Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State Land Department v. Tucson Rock and Sand Co., 481 P.2d 867.

44 citing documents.

Planned Parenthood v. Kristin mayes/hazelrigg Ariz. 2024
Planned Parenthood v. Kristin mayes/hazelrigg Ariz. 2024
See, State Land Dep’t. v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co.
State of Arizona v. Daniel Louis Santillanes Ariz. 2024
State of Arizona v. Daniel Louis Santillanes Ariz. 2024
)); State Land Dep’t v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co., (“It is the rule, one so solidly embedded in American jurisprudence to be without exception, that a court will not construe a statute as repealed by implication by another if it can avoid doing so on any reasonable hypothesis.”).
Paulden v. Big Chino Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Paulden v. Big Chino Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State Land Dep’t v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co., (citing cases).
Meyer v. State 436 P.3d 511 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Meyer v. State 436 P.3d 511 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
2579 did not explicitly repeal or supersede the Minimum Wage Act, cf. State Land Dep’t v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co., (a statute expressly repeals another when it “nam[es] .
Cave Creek Unified School District v. Ducey 308 P.3d 1152 Ariz. 2013
Cave Creek Unified School District v. Ducey 308 P.3d 1152 Ariz. 2013
9 CAVE CREEK V. DUCEY Opinion of the Court Although HB 2008 did not expressly state that it repealed, amended, or otherwise changed that directive, cf. State Land Dep’t v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co., (a statute expressly repeals another when it “nam[es] .
Hounshell v. White 199 P.3d 636 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Hounshell v. White 199 P.3d 636 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
See State Land Dep’t v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co., , (“[W]here a statute expressly repeals a specific act, the naming of those to be superseded is indicative of an intention not to repeal or interfere with the operation of others.”).
Peeples, Inc. v. Arizona State Land Department Ex Rel. Anable 59 P.3d 830 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Peeples, Inc. v. Arizona State Land Department Ex Rel. Anable 59 P.3d 830 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
See State Land Dep’t v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co.
Gibbs v. O'Malley Lumber Co. 868 P.2d 355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Gibbs v. O'Malley Lumber Co. 868 P.2d 355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
State Land Dept. v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co.
First Phoenix Realty Investments v. Superior Court 841 P.2d 1390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
First Phoenix Realty Investments v. Superior Court 841 P.2d 1390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
State Land Dep’t v. Tucson Rock and Sand Co.
Pima County by City of Tucson v. Maya Const. Co. 761 P.2d 1055 Ariz. 1988
Pima County by City of Tucson v. Maya Const. Co. 761 P.2d 1055 Ariz. 1988
State Land Dept. v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co.
Kadish v. Arizona State Land Department 747 P.2d 1183 Ariz. 1987
Kadish v. Arizona State Land Department 747 P.2d 1183 Ariz. 1987
193, 195 , (the phrase “such manner as the legislature may direct” does not permit disposal free from § 28 restrictions, but merely gives the legislature authority to regulate the manner in which the lease is made and to set lease terms that do not conflict with § 28), vacated on other grounds
Moore v. City of Page 713 P.2d 813 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Moore v. City of Page 713 P.2d 813 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
§ 9-522 and § 9-537 implicitly repeal Article 2, as “a court will not construe a statute as repealed by implication by another if it can avoid doing so on any reasonable hypothesis.” State Land Department v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co.
Lans v. Mutual Life Insurance 699 P.2d 1299 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
Lans v. Mutual Life Insurance 699 P.2d 1299 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
which holds, in part, [Wjhere statutes in pari materia are in apparent conflict, the customary rules of construction require that they should, as far as possible, be construed in harmony so as to give force and effect to each.
Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad 694 P.2d 299 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad 694 P.2d 299 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
See also State Land Dept. v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co.
Tanner Companies v. Arizona State Land Department 688 P.2d 1075 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
Tanner Companies v. Arizona State Land Department 688 P.2d 1075 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
We conclude that the trial court erred in determining that “common clay” was to be defined with reference to the dictionary and given an “ordinary meaning.” , the issue was whether sand and gravel were properly the subject of a mineral lease under A.R.S.
Cochise County v. Dandoy 567 P.2d 1182 Ariz. 1977
Cochise County v. Dandoy 567 P.2d 1182 Ariz. 1977
State Land Dept. v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co., , , are cited in support of this last assertion.
Farmers Investment Co. v. Pima Mining Co. 523 P.2d 487 Ariz. 1974
Farmers Investment Co. v. Pima Mining Co. 523 P.2d 487 Ariz. 1974
State v. Cassius 520 P.2d 1109 Ariz. 1974
State v. Cassius 520 P.2d 1109 Ariz. 1974
State Land Dept. v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co.
Watkins Cigarette Service, Inc. v. Arizona State Tax Commission 517 P.2d 1089 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
Watkins Cigarette Service, Inc. v. Arizona State Tax Commission 517 P.2d 1089 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
State Land Department v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co.
Shirley v. SUPERIOR COURT IN & FOR COUNTY OF APACHE 513 P.2d 939 Ariz. 1973
Shirley v. SUPERIOR COURT IN & FOR COUNTY OF APACHE 513 P.2d 939 Ariz. 1973
National Union Fire Insurance v. Truck Insurance Exchange 486 P.2d 773 Ariz. 1971
National Union Fire Insurance v. Truck Insurance Exchange 486 P.2d 773 Ariz. 1971
State Land Dept. v. Tucson Rock & Sand
State Ex Rel. Purcell v. Superior Court 485 P.2d 549 Ariz. 1971
State Ex Rel. Purcell v. Superior Court 485 P.2d 549 Ariz. 1971