Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Coursey, 225 P.2d 713.

50 citing documents.

State v. Rios 237 P.3d 1052 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State v. Rios 237 P.3d 1052 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State v. Pandeli 161 P.3d 557 Ariz. 2007
State v. Pandeli 161 P.3d 557 Ariz. 2007
at 452, 568 P.2d at 1264 ( ).
Clean Elections Institute, Inc. v. Brewer 99 P.3d 570 Ariz. 2004
Clean Elections Institute, Inc. v. Brewer 99 P.3d 570 Ariz. 2004
Thus, if one portion of a statute violates the single subject rule, “only that part which is objectionable will be eliminated and the balance left intact.” 3 , see also Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n v. Myers, , (stating that unconstitutional provision of act was severable from remainder of act).
Godoy v. Hantman 67 P.3d 700 Ariz. 2003
Godoy v. Hantman 67 P.3d 700 Ariz. 2003
(“[W]hen a motion to quash an information is granted there is no case pending in the Superior Court until a new information is filed.”); -43 (1955)
Randolph v. Groscost 989 P.2d 751 Ariz. 1999
Randolph v. Groscost 989 P.2d 751 Ariz. 1999
“This court on numerous occasions has held that if part of an act is unconstitutional and by eliminating the unconstitutional portion the balance of the act is workable, only that part which is objectionable will be eliminated and the balance left intact.”
State Compensation Fund v. Symington 848 P.2d 273 Ariz. 1993
State Compensation Fund v. Symington 848 P.2d 273 Ariz. 1993
If the unconstitutional part of a statute can be eliminated and the remaining constitutional part is independent and still workable, then “only that part which is objectionable will be eliminated and the balance left intact.” , see generally 82 C.J.S.
State v. Dykes 789 P.2d 1082 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
State v. Dykes 789 P.2d 1082 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
State v. Jones 689 P.2d 561 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
State v. Jones 689 P.2d 561 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
State v. Watson 586 P.2d 1253 Ariz. 1978
Eastin v. Broomfield 570 P.2d 744 Ariz. 1977
Eastin v. Broomfield 570 P.2d 744 Ariz. 1977
State v. Trotter 514 P.2d 1249 Ariz. 1973
State v. Trotter 514 P.2d 1249 Ariz. 1973
State ex rel. Berger v. Superior Court 491 P.2d 474 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
State ex rel. Berger v. Superior Court 491 P.2d 474 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
State Ex Rel. Berger v. SUPERIOR COURT, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF MARICOPA 476 P.2d 666 Ariz. 1970
State Ex Rel. Berger v. SUPERIOR COURT, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF MARICOPA 476 P.2d 666 Ariz. 1970
*370 , , we said: “This court on numerous occasions has held that if part of an act is unconstitutional and by eliminating the unconstitutional portion the balance of the act is workable, only that part which is objectionable will be eliminated and the balance left intact.
State v. Fenton 472 P.2d 492 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
State v. Fenton 472 P.2d 492 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
Board of Supervisors, Pima County v. Robinson 457 P.2d 951 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
Board of Supervisors, Pima County v. Robinson 457 P.2d 951 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
Alabam’s , 242 P. 658 ; , 194 P. 1101 ; , 146 P. 494 .” 101 Ariz., at 599 , 422 P.2d, at 715 .
Huerta v. Flood 447 P.2d 866 Ariz. 1968
Bowman v. State 445 P.2d 841 Ariz. 1968
Bowman v. State 445 P.2d 841 Ariz. 1968
Selective Life Insurance v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States 422 P.2d 710 Ariz. 1967
Selective Life Insurance v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States 422 P.2d 710 Ariz. 1967
Alabam’s , 242 P. 658 ; , 194 P. 1101 ; , 146 P. 494 .
Kadish v. Kallof 414 P.2d 193 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
Kadish v. Kallof 414 P.2d 193 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
State v. Holden 352 P.2d 705 Ariz. 1960
State v. Holden 352 P.2d 705 Ariz. 1960
State v. Freeman 279 P.2d 440 Ariz. 1955
State v. Freeman 279 P.2d 440 Ariz. 1955
to the effect that when an information had been quashed under the provisions of section 44 — 1013, A.C.A.1939, there is no action pending in the superior court against the defendant until a new information is filed.
State v. Lubetkin 276 P.2d 520 Ariz. 1954
State v. Lubetkin 276 P.2d 520 Ariz. 1954
the identical question here presented was decided in language so clear that it could not be misunderstood.
State v. Thomas 275 P.2d 408 Ariz. 1954
State v. Thomas 275 P.2d 408 Ariz. 1954
that: “ * * * there is no such thing as an ‘arraignment’ in a preliminary hearing, as no plea of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ is required.” In the instant case the apparently voluntary words of the defendant, “I don’t need a lawyer, I am guilty, I killed the woman”, not only had the effect of waiving
State v. Dunivan 266 P.2d 1077 Ariz. 1954
State v. Dunivan 266 P.2d 1077 Ariz. 1954
State v. Kuhnley 242 P.2d 843 Ariz. 1952
State v. Kuhnley 242 P.2d 843 Ariz. 1952
Section 44-1016, A.C.A.1939 (Rule 218); , .
In Re Graham's Estate 239 P.2d 365 Ariz. 1951
In Re Graham's Estate 239 P.2d 365 Ariz. 1951
A , , seems apropos: "`A technicality is a microbe which gets into the procedure of the law and gives justice the blind staggers.'" The Probate Code, section 38-902, A.C.A.