Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Green Acres Trust v. London, 688 P.2d 617.
- Fillmore v. MARICOPA WATER PROCESSING 120 P.3d 697 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
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Fillmore v. MARICOPA WATER PROCESSING
120 P.3d 697
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
361 ¶ 7, (judicial proceedings); , (legislative or executive proceedings); , (litigators); , (required by law).
- Safeway Ins. Co., Inc. v. Guerrero 106 P.3d 1020 Ariz. 2005
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Safeway Ins. Co., Inc. v. Guerrero
106 P.3d 1020
Ariz. 2005
(outlining the privilege); Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 57 cmt.
- Safeway Ins. Co., Inc. v. Guerrero 83 P.3d 560 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
- Safeway Ins. Co., Inc. v. Guerrero 83 P.3d 560 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
- State ex rel. Arizona Department of Revenue v. Capitol Castings, Inc. 69 P.3d 29 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
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State ex rel. Arizona Department of Revenue v. Capitol Castings, Inc.
69 P.3d 29
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
For those reasons plus ADOR’s failure to identify any prejudice that it suffered as a result of the delay, -17 , -63 (App.1983), approved in part and vacated in part, , we too reject ADOR’s contention that Capitol failed to move for relief from judgment within a reasonable time.
- RECORP PARTNERS v. Gust Rosenfeld, PLC 8 P.3d 418 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
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RECORP PARTNERS v. Gust Rosenfeld, PLC
8 P.3d 418
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
¶ 6 Appellees moved for dismissal of the claims against them, contending that their statements were absolutely privileged under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (1977)
- Schmitz v. Aston 3 P.3d 1184 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
- Schmitz v. Aston 3 P.3d 1184 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
- Johnson v. McDonald 3 P.3d 1075 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
- Johnson v. McDonald 3 P.3d 1075 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
- Burns v. Davis 993 P.2d 1119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
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Burns v. Davis
993 P.2d 1119
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
While a qualified privilege protects the speaker only for those statements made in good faith, an absolute privilege is much broader, protecting the speaker regardless of his “motive, purpose, or reasonableness.”
- Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce 988 P.2d 143 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
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Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce
988 P.2d 143
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
1 In reaching that conclusion, , and language in Lewis which quoted from the California case of Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal.App.3d 917 , 123 Cal.Rptr.
- Link v. Pima County 972 P.2d 669 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
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Link v. Pima County
972 P.2d 669
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Because absolute immunity is related to a defendant’s status, , usually there are limited factual determinations necessary to resolve the issue.
- Linder v. Brown & Herrick 943 P.2d 758 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
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Linder v. Brown & Herrick
943 P.2d 758
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
plaintiffs brought a defamation action against defendants and their attorneys based on oral and written statements published during a press conference preliminary to the initiation of a class action against plaintiffs.
- Ashton-Blair v. Merrill 928 P.2d 1244 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
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Ashton-Blair v. Merrill
928 P.2d 1244
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
613 n. 1, , 621 n. 1 (1984).
- Darragh v. SUPERIOR CT. IN & FOR CTY. OF MARICOPA 900 P.2d 1215 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
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Darragh v. SUPERIOR CT. IN & FOR CTY. OF MARICOPA
900 P.2d 1215
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Accordingly, absolute privileges allow certain persons, because of their special position or status, to “be as free as possible from fear that their actions in that position might have an adverse effect upon their own personal interest.”
- Carroll v. Robinson 874 P.2d 1010 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
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Carroll v. Robinson
874 P.2d 1010
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
“Once an immunity defense has been raised properly, the court determines whether defendants are entitled to immunity.”
- Lewis v. Oliver 873 P.2d 668 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- Lewis v. Oliver 873 P.2d 668 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- Sanchez v. Coxon 854 P.2d 126 Ariz. 1993
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Sanchez v. Coxon
854 P.2d 126
Ariz. 1993
Western Technologies, Inc. v. Sverdrup & Parcel, Inc., , Todd v. Cox, 20 Ariz.App.
- Miller v. Servicemaster by Rees 851 P.2d 143 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
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Miller v. Servicemaster by Rees
851 P.2d 143
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 594, 596 (1977).
- Lavit v. Superior Court 839 P.2d 1141 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
- Lavit v. Superior Court 839 P.2d 1141 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
- Cahn v. Fisher 805 P.2d 1040 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
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Cahn v. Fisher
805 P.2d 1040
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
vacated in part on other grounds
- London v. Green Acres Trust 765 P.2d 538 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
- London v. Green Acres Trust 765 P.2d 538 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
- Chamberlain v. Mathis 729 P.2d 905 Ariz. 1986
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Chamberlain v. Mathis
729 P.2d 905
Ariz. 1986
However, we have previously held that the defense of immunity “may be properly raised in a motion to dismiss, if the facts establishing the occasion for the privilege 1 appear in the pleadings.” , (footnote added); see also Sierra Madre Dev., Inc. v. Via Entrada Townhouses Ass’n, 20 Ariz.App.
- Hirsch v. Cooper 737 P.2d 1092 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
- Hirsch v. Cooper 737 P.2d 1092 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
- Western Technologies, Inc. v. Sverdrup & Parcel, Inc. 739 P.2d 1318 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
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Western Technologies, Inc. v. Sverdrup & Parcel, Inc.
739 P.2d 1318
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Absolute privileges, commonly associated with defamation actions, recognize that “ ‘conduct which otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability because the defendant is acting in furtherance of some interest of social importance, which is entitled to protection.’ ” , (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 114, p. 776 (footnote omitted)).
- Molever v. Roush 732 P.2d 1105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
- Molever v. Roush 732 P.2d 1105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
- Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 724 P.2d 562 Ariz. 1986
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Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
724 P.2d 562
Ariz. 1986
Of course, the common law also recognized a number of privileges, in some cases allowing recovery only upon a showing of “malice in fact.” Broking, 76 Ariz. at 338 , 264 P.2d at 416