Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. B Bar Enterprises, Inc., 649 P.2d 978.

63 citing documents.

  • Lenk v. Monolithic Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • Lenk v. Monolithic Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    See State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., n.2 (1982).
  • Knight v. Fontes Ariz. 2025
  • Knight v. Fontes Ariz. 2025
    County of Maricopa, ¶ 8 (2014); State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., n.2 (1982) (“Arizona has no analog to the case or controversy provision in its [C]onstitution, and our reluctance to consider issues raised where there is no standing is solely a rule of judicial restraint.”).
  • In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.A. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.A. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    Standing to protect a third person’s constitutional rights requires the claimant to establish (1) “a substantial relationship to the third person”; (2) “the third person [is] unable to assert the constitutional right on [her] own behalf”; and (3) “the failure to grant the party standing must result in a dilution of the third person’s constitutional rights.” State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., n.2 (1982) (citation omitted); ¶ 16 (App. 2000); Heather A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 1 CA-JV 21-0315, 2022 WL
  • Ernest v. Carylee W. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • Ernest v. Carylee W. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    To assert a constitutional challenge, an individual must have suffered “some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action.” State v. B Bar Enterprises, Inc., n.2 (1982) ().
  • Heather A., Jared M. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • Heather A., Jared M. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    have suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action.” State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., n.2 (1982) (cleaned up).
  • Advanced Property Tax Liens, Inc. v. Jorge Othon Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2021
  • Advanced Property Tax Liens, Inc. v. Jorge Othon Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2021
    10As our supreme court has explained, “standing is not a constitutional jurisdictional requirement in the state courts of Arizona,” and “our reluctance to consider issues raised where there is no standing is solely a rule of judicial restraint.” State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., n.2 (1982).
  • A.S., Zeth W. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • A.S., Zeth W. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
    See Hirsch v. Nat'l Van Lines, Inc., ("[I]t is a highly desirable legal objective that cases be decided on their merits and that any doubts should be resolved in favor of the party seeking to set aside the default judgment."); State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., n.2 (1982) (addressing merits because "standing is not a constitutional jurisdictional requirement" in Arizona and other party failed to raise the issue on appeal).
  • State v. Reed 435 P.3d 1044 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • State v. Reed 435 P.3d 1044 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
    State v. B Bar Enters., Inc. , , 101 n.2, , 980 (1982).
  • Doty-Perez v. Doty-Perez 426 P.3d 1208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • Doty-Perez v. Doty-Perez 426 P.3d 1208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    see also State v. B Bar Enters., Inc. , , 101 n.2, , 980 (1982) ("standing is not a constitutional jurisdictional requirement in the state courts of Arizona").
  • Aea v. T&K Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Aea v. T&K Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    See State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., n.2, n.2 (1982).
  • Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission v. Brain 311 P.3d 1093 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
  • Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission v. Brain 311 P.3d 1093 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
    in Ariz., , )); see also Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n, 148 Ariz. at 6 , 712 P.2d at 919 (“We have previously determined that the question of standing in Arizona is not a constitutional mandate since we have no counterpart to the ‘case or controversy' requirement of the federal constitution.” (citing State v. B Bar Enters., , )).
  • State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis 290 P.3d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
  • State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis 290 P.3d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
    State v. B Bar Enters., , 101 n. 2, , 980 n. 2 (1982).
  • STATE, EX REL. HORNE v. Campos 250 P.3d 201 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
  • STATE, EX REL. HORNE v. Campos 250 P.3d 201 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
    -26, ¶ 5 , -61 (App.2003) (standing is not a jurisdictional doctrine under Arizona law; State’s failure to raise standing in trial court constituted waiver of the issue); cf. State v. B Bar Enters., , 101 n.2, , 980 n.2 (1982) (standing is not a constitutional jurisdictional requirement and Arizona courts may consider questions despite lack of standing); see also Azabdaftari v. Mayer, 734 F.Supp.2d 51 , 53 n.3 (D.D.C.2010) (federal civil forfeiture statute does not explicitly state its exhaustio
  • Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc. 108 P.3d 917 Ariz. 2005
  • Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc. 108 P.3d 917 Ariz. 2005
    in Ariz., (citing State v. B Bar Enters., P.2d 978 (1982)), and thus, when addressing questions of standing “we are confronted only with questions of prudential or judicial restraint.” Id.
  • State v. Thompson 34 P.3d 382 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
  • State v. Thompson 34 P.3d 382 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
    State v. B Bar Enterprises, Inc., , 101 n. 2, , 980 n. 2 (1982).
  • Kerr v. Killian 3 P.3d 1133 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • Kerr v. Killian 3 P.3d 1133 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
    See State v. B Bar Enterprises, Inc., , 101 n. 2, , 980 n. 2 (1982).
  • Blanchard v. Show Low Planning & Zoning Commission 993 P.2d 1078 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • Blanchard v. Show Low Planning & Zoning Commission 993 P.2d 1078 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
    ¶ 19 Our supreme court has determined that “the question of standing in Arizona is not a constitutional mandate since we have no counterpart to the ‘case or controversy 5 requirement of the federal constitution.” Armory Park, 148 Ariz. at 6 , 712 P.2d at 919 (quoting State v. B Bar Enter., , ).
  • Martin v. Reinstein 987 P.2d 779 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • Martin v. Reinstein 987 P.2d 779 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
    ¶78 Because standing is not a constitutional jurisdictional requirement in Arizona, see State v. B Bar Enterprises, Inc., , 100 n. 2, , 980 n. 2 (1982), we find that the Petitioners have standing to challenge the Act on overbreadth and vagueness grounds.
  • Town of Miami v. City of Globe 985 P.2d 1035 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
  • Town of Miami v. City of Globe 985 P.2d 1035 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
    Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Community Servs., , State v. B Bar Enterprises
  • Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. 978 P.2d 119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
  • Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. 978 P.2d 119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
    See State v. B Bar Enterprises, Inc.
  • Sears v. Hull 961 P.2d 1013 Ariz. 1998
  • Sears v. Hull 961 P.2d 1013 Ariz. 1998
    ¶ ¶ 28 State v. B Bar Enterprises, , a case relied upon by the Sears, actually involved circumstances quite different from those of this action.
  • City of Tucson v. Woods 959 P.2d 394 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • City of Tucson v. Woods 959 P.2d 394 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
    State v. B Bar Enterprises, Inc., , 101 n. 2, , 980 n. 2 (1982).
  • Toy v. Katz 961 P.2d 1021 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • Toy v. Katz 961 P.2d 1021 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
    State v. B. Bar Enterprises, Inc., , 101 n. 2, , 980 n. 2 (1982).
  • Father in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-114487 v. Adam 876 P.2d 1121 Ariz. 1994
  • Matter of Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action 876 P.2d 1121 Ariz. 1994
  • Father in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-114487 v. Adam 876 P.2d 1121 Ariz. 1994
    Inc., , (for jurisdictional purposes, standing is not a constitutional requirement in Arizona courts; if not raised, a court may consider the merits); Ariz.R.Civ.P.
  • Matter of Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action 876 P.2d 1121 Ariz. 1994
    Inc., , (for jurisdictional purposes, standing is not a constitutional requirement in Arizona courts; if not raised, a court may consider the merits); Ariz.R.Civ.P.