Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Maldonado, 373 P.2d 583.
- In re MH 2006-002044 170 P.3d 280 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
- In re MH 2006-002044 170 P.3d 280 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
- State v. Lemming 937 P.2d 381 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
- State v. Medina 949 P.2d 507 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
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State v. Medina
949 P.2d 507
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
(interpreting the predecessor to Ariz. R. of Crim.
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State v. Lemming
937 P.2d 381
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
426' P.2d 633, 634 (1967); , cert.
- Padilla v. SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA, ETC. 652 P.2d 561 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
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Padilla v. SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA, ETC.
652 P.2d 561
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
567 , United States v. Wickham, 618 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1979), or the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevent a fair hearing
- In re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JD-561 638 P.2d 717 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
- In re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JD-561 638 P.2d 717 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
- State v. Filipov 576 P.2d 507 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
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State v. Filipov
576 P.2d 507
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
In order to declare a denial of it * * * [the court] must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevent a fair trial.’ ” , citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 , 62 S.Ct.
- State v. Tacho 555 P.2d 338 Ariz. 1976
- State v. Tacho 555 P.2d 338 Ariz. 1976
- State v. Wright 553 P.2d 667 Ariz. 1976
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State v. Wright
553 P.2d 667
Ariz. 1976
2182 ; State v. McDonald, supra, 111 Ariz. at 162 , ; , but it is one factor to be considered along with the others.
- State v. Lee 519 P.2d 56 Ariz. 1974
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State v. Lee
519 P.2d 56
Ariz. 1974
We have held that the right to a speedy trial commences at the time the accused has been held to answer by a magistrate, , or after an indictment has been returned
- State v. Rodriquez 514 P.2d 1245 Ariz. 1973
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State v. Rodriquez
514 P.2d 1245
Ariz. 1973
State v. Stout, 5 Ariz.App.
- State v. Brannin 514 P.2d 446 Ariz. 1973
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State v. Brannin
514 P.2d 446
Ariz. 1973
This court has held that “ * * * in Arizona the right to a speedy trial as that term is defined in Rule 236 commences at the time an accused has been ‘held to answer’ by a magistrate,” , or after indictment is returned
- State v. Jackson 504 P.2d 976 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
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State v. Jackson
504 P.2d 976
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
We answer in the negative since the right to speedy trial commences at the time the defendant is held to answer by the magistrate, , and ' such right is not violated by failure to bring defendant promptly before a magistrate for the preliminary hearing.
- State v. White 492 P.2d 1217 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
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State v. White
492 P.2d 1217
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
431 , ; , .” He suggests, however, that we reconsider the holding in the two cases and arrive at a contrary conclusion, i. e., that the right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of arrest.
- State v. James 474 P.2d 470 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
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State v. James
474 P.2d 470
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
: “ * * * (Rule 236) of the constitutional provision defined speedy trial in terms of time elapsed after commitment by a magistrate rather than after arrest.
- State v. Gilbert 467 P.2d 63 Ariz. 1970
- State v. Gilbert 467 P.2d 63 Ariz. 1970
- State v. Rhodes 454 P.2d 993 Ariz. 1969
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State v. Rhodes
454 P.2d 993
Ariz. 1969
[May 14, 1969] ; , ; , ; , ; , .
- State v. Tafoya 454 P.2d 569 Ariz. 1969
- State v. Tafoya 454 P.2d 569 Ariz. 1969
- State v. Saiz 447 P.2d 541 Ariz. 1968
- State v. Saiz 447 P.2d 541 Ariz. 1968
- State v. Perez 442 P.2d 125 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
- State v. Perez 442 P.2d 125 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
- State v. Wesley 436 P.2d 627 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
- State v. Wesley 436 P.2d 627 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
- Application of Buccheri 431 P.2d 91 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
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Application of Buccheri
431 P.2d 91
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
It has been held in this state that a “flagrant” (92 Ariz. at 73, ) violation of the counterpart statute, A.R.S.
- State v. Enriquez 430 P.2d 422 Ariz. 1967
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State v. Enriquez
430 P.2d 422
Ariz. 1967
We have stated, “The rule is firmly etablished that the protection afforded by Art. 2, § 24 of the Arizona Constitution and by the Sixth Amendment right under the United States Constitution to a speedy trial, has no application until after a prosecution is commenced or an accused is held to answer.”
- State v. Juarez 427 P.2d 565 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
- State v. Juarez 427 P.2d 565 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
- Dotseth v. Justice Court, Tucson, Precinct No. One 427 P.2d 558 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
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Dotseth v. Justice Court, Tucson, Precinct No. One
427 P.2d 558
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
e continuance from- June 17 to June 20 to procure the services of a certified court reporter has nothing to do with the matter.” Accordingly, for the purposes of this opinion, we assume that the continuance from June 17 to June 20 in the conducting of the subject preliminary hearing was without “good cause,” *427 , holding that, in the absence of a showing that the accused was prejudiced in his defense, the violation of a statute requiring that an accused be brought before a magistrate “ * * * w
- State v. Burrell 426 P.2d 633 Ariz. 1967
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State v. Burrell
426 P.2d 633
Ariz. 1967
and by the Sixth Amendment right under the United States Constitution to a speedy trial, has no application until after a prosecution is commenced or an accused is held to answer, , ; , ; , ; Foley v. United States, 290 F.2d 562 (1961) (8th Cir.) cert.