Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Anderson, 392 P.2d 784.

75 citing documents.

Picaso v. Tucson Unified School District 154 P.3d 364 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Picaso v. Tucson Unified School District 154 P.3d 364 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
*467 ¶ 16 TUSD, , argues “Maribel’s guilty plea [wa]s a full and final adjudication on the merits.” In Anderson , our supreme court, in dealing with the issue of the right of indigent defendants to have appointed counsel, stated that “[t]he effect of a plea of guilty is the same as if the defendant had been tried
State v. McCann 21 P.3d 845 Ariz. 2001
State v. McCann 21 P.3d 845 Ariz. 2001
For example, , we extended the right to counsel in felony matters, recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct.
State v. McCann 3 P.3d 388 Ariz. 2000
State v. McCann 3 P.3d 388 Ariz. 2000
For example, , we extended the right to counsel in felony matters, recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct.
Zarabia v. Bradshaw 912 P.2d 5 Ariz. 1996
Zarabia v. Bradshaw 912 P.2d 5 Ariz. 1996
Ariz. Const. Art. 2, § 24
Quinton v. Superior Court 815 P.2d 914 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Quinton v. Superior Court 815 P.2d 914 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Campa v. Fleming 656 P.2d 619 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
Campa v. Fleming 656 P.2d 619 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
Significantly, , , and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 , 92 S.Ct.
State v. DeLuna 520 P.2d 1121 Ariz. 1974
State v. DeLuna 520 P.2d 1121 Ariz. 1974
* * * “* * * While it is right that the court should indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver, , , this in no way implies that it should refuse to consider the defendant’s request altogether.
State v. Fratus 513 P.2d 373 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
State v. Fratus 513 P.2d 373 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
State v. Franklin, 2 Ariz.App.
State v. Scott 505 P.2d 1390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
State v. Scott 505 P.2d 1390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
For a complete analysis of this Sixth Amendment right to the appointment of counsel, , , Casenote, 8 Ariz.L.Rev., 347, (No. 2 Spring 1967).
Lee v. Superior Court 472 P.2d 34 Ariz. 1970
Lee v. Superior Court 472 P.2d 34 Ariz. 1970
A , , in which we held that under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, it was necessary to appoint counsel for indigents accused of misdemeanors which fell in the category of “serious offense.” If, therefore, the legislature intended to have the Public Defender represent defendants accused of c
State v. Linsner 467 P.2d 238 Ariz. 1970
State v. Linsner 467 P.2d 238 Ariz. 1970
510 , 7 L.Ed.2d 473 ; , ; Cuzick v. State, 4 Ariz.App.
State v. Jelks 461 P.2d 473 Ariz. 1969
State v. Jelks 461 P.2d 473 Ariz. 1969
Burrage v. Superior Court 459 P.2d 313 Ariz. 1969
Burrage v. Superior Court 459 P.2d 313 Ariz. 1969
On appeal to the Superior Court of Mohave County, Judge Frank X. Gordon held a hearing prior to trial, at which he stated that the maximum punishment for the crime charged is five months in jail, a $300 fine, or both; , , the right to court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants is limited to felonies and “serious misdemeanors”; that whether a misdemeanor is “serious” depends upon the potential penalty, the nature of the offense, and the complexity of the case; that the penalty in the instant
State v. Jennings 448 P.2d 59 Ariz. 1969
State v. Jennings 448 P.2d 59 Ariz. 1969
State v. Dean 447 P.2d 890 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
State v. Dean 447 P.2d 890 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
of that prior conviction show that defendant was represented by counsel, or advised of his rights to counsel and waived his right to counsel, before it can be used in the subsequent prosecution.” In denominating a prior conviction for petty theft as a “serious offense” when used for the purpose of enhancing punishment, the Court brought such a , which *511 interpreted the constitutional right to have counsel provided to all prosecutions involving “serious offenses.” In the case before us, it is
State v. McGriff 441 P.2d 264 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
State v. McGriff 441 P.2d 264 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
the Supreme Court recognized that there could be a waiver of the constitutional right to counsel.
State v. Reagan 440 P.2d 907 Ariz. 1968
State v. Reagan 440 P.2d 907 Ariz. 1968
In Arizona the Gideon [supra] rule of fundamental right to counsel has been extended beyond just felony prosecutions to include also prosecution for “serious offenses.” , .
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Superior Court in and for County of Cochise 438 P.2d 424 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Superior Court in and for County of Cochise 438 P.2d 424 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
A waiver is generally defined as the “intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Albert v. Joralemon, 271 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1959)
State v. Borst 154 N.W.2d 888 Minn. 1967
State v. Juarez 427 P.2d 565 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
State v. Juarez 427 P.2d 565 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
Leonard v. Eyman, 1 Ariz.App.
State v. Martin 426 P.2d 639 Ariz. 1967
State v. Martin 426 P.2d 639 Ariz. 1967
You would be doing yourself a disservice and everyone else.” While it is right that the court should indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver, , , this in no way implies that it should refuse to consider the defendant’s request altogether.
State v. Spencer 421 P.2d 886 Ariz. 1966
State v. Spencer 421 P.2d 886 Ariz. 1966
Cuzick v. State 421 P.2d 537 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
Cuzick v. State 421 P.2d 537 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
State v. George 414 P.2d 730 Ariz. 1966
State v. George 414 P.2d 730 Ariz. 1966
Although the right to assistance of counsel in certain phases of a criminal prosecution is fundamental to due process of law, , ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct.
State v. Herman 414 P.2d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
State v. Herman 414 P.2d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
348 , [1965], , [1964]).
State v. Mohon 412 P.2d 79 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966