Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Minor v. Cochise County, 608 P.2d 309.

49 citing documents.

Branum v. United Healthcare Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Branum v. United Healthcare Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Natasha S. v. Dep't of Child Safety 442 P.3d 372 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Natasha S. v. Dep't of Child Safety 442 P.3d 372 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Foley v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Foley v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
A. Exhaustion Requirement ¶8 “[A] party must exhaust his administrative remedies before appealing to the courts.”
Creamer v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Creamer v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
(explaining that when an administrative agency is empowered to act, it should be allowed to do so before the courts intervene).
Shaka v. Ryan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Shaka v. Ryan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Hintze v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Hintze v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
If applicable, the trial court lacks jurisdiction “until the administrative process has run its course.” (“[F]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies deprives the superior court of authority to hear the party's claim.”).
Anderson v. Prescott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Anderson v. Prescott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
(“It is a well recognized principle of law that a party must exhaust his administrative remedies before appealing to the courts.”).
Stagecoach Trails MHC, L.L.C. v. City of Benson 295 P.3d 943 Ariz. 2013
Stagecoach Trails MHC, L.L.C. v. City of Benson 295 P.3d 943 Ariz. 2013
¶14 A party must exhaust available administrative remedies “before appealing to the courts.”
Freeport McMoran Corporation v. Langley Eden Farms, LLC Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Freeport McMoran Corporation v. Langley Eden Farms, LLC Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
¶7 -72, -11 (1980), our supreme court considered whether the appellants had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a special action to set aside the county planning department‟s issuance of a building permit for a chemical manufacturing plant, instead of appealing to the board
Canyon Del Rio Investors, L.L.C. v. City of Flagstaff 258 P.3d 154 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Canyon Del Rio Investors, L.L.C. v. City of Flagstaff 258 P.3d 154 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Aegis of Arizona, L.L.C. v. Town of Marana 81 P.3d 1016 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Aegis of Arizona, L.L.C. v. Town of Marana 81 P.3d 1016 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Moulton v. Napolitano 73 P.3d 637 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Moulton v. Napolitano 73 P.3d 637 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Southwest Soil Remediation, Inc. v. City of Tucson 36 P.3d 1208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
Southwest Soil Remediation, Inc. v. City of Tucson 36 P.3d 1208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
A party must exhaust available administrative remedies “before appealing to the courts.”
Phoenix Children's Hospital v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System Administration 987 P.2d 763 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Phoenix Children's Hospital v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System Administration 987 P.2d 763 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
(rejecting argument that exhaustion would be futile when there was “nothing in the record which would indicate that the [administrative board] would not have seriously considered appellants’ position”).
Southwestern Paint & Varnish Co. v. Arizona Department of Environmental Quality 976 P.2d 872 Ariz. 1999
Hamilton v. State 925 P.2d 731 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Hamilton v. State 925 P.2d 731 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
(“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by the administrative agency alone.”); , Campbell v. Mountain States Tel.
Owens v. City of Phoenix 884 P.2d 1100 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Owens v. City of Phoenix 884 P.2d 1100 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Third & Catalina Associates v. City of Phoenix 895 P.2d 115 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Third & Catalina Associates v. City of Phoenix 895 P.2d 115 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Estate of Bohn v. Waddell 848 P.2d 324 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Estate of Bohn v. Waddell 848 P.2d 324 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
U.S. Parking Systems v. City of Phoenix 772 P.2d 33 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
U.S. Parking Systems v. City of Phoenix 772 P.2d 33 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
appellees argue that the interpretation of a zoning ordinance is properly a function of the board of adjustment.
Transamerica Financial Corp. v. Superior Court 746 P.2d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Transamerica Financial Corp. v. Superior Court 746 P.2d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Book-Cellar, Inc. v. City of Phoenix 721 P.2d 1169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
Book-Cellar, Inc. v. City of Phoenix 721 P.2d 1169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
St. Mary's Hospital & Health Center v. State 721 P.2d 666 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
St. Mary's Hospital & Health Center v. State 721 P.2d 666 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
459, 463 , 82 L.Ed.2d 638 (1938); Breeland v. Southern Pacific Company, 231 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.1955)
Farmers Investment Co. v. Arizona State Land Department 666 P.2d 469 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
Farmers Investment Co. v. Arizona State Land Department 666 P.2d 469 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
Bettwy v. Black Canyon Greyhound Park, Inc.
City of Tucson v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC. 619 P.2d 33 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1980
City of Tucson v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC. 619 P.2d 33 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1980