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Amendment is generally permissible when it “seeks no more than to add a new legal theory supported by factual issues already in the case.”

¶ 13 (2015) (cleaned up) () (“Prejudice is the inconvenience and delay suffered when the amendment raises new issues or inserts new parties into the litigation.”).

bjecting party fails to satisfy the court that the evidence would unfairly prejudice that party’s claim or defense on the merits.” Although a court should freely grant leave to amend when justice requires, “notice and substantial prejudice to the opposing party are critical factors in determining whether an amendment should be granted.” JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 355 ().

P. 15(a)(2) (“Leave to amend must be freely given when justice requires.”); Bishop v. State Dep’t of Corr., –75 (App. 1992); ¶ 26 (App. 1999) (explaining the court should grant a non-moving party the opportunity to amend a complaint “if such an amendment cures its defects”).

P. 15(a)(2) (“Leave to amend must be freely given when justice requires.”); Bishop v. State Dep’t of Corr., -75 (App. 1992); ¶ 26 (App. 1999) (explaining the superior court should grant a non-moving party the opportunity to amend a complaint “if such an amendment cures its defects”).

First, although courts should freely grant motions to amend in the interests of justice, an eleventh-hour request tends to cause substantial prejudice to other parties, which is a “critical factor” in “determining whether an amendment should be granted.” Owen v. Superior Court (Moroney)

Ct., ¶ 26 (App. 1999) (explaining the superior court should grant a non- moving party the opportunity to amend a complaint “if such an amendment cures its defects”).

P. 15(a)(2), such leave may be denied “when the amendment comes late and raises new issues requiring preparation for factual discovery which would not otherwise have been necessitated nor expected, thus requiring delay in the decision of the case,”

Although a timely motion to substitute will ordinarily be granted, the court may deny the motion if it finds “‘undue’ delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments or undue prejudice to the opposing party,” Owen v. Superior Court of State of Ariz., In & For Maricopa County, or if circumstances have arisen rendering it unfair to allow the substitution, Heredia v. Indus.

Ct., Bishop v. State Dep’t of Corr., –75 (App. 1992); ¶ 26 (App. 1999) (explaining the superior court should grant a non-moving party the opportunity to amend a complaint “if such an amendment cures its defects”); Ariz. R. Civ.

As our supreme court has explained, trial on the merits is favored; therefore, “amendment will be permitted unless there has been undue delay, dilatory action or undue prejudice.” See Owen v. Superior Court (Moroney)

Ct., (quoting Spitz v. Bache & Co., ).

(quoting Hageman v. Signal L. P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1973)).

“Prejudice is the inconvenience and delay suffered when the amendment raises new issues or inserts new parties into the litigation.” (citations omitted).

Our supreme court has endorsed an application of Rule 17(a) that recognizes the discretion of trial courts, under Rule 15(a), to deny leave to amend when “there has been undue delay, dilatory action, or undue prejudice.” See Preston, 226 Ariz. at 394, ¶ 13, 249 P.3d at 774 (quoting Owen v. Superior Court (Donald), ).

A motion to amend should be granted “unless the court finds undue delay in the request, bad faith, undue prejudice, or futility in the amendment.” MacCollum, 185 Ariz. at 185, 913 P.2d at 1103

See Owen v. Superior Court (Donald), (recognizing trial court’s power to deny leave to amend where “there has been undue delay, dilatory action or undue prejudice”).

“[T]he mere fact that the attempt to amend comes late[] is not justification for denial of leave to amend.”

(denial of motion to amend after approximately twenty-seven-month delay reversed); Schoolhouse Educational Aids, , (delay, without more, is not cause to deny motion to amend answer).