Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite SEMPRE LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. Maricopa County, 235 P.3d 259.

28 citing documents.

Bsi v. Adot Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
Bsi v. Adot Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
See Sempre Ltd. P’ ¶ 5 (App. 2010) (recognizing that the language used is “the most reliable indicator” of its meaning).
Anthony Garcia v. Hon. butler/state 487 P.3d 256 Ariz. 2021
Anthony Garcia v. Hon. butler/state 487 P.3d 256 Ariz. 2021
nited States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))); see also Sempre Ltd. P’ ¶ 11 (App. 2010) (“When the Legislature has used both ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the same paragraph of a statute, we infer that th
Risas Holdings v. Tackett Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Risas Holdings v. Tackett Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
(Emphasis added); see Sempre Ltd. P’ ¶ 5 (App. 2010) (“We first look to the plain language of the statutes as the most reliable indicator of their meaning.”).
Roi v. Ford 437 P.3d 890 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Roi v. Ford 437 P.3d 890 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Capitol Castings, Inc., ¶ 9 (2004); see also Sempre Ltd. P’ ¶ 5 (App. 2010).
Becker v. Liu Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Becker v. Liu Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
See Sempre Ltd. P’ ¶ 5 (App. 2010).
Walker v. U-Haul Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Walker v. U-Haul Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
See Sempre Ltd. P’ ¶ 5 (App. 2010).
Sun Lakes v. state/ador Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Sun Lakes v. state/ador Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
See also Sempre Ltd. P’ ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (holding that as a general rule, we “presume that an amendment changes the meaning of an existing statute.” (citing McCloe v. Utah Home Fire Ins.
Bsi v. Adot 399 P.3d 696 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Bsi v. Adot 399 P.3d 696 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Sempre Ltd. P’ ¶ 5 (App. 2010).
SolarCity Corp. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 396 P.3d 631 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
SolarCity Corp. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 396 P.3d 631 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Sempre Ltd. P’ , 108 ¶ 5
Sundevil Power Holdings, LLC v. Arizona Department of Revenue 379 P.3d 236 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Sundevil Power Holdings, LLC v. Arizona Department of Revenue 379 P.3d 236 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 13 The primary goal in statutory interpretation is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent, , 339 ¶ 8, with the statute’s plain language as the most reliable indicator of its meaning, Sempre Ltd. P’ , 108 ¶ 5
General Motors Corp. v. Maricopa County 350 P.3d 841 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
General Motors Corp. v. Maricopa County 350 P.3d 841 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 305 , 802 P.2d at 1004 ; Sempre Ltd. P’ ¶ 5
Steven Lane Fuller v. State of Arizona 314 P.3d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Steven Lane Fuller v. State of Arizona 314 P.3d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
f statutory construction that have been viewed as dispositive in our state’s jurisprudence.2 In this case, however, we 2Fuller observes that, when the legislature uses the word “shall” and the word “may” in the same paragraph, we presume lawmakers “acknowledged the difference and intended each word to carry its ordinary meaning.” Sempre Ltd. P’
State v. Bayardi 281 P.3d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
State v. Bayardi 281 P.3d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Co., -70 , -74 (1994) (“When seeking to ascertain the intent of legislators, courts normally give little or no weight to comments made at committee hearings by nonlegisla-tors.”); see also Sempre Ltd. P’ ¶¶ 20-22 , (citing Hayes ).
Burlingame Industries, Inc. v. Maricopa County 263 P.3d 66 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Burlingame Industries, Inc. v. Maricopa County 263 P.3d 66 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
We note that the trial court ruled shortly before we issued our opinion on June 22, 2010, in Sempre Ltd. P’