Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Park v. Strick, 669 P.2d 78.

38 citing documents.

Muscarella v. Muscarella Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Muscarella v. Muscarella Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Kogan v. tibsherany/murray Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
Kogan v. tibsherany/murray Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
Under Rule 60(b)(6), the superior court can grant relief for reasons other than those explicitly enumerated in Rule 60(b), but only when the public policy for finality of judgments “must give way in extraordinary circumstances.” see also Skydive Ariz., ¶¶ 26–27 (App. 2015) (finding “extraordinary circumstances” applied to a member of the military who failed to respond to the court because he was on active-duty training out-of-state).
State v. Groh Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Groh Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Rule 60(b)(6)”); see also Davis, 143 Ariz. at 59 (declining to adopt any “hard-and-fast rules to determine when there are extraordinary circumstances justifying relief from judgment under [Rule 60(b)(6)]”); (“The need for finality, however, must give way in extraordinary circumstances.”).
Amanti Electric, Inc. v. Engineered Structures, Inc., Western Surety Company Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Amanti Electric, Inc. v. Engineered Structures, Inc., Western Surety Company Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
ESI counters that, because Amanti’s arguments were colorable under clauses (1) and (3) of Rule 60(c), relief was unavailable under clause (6).2 ¶6 “The need for finality [in judgments] must give way in extraordinary circumstances,” and “Rule 60(c)(6) gives the courts ample power to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice,”
Andrew R. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 224 P.3d 950 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Andrew R. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 224 P.3d 950 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
(quoting Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir.1983); , ); ¶ 19 , (recognizing the strong public policy favoring the finality of judgments); , (noting that the six-month limit of Rule 60(c)(i)-(3) "was des
Haroutunian v. Valueoptions Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Haroutunian v. Valueoptions Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Our supreme court, however, holding that a trial court may grant relief under Rule 60(c) by vacating and reentering a judgment when “an aggrieved party establishes lack of knowledge that judgment has been entered, and 34 asserts additional reasons that are so extrao
Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Insurance 151 P.3d 538 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Insurance 151 P.3d 538 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
In Park v. Strick, our supreme court held that relief “may be considered where the party did not have knowledge from any source that judgment had been entered and where there are extraordinary circumstances.”
Decola v. Freyer 6 P.3d 333 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Decola v. Freyer 6 P.3d 333 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
The trial court concluded that defendants’ remedy would be to file a motion with the arbitrator seeking to have the award vacated and re-entered so that a , and Appeal in Pima County
JC Penney v. Lane 3 P.3d 1033 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
JC Penney v. Lane 3 P.3d 1033 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
¶ 13 Two years later, however, , our supreme court accepted jurisdiction of a spe *116 cial action challenging the ruling of the trial court that Vital precluded it from granting Rule 60(c)(6) relief under similar circumstances, such as when a party seeking to appeal has received no notice of entry of the judgment.
Hill v. Maricopa County 950 P.2d 1179 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Hill v. Maricopa County 950 P.2d 1179 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
(holding that “extraordinary,” “unique,” or “compelling” circumstances may justify vacating judgment and re-entry to permit delayed filing of notice of appeal).
Jarostchuk v. Aricol Communications, Inc. 942 P.2d 1178 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Distinguished Jarostchuk v. Aricol Communications, Inc. 942 P.2d 1178 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Defendants cite cases which so hold: , and Geyler .
State v. Benson 833 P.2d 32 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
State v. Benson 833 P.2d 32 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
In re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JS-8441 838 P.2d 1278 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
In re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JS-8441 838 P.2d 1278 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Gorman v. City of Phoenix 731 P.2d 74 Ariz. 1987
Gorman v. City of Phoenix 731 P.2d 74 Ariz. 1987
accord Davis, 143 Ariz. at 59 , 691 P.2d at 1087 .
City of Phoenix v. Geyler 697 P.2d 1073 Ariz. 1985
City of Phoenix v. Geyler 697 P.2d 1073 Ariz. 1985
where we held that Rule 60(c)(6) could be utilized for such a purpose when the “aggrieved party establishes a lack of knowledge that judgment has been entered, and asserts additional reasons that are so extraordinary as to justify relief.
Davis v. Davis 691 P.2d 1082 Ariz. 1984
Davis v. Davis 691 P.2d 1082 Ariz. 1984
As to the motion to vacate judgment
Davis v. Davis 691 P.2d 1102 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
Davis v. Davis 691 P.2d 1102 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
Daou v. Harris 678 P.2d 934 Ariz. 1984
Daou v. Harris 678 P.2d 934 Ariz. 1984
In Re the Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile Action No. B-9385 674 P.2d 845 Ariz. 1983
In Re the Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile Action No. B-9385 674 P.2d 845 Ariz. 1983
when we stated: “Rule 77(g) restricts the power of an Arizona trial court to grant Rule 60(c)(6) relief where the only ground is the failure to give or receive the notice required by Rule 77(g).