Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Crimmins v. SUPERIOR CT. IN & FOR MARICOPA CY., 668 P.2d 882.
-
Escobar v. SUPERIOR COURT, MARICOPA CTY.
746 P.2d 39
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
and states that he is not basing his claim on the sufficiency of the evidence but on the grounds that the proceedings denied him his substantial and procedural right to a fair and impartial presentation of evidence.
- Korzep v. Superior Court 746 P.2d 44 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
- State v. Superior Court 751 P.2d 566 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
- State v. Superior Court 751 P.2d 566 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
- State v. Kamin 725 P.2d 1104 Ariz. 1986
- State v. Young 720 P.2d 965 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
-
State v. Young
720 P.2d 965
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
(Feldman, J., specially concurring); , see 1 American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Ch. 3, Standard 3-3.5 (2d ed. 1980).
- State v. Dungan 718 P.2d 1010 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
-
State v. Dungan
718 P.2d 1010
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
Mills did not perjure himself and did not violate the tenets of either U.S. v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.1974)
- State v. Lamb 690 P.2d 764 Ariz. 1984
-
State v. Lamb
690 P.2d 764
Ariz. 1984
Irregularities in the Grand Jury proceedings The defendant next argues “Refusal to disclose [to the Grand Jury] the fact of the Public Defender’s prior representation and the reasons for his removal from the case constitute^] prosecutorial misconduct and a denial of [the defendant’s] right to a fair trial and impartial presentation of the evidence.” , in support of his claim, and insists that, by withholding evidence, the prosecutor controlled the result of the grand jury proceeding.
- Franzi v. Superior Court of Arizona 679 P.2d 1043 Ariz. 1984
- Franzi v. Superior Court of Arizona 679 P.2d 1043 Ariz. 1984
- State v. Coconino Cty. Superior Ct., Div. II 678 P.2d 1386 Ariz. 1984
-
State v. Coconino Cty. Superior Ct., Div. II
678 P.2d 1386
Ariz. 1984
required a new determination of probable cause on Count I, and the trial court also ruled that the insanity statute in effect at the time of the commission of the act would be applied.