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Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Watts v. Golden Age Nursing Home, 619 P.2d 1032.

29 citing documents.

  • Derek D. Fraser v. State of Arizona Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
  • Derek D. Fraser v. State of Arizona Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
  • Garsha v. Hill Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
  • Garsha v. Hill Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
    The “conduct necessary to sustain an [IIED] claim falls at the very extreme edge of the spectrum of possible conduct.” see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt.
  • Snyder v. banner/goel Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • Snyder v. banner/goel Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    See Ford, 153 Ariz. at 43, 734 P.2d at 585 (analyzing jury verdict against defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd., (reversing grant of summary judgment on intentional infliction claim); (affirming directed verdict against plaintiff on intentional infliction claim).
  • Guerra v. State 323 P.3d 765 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • Guerra v. State 323 P.3d 765 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • Knoell v. Cerkvenik-Anderson Travel, Inc. 891 P.2d 861 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
  • Knoell v. Cerkvenik-Anderson Travel, Inc. 891 P.2d 861 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
    Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46
  • Nelson v. Phoenix Resort Corp. 888 P.2d 1375 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • Nelson v. Phoenix Resort Corp. 888 P.2d 1375 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
    Even if a defendant’s conduct is unjustifiable, it does not necessarily rise to the level of “atrocious” and “beyond all possible bounds of decency” that would cause an average member of the community to believe it was “outrageous.” Ford v. Revlon, Inc., , Lucchesi, 149 Ariz. at 78 , 716 P.2d at 1015 ; , (unjustifiable delay in failing to notify wife of husband’s terminal illness was not outrageous); , (false accusations against police officer not outrageous conduct justifying claim for emotiona
  • Gonzales v. Palo Verde Mental Health Services 783 P.2d 833 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
  • Gonzales v. Palo Verde Mental Health Services 783 P.2d 833 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
    The conduct required to support a cause of action for infliction of emotional distress “falls at the very extreme edge of the spectrum of possible conduct.”
  • Pankratz v. Willis 744 P.2d 1182 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • Pankratz v. Willis 744 P.2d 1182 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
    Beyond that appellants stress the court’s , that the atrocious and utterly intolerable conduct that is actionable under § 46 is a “quite narrow range” of conduct “at the very extreme edge of the spectrum of possible conduct.” 127 Ariz. at 258, 619 P.2d at 1035.
  • Ford v. Revlon, Inc. 734 P.2d 580 Ariz. 1987
  • Ford v. Revlon, Inc. 734 P.2d 580 Ariz. 1987
    accord Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F.Supp.
  • Hirsch v. Cooper 737 P.2d 1092 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
  • Hirsch v. Cooper 737 P.2d 1092 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
    It must be conduct “at the very extreme edge of the spectrum of possible conduct.”
  • Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd. 716 P.2d 1013 Ariz. 1986
  • Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd. 716 P.2d 1013 Ariz. 1986
  • Helfond v. Stamper 716 P.2d 70 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
  • Helfond v. Stamper 716 P.2d 70 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
    tion of emotional distress as follows: “The defendant’s conduct must be capable of being characterized as ‘extreme and outrageous;’ the defendant must either intend to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregard the near certainty that such distress will result from his conduct; severe emotional distress must indeed occur as a result of defendant’s conduct.”
  • Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd. 716 P.2d 1022 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
  • State v. Mincey 687 P.2d 1180 Ariz. 1984
  • State v. Mincey 687 P.2d 1180 Ariz. 1984
  • State v. Roberts 677 P.2d 280 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
  • State v. Roberts 677 P.2d 280 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983