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¶ 8 (2017) ( ¶ 14 (2017)); (noting trial judges have "a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record").

Determining the credibility of witnesses and finding the facts is primarily the province of the jury, and a judge has no “vote in deciding the case, much less a vote equal to or greater than that of the jurors; but given the judge’s training, experience, and unique vantage point, the judge must have substantial latitude in overseeing the jury verdict.” Id.; (recognizing that we generally afford the trial court wide deference because “[t]he judge sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and has a

Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 49 ¶ 14, 50 ¶ 19; (“[The trial judge] has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.”); (noting that a trial judge, as an extra juror, “must be convinced that the weight

In 1757, Lord Mansfield wrote that “[t]rials by jury, in civil causes, could not subsist now, without a power, somewhere, to grant new trials.” (quoting Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr.

at 53, ¶ 12, 961 P.2d at 451 ( ).

” in weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations “because ‘[t]he [trial] judge sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.’” Cal X-Tra, 229 Ariz. at 403, ¶ 88 (citing Hutcherson, 192 Ariz. at 53, ¶ 12 ().

‘The [fact finder] sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the [decision] which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.’” ( )).

¶17 The trial court has broad discretion to grant a new trial; the court has substantial latitude in deciding whether to upset the verdict because it has seen the witnesses, heard the testimony, and “has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict.” ¶ 12

We afford trial judges great discretion given their “special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.” Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 163

at 53, ¶ 12 , 961 P.2d at 451 ( , ); see also Morrison, 88 Ariz. at 262 , 355 P.2d at 901 (stating that the trial court “must of course have wide discretion because of [its] intimate relation to the trial and primary justice”).

-64 , -87 (1978); Tubbs, 155 Ariz. at 535 , 747 P.2d at 1234 ; Clifton, 134 Ariz. at 348 , 656 P.2d at 637 .

The fact finder “sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.” ¶ 12 , ( , ).

See Hutcherson, 961 P.2d at 451; see also Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 310-11, 802 P.2d at 1009-10

“The judge sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.” , see Creamer, 108 Ariz. at 575 , 503 P.2d at 796 (A court’s “ruling on additur, remittitur, and new trial, because of an inadequate or excessive verdict, will generally be affirmed, because it will nearly always be more soundly based than ours can be.”).

(“If expert witnesses could not rely on information gained through their study of scientific literature because of its hearsay nature, then it would be virtually impossible for any expert to evaluate the facts presented in any lawsuit, because nearly everything a person has learned te

Rule 803(18), Arizona Rules of Evidence