Cited by

¶24 But even when aggrieved, a party “may nevertheless lack standing to assert particular arguments in attempting to secure a reversal of a judgment.” ¶ 11 (App. 2000).

es the claimant to establish (1) “a substantial relationship to the third person”; (2) “the third person [is] unable to assert the constitutional right on [her] own behalf”; and (3) “the failure to grant the party standing must result in a dilution of the third person’s constitutional rights.” State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., n.2 (1982) (citation omitted); ¶ 16 (App. 2000); Heather A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 1 CA-JV 21-0315, 2022 WL 964084, at *2, ¶ 9 (Ariz. App. Mar.

A judgment aggrieves a party “if it denies that party some personal or property right or imposes on that party some substantial burden or obligation.” ¶ 10 (App. 2000).

Kerr v. Killian , , 217 ¶ 16, , 1137 (App. 2000).

An appellant is only aggrieved by a judgment when “it denies that party some personal or property right or 3 BOSER v. WARE Decision of the Court imposes on that party some substantial burden or obligation.” ¶ 10 (App. 2000).

An appellant is only aggrieved by a judgment when “it denies that party some personal or property right or imposes on that party some substantial burden or obligation.” ¶ 10

“Under the common fund doctrine a court may award attorneys’ fees to counsel for the prevailing side whose efforts in litigation create or preserve a common fund from which others who have undertaken no risk or cost will nevertheless benefit.” –18 ¶ 19, –38 (App. 2000).

“Under the common fund doctrine a court may award attorneys’ fees to counsel for the prevailing side whose efforts in litigation create or preserve a common fund from which others who have undertaken no risk or cost will nevertheless benefit.” –18 ¶ 19, –38 (App. 2000).

A party is “aggrieved” if the judgment “denies that party some personal or property right or imposes on that party some substantial burden or obligation.” ¶ 10 , ( , ).

-18, ¶ 19 , -38 (App.2000).

1 P.3d 434 (App. 2003) (“Kerr V”); P.3d 408 (App. 2001) (“Kerr IV”); P.3d 1133 (App. 2000) (“Kerr III”); P.2d 1173 (App. 1996) (“Kerr II”); P.2d 162 (App. 1994) (“Kerr I”).

e is an equitable exception “to the general rule that, in the absence of statute or contract, each side in a litigated case must bear its own attorneys’ fees,” allowing a court to award attorney fees “to counsel for the prevailing side whose efforts in litigation create or preserve a common fund from which others who have undertaken no risk or cost will nevertheless benefit.” P.2d 246 (App. 1998).

54(d)); ¶ 20 , (finding request for fees under common fund doctrine timely although requested after administrative process).