Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Fenton v. Howard, 575 P.2d 318.
- Az Electric Power v. Djl 2007 443 P.3d 24 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
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Az Electric Power v. Djl 2007
443 P.3d 24
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
§ 12- 349(A)(3); (“Every court has inherent power to do those things which are necessary for the efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.”); –48 (1931) (same); see also Ariz. R. Civ.
- Butler v. Butler Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
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Butler v. Butler
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
¶ 8 (App. 2012) (recognizing that a trial court retains the inherent power to ensure its orders are followed); (“Every court has inherent power to do those things which are necessary for the efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)).
- Elizabeth W. v. State of Arizona 287 P.3d 821 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
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Elizabeth W. v. State of Arizona
287 P.3d 821
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
§§ 12-122, 12-123(B); (“Every court has inherent power to do those things which are necessary for the efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.”); Sheehan 4 v. Flower, (“[A] court may exercise its inherent contemp
- In Re Esther Caplan Trust 265 P.3d 364 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
- Bistrow v. Sova 265 P.3d 364 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
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Bistrow v. Sova
265 P.3d 364
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
See, , -97 (1952) (remanding records dispute and directing documents to be produced “for the private examination of the trial judge in order that the court may determine whether [the documents] are confidential and privileged or whether their disclosure would be detrimental to the best interests of the state.”); , (in camera review is appropriate for balancing a litigant’s need for information against the Conciliation Court’s right to “function effectively” by not disclosing non-privileged infor
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In Re Esther Caplan Trust
265 P.3d 364
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
See, , -97 (1952) (remanding records dispute and directing documents to be produced "for the private examination of the trial judge in order that the court may determine whether [the documents] are confidential and privileged or whether their disclosure would be detrimental to the best interests of the state."); , ( in camera review is appropriate for balancing a litigant's need for information against the Conciliation Court's right to "function effectively" by not disclosing non-privileged info
- STATE EX REL. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS v. Kiger 229 P.3d 264 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
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STATE EX REL. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS v. Kiger
229 P.3d 264
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
("Every court has inherent power to do those things which are necessary for the efficient exercise of its jurisdiction."); , (Inherent powers are those that are "indispensable if a court is to perform the duties s
- Bergeron Ex Rel. Perez v. O'NEIL 74 P.3d 952 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
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Bergeron Ex Rel. Perez v. O'NEIL
74 P.3d 952
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Although it may be trae as a general proposition that trial courts have inherent authority to enter orders that facilitate the orderly and efficient execution of them jurisdiction, , , the supreme court has been given the exclusive power to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court.
- Riley, Hoggatt & Suagee, P.C. v. English 864 P.2d 1042 Ariz. 1993
- Hurles v. Superior Court 849 P.2d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
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Hurles v. Superior Court
849 P.2d 1
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
The “defense-of-policy” response is illustrated by the first of the pertinent cases
- Dunn v. Superior Court 772 P.2d 1164 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
- Criticized Dunn v. Superior Court 772 P.2d 1164 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
- Bain v. SUPER. CT. IN AND FOR MARICOPA CTY. 714 P.2d 824 Ariz. 1986
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Bain v. SUPER. CT. IN AND FOR MARICOPA CTY.
714 P.2d 824
Ariz. 1986
vacated on other grounds, , UDALL & LIVERMORE, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 71.
- Klaiber v. Orzel 714 P.2d 813 Ariz. 1986
- Klaiber v. Orzel 714 P.2d 813 Ariz. 1986
- State Ex Rel. Dean v. CITY COURT, ETC. 598 P.2d 1008 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
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State Ex Rel. Dean v. CITY COURT, ETC.
598 P.2d 1008
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
wherein the court stated: “We hold that a judge does have the right to appear and to be represented in a special action against him, where the judge is a named respondent.” 575 P.2d at 320 .