Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Tucson Industries, Incorporated v. Schwartz, 501 P.2d 936.

43 citing documents.

MacKay v. Auto-Owners Ins Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
MacKay v. Auto-Owners Ins Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
to those who marketed the product, profit from its sale, and have the know- how to remove its defects before placing it in the chain of distribution.” ¶ 10 (App. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Tucson Indus., – 68 (1972)).
Antone v. Greater Arizona Auto Auction, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Antone v. Greater Arizona Auto Auction, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
to those who marketed the product, profit from its sale, and have the know-how to remove its defects before placing it in the chain of distribution.” Tucson Indus., -68, -40 (1972).2 As this broad policy statement suggests, the underlying justification for imposing strict liability is risk/cost spreading to those parties in the distribution chain that are best able to both bear the cost and protect the consumer from 2 We acknowledge that
State Farm Insurance Companies v. Premier Manufactured Systems, Inc. 142 P.3d 1232 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
State Farm Insurance Companies v. Premier Manufactured Systems, Inc. 142 P.3d 1232 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Strict Products Liability and Comparative Fault ¶ 7 The doctrine of strict products liability is “a public policy device to spread the risk from one to whom a defective product may be a catastrophe, to those who marketed the product, profit from its sale, and have the know-how to remove its defects before placing it in the chain of distribution.” Tucson Indus., -68 , -40 (1972).
Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C. 63 P.3d 1040 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C. 63 P.3d 1040 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., , (“The underlying objective of the doctrine [of products liability] was to place the risk of loss on those in the chain of distribution of defective, unreasonably dangerous goods.”) (emphasis added); Tucson Indus., -68 , -40 (1972) (“Strict liability is a policy device to spread the risk from one to whom a defective product may be a catastrophe, to those who marketed the product, profit from its sale, and have the know-how to remove its defects before p
Unique Equipment Co. v. TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc. 3 P.3d 970 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Unique Equipment Co. v. TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc. 3 P.3d 970 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Torres explained that the policy behind strict products liability law is to identify and hold responsible “ ‘those who marketed the product, profit from its sale, and have the know how to remove its defects before placing it in the chain of distribution.’ ” 163 Ariz. at 91 , 786 P.2d at 942 (quoting Tucson Indus., -68 , -40 (1972)).
Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 786 P.2d 939 Ariz. 1990
Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 786 P.2d 939 Ariz. 1990
The majority ordered that the following question be certified to this court: [W]hether a trademark licensor is subject to strict product liability under § 402A of the Restatement (Second)' of Torts (made the law of Arizona in Tucson Industries, , by reason of being either (a) a “manufacturer” or “seller” within the meaning of Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann.
Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Associated Merchandising Corp. 782 P.2d 1187 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Associated Merchandising Corp. 782 P.2d 1187 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
In resolving this issue, Jordan adopted the reasoning set forth in Tucson Industries, -68 , -40 (1972): Strict liability is a public policy device to spread the risk from one to whom a defective product may be a catastrophe, to those who marketed the product, profit from its sale, and have the know-how to remove its defects before placing it in the chain of distribution.
Baroldy v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 760 P.2d 574 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Baroldy v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 760 P.2d 574 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Schneider v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 722 P.2d 321 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Schneider v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 722 P.2d 321 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co. 737 P.2d 365 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co. 737 P.2d 365 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer Company, 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.1974); Tucson Industries
Jones v. Pak-Mor Manufacturing Co. 700 P.2d 819 Ariz. 1985
Jones v. Pak-Mor Manufacturing Co. 700 P.2d 819 Ariz. 1985
Jones v. Pak-Mor Manufacturing Co. 700 P.2d 830 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
Jones v. Pak-Mor Manufacturing Co. 700 P.2d 830 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
Appellant also argues that our courts are retreating from a strict rule of exclusion, , and Tucson Industries
Turner v. MacHine Ice Co. 674 P.2d 883 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 694 P.2d 267 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 694 P.2d 267 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
See e.g. Tucson Indus., , and Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz.App.
Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co. 660 P.2d 1236 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co. 660 P.2d 1236 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
*315 In Tucson Industries, , the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the policy considerations behind the doctrine of strict liability for product defects.
Flory v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc. 633 P.2d 383 Ariz. 1981
Flory v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc. 633 P.2d 383 Ariz. 1981
54 , based on the principles of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(A) (1965), see Tucson Industries
Rayner v. Stauffer Chemical Co. 585 P.2d 1240 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
Rayner v. Stauffer Chemical Co. 585 P.2d 1240 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
It should however be noted that even in a negligence case, the lack of notice of injuries (1) does not establish the fact that no injuries had occurred, and (2) a long history of good fortune does not exclude a conclusion that ordinary prudence requires a warning.”
Sullivan v. Green Manufacturing Co. 575 P.2d 811 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
Sullivan v. Green Manufacturing Co. 575 P.2d 811 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
.” See also Tucson Industries, , and O. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, supra, which also recognized the propriety of bystander suits under § 402A.
Rogers v. Unimac Co., Inc. 565 P.2d 181 Ariz. 1977
Rogers v. Unimac Co., Inc. 565 P.2d 181 Ariz. 1977
Embry v. General Motors Corp. 565 P.2d 1294 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Embry v. General Motors Corp. 565 P.2d 1294 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer Company, 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Tucson Industries
International Harvester Co. v. Chiarello 555 P.2d 670 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
International Harvester Co. v. Chiarello 555 P.2d 670 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
Adroit Supply Co. v. Electric Mutual Liability Insurance 542 P.2d 810 Ariz. 1975
Adroit Supply Co. v. Electric Mutual Liability Insurance 542 P.2d 810 Ariz. 1975