Cited by

The court explained that “demonstrating sobriety is a reasonable and necessary part of the safety assessment in this case, especially [since Brody was] born substance exposed, Father’s relationship with Mother who is known to have a severe substance abuse history, and prior DCS concerns of substance abuse.” –48 n.3 (1971) (“[I]t is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take [a substance] test indicates the defendant’s fear of the results of the test and his consciousness of guilt.”) (quoting Cit

Sec., -79, ¶¶ 26-29 (App. 2010); -48 n.3 (1971) (“[I]t is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take [a breathalyzer] test indicates the defendant’s fear of the results of the test and his consciousness of guilt.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)); (noting the minimal inconvenience of breath testing).

In fact, Butler failed to meaningfully acknowledge the two binding appellate cases authorizing use of the language on the admin per se admonition- Campbell v. Superior Court , , and State v. Brito

Campbell v. Superior Court , , 546, , 689 (1971).

Svendsen, 234 Ariz. at 534 ¶ 19.

–46 (1971) (“In Arizona the use of the highways of this state is a right which all qualified citizens possess subject to reasonable regulation under the police power of the sovereign.”); Mack v. Dellas, 235 67, 71 (1955) (holding a landowner was liable for damages caused by crop dusting to an adjacent property b

See, e.g. , Campbell v. Superior Court , , 549, , 692 (1971).

for the proposition that this Court found "no merit” to a constitutional challenge to the implied consent law.

thout authority of law.” 3 STATE v. NAVARRO Opinion of the Court that requiring a DUI arrestee to exhale into a testing device is a “slight inconvenience” that represents a “burden which such defendant must bear for the common interest.” Berg, 76 Ariz. at 103, 259 P.2d at 266

2 , (finding “no merit” to the argument that Arizona’s implied consent law violates the Fourth Amendment).

1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 ] (1966).”

Ct., –54 (1971); Aleman, 210 Ariz. at 236– 37, ¶¶ 11–12.

Butler, , 302 P.3d at 612 ; , (license suspension proceedings civil in nature).

Code R2-19-119(B)(1) (in administrative matters before office of administrative hearings, “[t]he party asserting a claim, right, or entitlement has the burden of proof”); -51, -94 (1971) (“[I]t is well established in this jurisdiction that in a trial de novo the burden remains the same whether it is in relation to an appeal from the justice court or an appeal from an administrative agency.”).

d “refuses.” This Court held in Campbell v. Superior Court that a refusal occurs when “the conduct of the arrested motorist is such that a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified in believing that such motorist was capable of refusal and manifested an unwillingness to submit to the test.”

§ 28-1321 (2001) (providing implied consent for a blood draw only if the driver is first arrested for a DUI offense); -54 , -97 (1971) (holding that a blood draw pursuant to DUI implied consent law requires probable cause); A.R.S.

*613 ¶ 14 The dissent also derives from the “consent aspect” of the implied consent law a legislative intent to assure uncooperative suspects that no physical force would be used