Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Phillips, 430 P.2d 139.
- State v. Finley 501 P.2d 4 Ariz. 1972
- State v. Finley 501 P.2d 4 Ariz. 1972
- State v. Quandt 495 P.2d 158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
- State v. Quandt 495 P.2d 158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
- State v. Gilreath 487 P.2d 385 Ariz. 1971
- State v. Gilreath 487 P.2d 385 Ariz. 1971
- State v. Johnson 484 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1971
- State v. Johnson 484 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1971
- State v. Rackley 477 P.2d 255 Ariz. 1970
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State v. Rackley
477 P.2d 255
Ariz. 1970
1790 , 23 L.Ed.2d 248 ; , ; , , cert.
- State v. Parker 470 P.2d 461 Ariz. 1970
- State v. Parker 470 P.2d 461 Ariz. 1970
- State v. Deschamps 468 P.2d 383 Ariz. 1970
- State v. Deschamps 468 P.2d 383 Ariz. 1970
- State v. Mason 466 P.2d 760 Ariz. 1970
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State v. Mason
466 P.2d 760
Ariz. 1970
1790 , 23 L.Ed.2d 248 ; , , , cert.
- State v. Scott 460 P.2d 3 Ariz. 1969
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State v. Scott
460 P.2d 3
Ariz. 1969
State v. Howe, *111 , , : We take judicial notice of the fact that St.
- State v. Parra 459 P.2d 344 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
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State v. Parra
459 P.2d 344
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
(statutory rape and lewd and lascivious acts) *430 , ; (burglary and theft) , (robbery and grand theft) , , [ 53 A.L.R.2d 619 ] (1955); (burglary and conspiring to commit burglary) , (fellatio and lewd and lascivious conduct based on different acts) State v. Payne, 7 Ariz.App.
- State v. Ortiz 455 P.2d 971 Ariz. 1969
- State v. Ortiz 455 P.2d 971 Ariz. 1969
- State v. Propp 455 P.2d 263 Ariz. 1969
- State v. Propp 455 P.2d 263 Ariz. 1969
- State v. Roche 451 P.2d 605 Ariz. 1969
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State v. Roche
451 P.2d 605
Ariz. 1969
“We will not upset the sentence imposed by the trial judge as long as he stays within the statutory limits and does not abuse his discretion.”
- State v. Stai 450 P.2d 735 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
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State v. Stai
450 P.2d 735
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
State v. Phillips, 102 Ariz. .377, , , cert.
- State v. Smallwood 438 P.2d 335 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
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State v. Smallwood
438 P.2d 335
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
(1956), P.2d 139 (1967), that, in the area of unusual sex offenses, there is a specific exception to the general rule that evidence of another crime entirely distinct and independent of that for which the defendant is being tried is neither relevant nor admissible unless proof of one tends to establish the other by showi