Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 566 P.2d 293.

34 citing documents.

Special Fund Division v. Arizona Department of Transportation 8 P.3d 412 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Special Fund Division v. Arizona Department of Transportation 8 P.3d 412 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, , (no apportionment if injury aggravates a prior, non-disabling condition); Hester v. Industrial Comm’n, , (prior disability must be permanent to trigger apportionment statute).
Vargas v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 926 P.2d 533 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Vargas v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 926 P.2d 533 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
See Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n
Special Fund Division v. Industrial Commission 897 P.2d 643 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Special Fund Division v. Industrial Commission 897 P.2d 643 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, -96 , -97 (1977) (denying apportionment and imposing entire liability on second injury carrier even though disability aggravated by prior impairment).
Fry's Food Stores v. Industrial Commission 866 P.2d 1350 Ariz. 1994
Fry's Food Stores v. Industrial Commission 866 P.2d 1350 Ariz. 1994
Furthermore, this approach is consistent with our prior treatment of dual-causation cases, see e.g., Ford, , ; Morrison-Knudsen Co., , Tatman, , ; Rev1 , Murray, , ; , and with the underlying purposes of the *270 workers’ compensation
Wiley v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 847 P.2d 595 Ariz. 1993
Wiley v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 847 P.2d 595 Ariz. 1993
See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, , (subsequent employer solely responsible for entire result of aggravation of injury first suffered in prior employment).
Espinosa v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONA 824 P.2d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Espinosa v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONA 824 P.2d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
1, 3 , vacated on other grounds
Vishinskas v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONA 711 P.2d 1247 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Vishinskas v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONA 711 P.2d 1247 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
See generally Morrison-Knudsen Co., , , (citing Morrison-Knudsen).
Pearce Development v. Industrial Commission 712 P.2d 445 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Pearce Development v. Industrial Commission 712 P.2d 445 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Rather, in such circumstances, our courts have refused to apply the doctrine of consequential damages so as to hold the first carrier liable, and instead have imposed liability on the second carrier____ As stated in Morrison-Knudsen [Company, Inc., v. Industrial Commission, , ]: “Although the second injury would have been less severe in the absence of the prior injury, the second employer is held to be solely responsible.” This is merely a specialized application of the principle that an employe
Hoppin v. INDUS. COM'N OF ARIZ. 692 P.2d 297 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
Hoppin v. INDUS. COM'N OF ARIZ. 692 P.2d 297 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
See MorrisonKnudson Company, , , , Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin v. Industrial Commission, 17 Ariz.App.
Professional Furniture Service v. Industrial Commission 650 P.2d 508 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
Professional Furniture Service v. Industrial Commission 650 P.2d 508 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
See Morrison-Knudsen Company
Salt River Project v. Industrial Commission 613 P.2d 860 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Salt River Project v. Industrial Commission 613 P.2d 860 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
that apportionment between two carriers for a single disability cannot occur if the original injury did not result in an earning capacity disability.
O'Donnell v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 609 P.2d 1058 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
O'Donnell v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 609 P.2d 1058 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
In support of this argument, , P.2d 35 (1979), and in particular relies on that portion of Continental Casualty Co. which states: “The decision in Morrison-Knudsen was predicated on the fact that the claimant was able to hold down his job in spite of a d
Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission 595 P.2d 35 Ariz. 1979
Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission 595 P.2d 35 Ariz. 1979
ty, as the loss of one eye, one hand, one foot or otherwise, the percentage of disability for a subsequent injury shall be deter *359 mined by computing the percentage of the entire disability and deducting therefrom the percentage of the previous disability as it existed at the time of the subsequent injury.” This language was construed in Morrison-Knudsen Company
Van Sickle v. Industrial Commission 588 P.2d 857 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
Van Sickle v. Industrial Commission 588 P.2d 857 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
See also: Morrison-Knudsen Company
Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission 594 P.2d 1008 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission 594 P.2d 1008 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
We also held, based on the Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion in Morrison-Knudsen Company, , that apportionment of benefits between the two carriers was not available and that the carrier at the time of the second injury was solely responsible for any benefits following the second accident.
Gates v. Industrial Commission 578 P.2d 602 Ariz. 1978
Gates v. Industrial Commission 578 P.2d 602 Ariz. 1978
Mead v. American Smelting & Refining Co., , , ” Morrison-Knudsen Co.
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission 574 P.2d 1311 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission 574 P.2d 1311 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
Since we conclude that the findings with respect to a new injury were fully supported by the record, and that apportionment is not an available remedy under the recent Supreme Court decision in Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, , we affirm the award.