutory definition is provided); Circle K *85 Stores, ¶ 18 , (“By declining to define a statutory term, the legislature generally intends to give the ordinary meaning to the word.”) ( ¶ 6 , ).
Heath v. Kiger 176 P.3d 690 Ariz. 2008
Heath v. Kiger 176 P.3d 690 Ariz. 2008
¶ 11, (finding that a Webster’s dictionary definition, which defined “taxpayer” as “[o]ne that pays or is liable for a tax,” reflected the ordinary meaning of the term as understood by the populace).
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 175 P.3d 700 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
STATE EX REL. DEPT. OF ECON. SEC. v. Lee 175 P.3d 85 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 175 P.3d 700 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
STATE EX REL. DEPT. OF ECON. SEC. v. Lee 175 P.3d 85 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
§ 1-213 (2002); see also Circle K Stores, ¶ 18 , ("By declining to define a statutory term, the legislature generally intends to give the ordinary meaning to the word.") ( ¶ 6 , ).
Sheehan v. Flower 170 P.3d 288 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Sheehan v. Flower 170 P.3d 288 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
§ 1-213 (2002); see also Circle K. Stores, ¶ 18 , (“By declining to define a statutory term, the legislature generally intends to give the ordinary meaning to the word.” ( ¶ 6 , )).
Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 121 P.3d 843 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 121 P.3d 843 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Nordstrom, Inc. v. Maricopa County 88 P.3d 1165 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Nordstrom, Inc. v. Maricopa County 88 P.3d 1165 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Opinions of the tax court are due our respect, but we are not bound by the tax court’s interpretation of a statute, Circle K Stores, ¶ 7 , and we independently review the tax court’s statutory interpretations.
University Physicians, Inc. v. Pima County 75 P.3d 153 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
University Physicians, Inc. v. Pima County 75 P.3d 153 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
v. State, -11, ¶ 7 , -06 (App. 2001); see also Circle K Stores, ¶ 7
Maricopa County v. Kinko's Inc. 56 P.3d 70 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Maricopa County v. Kinko's Inc. 56 P.3d 70 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
We recently interpreted this constitutional provision in Circle K Stores, , holding that the word “taxpayer” as used in Article 9, Section 2(6) of the Constitution and in former Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 42-280 (repealed 1999) meant the owner of the property who pays taxes, thereby limiting the taxpayers in that case to a single, statewide exemption
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blue Line Distributing, Inc. 43 P.3d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blue Line Distributing, Inc. 43 P.3d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
University Medical Center Corp. v. Department of Revenue 36 P.3d 1217 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
University Medical Center Corp. v. Department of Revenue 36 P.3d 1217 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
See Circle K Stores, -06, ¶ 8 , -17 (App.2001).

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