Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Hudson, 331 P.2d 1092.

26 citing documents.

State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
¶ 195 In urging that reversal is required here, , in which we reversed the defendant’s murder conviction and remanded for a new trial because the trial court failed to give an instruction on voluntary intoxication.
State v. Laffoon 610 P.2d 1045 Ariz. 1980
State v. Laffoon 610 P.2d 1045 Ariz. 1980
While the language therein does not comport with the language we have approved previously, , , , , different phraseology alone is insufficient to constitute reversible error.
State v. Morales 587 P.2d 236 Ariz. 1978
State v. Morales 587 P.2d 236 Ariz. 1978
There are, however, opinions of this court which seem to hold that because malice aforethought is the difference between murder and manslaughter “ * * * voluntary intoxication or drunkenness is to be taken into consideration in deternrning the existence or nonexistence of malice aforethought, which distinguishes murder from manslaughter.”
State v. Norman 574 P.2d 491 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
State v. Norman 574 P.2d 491 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
State v. Duke 518 P.2d 570 Ariz. 1974
State v. Duke 518 P.2d 570 Ariz. 1974
State v. Mojarro Padilla 483 P.2d 549 Ariz. 1971
State v. Mojarro Padilla 483 P.2d 549 Ariz. 1971
“The malice which is an essential element to second degree murder means that condition of mind which prompts one to do a wrongful act intentionally, without legal justification or excuse.” , -1095 (1958).
State v. Contreras 481 P.2d 861 Ariz. 1971
State v. Contreras 481 P.2d 861 Ariz. 1971
Such voluntary intoxication or drunkenness is to be taken into consideration in determining the existence or non-existence of malice aforethought, which distinguishes murder from manslaughter.” at 80 , at 1095 (1958).
State v. Kabinto 480 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1971
State v. Kabinto 480 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1971
in which this Court stated: *577 “It is a well-settled general rule that voluntary drunkenness at the time a crime is committed is no defense, [citation] and while mere drunkenness does not excuse an offense it may produce a state of mind in the accused which incapacitates him from forming or en
State v. Clark 434 P.2d 636 Ariz. 1967
State v. Clark 434 P.2d 636 Ariz. 1967
P.2d 1092 (1958), and correctly instructs " the jury that voluntary intoxication is to be ' considered in determining the presence pr absence of malice aforethought,' which dis- ' tinguishes murder from manslaughter.
State v. Saunders 435 P.2d 39 Ariz. 1967
State v. Saunders 435 P.2d 39 Ariz. 1967
riminal by reason of his having been in such condition, but when the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive of intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act.” , we applied this statutory provision as follows: “It is a well-settled, general rule that voluntary drunkenness at the
State v. Schantz 403 P.2d 521 Ariz. 1965
State v. Schantz 403 P.2d 521 Ariz. 1965
3 P.2d 1092 ; , 136 P. 276 .
State v. Roqueni 381 P.2d 757 Ariz. 1963
Distinguished State v. Roqueni 381 P.2d 757 Ariz. 1963
That testimony was unconvincing to the trial judge and is unconvincing to us. 5 P.2d 1092 (1958).
State v. Hudson 358 P.2d 332 Ariz. 1960
State v. Hudson 358 P.2d 332 Ariz. 1960
Our decision reversing the first conviction of second degree murder because of the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the effect of voluntary intoxication on the intent of the defendant to commit murder is reported in , .