Cited by

See City of Phoenix v. Superior Court (Ariz. State Hosp.), (noting “special or specific statutory provisions will usually control over those that are general”).

v. Superior Court (Derickson), ).

v. Superior Court (Derickson), , and Kearney v. Mid-Century Ins., 22 Ariz.App.

v. Superior Court (Ariz. State Hosp.), (when in conflict, specific provisions control over general provisions).

Cf. City of Phoenix v. Superior Court (Ariz. State Hosp.), , (preferring interpretation that gives a statute “a fair and *397 sensible meaning”).

Following the well-established rule that a specific statutory provision controls over a general one, , we conclude that A.R.S.

(cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain legislative intent, and court should interpret statute so as to give it a fair and sensible meaning); ¶ 14 , (quoting Walker v. City of Scottsdale, 163 A

§§ 44-1998(B), 44-1997(F) (specifying loss causation as affirmative defense); see also City of Phoenix v. Superior Court , , (“[S]pecific statutory provisions will usually control over those that are general.”).

If Congress intended to limit qualifying sales to those between suppliers and persons entitled to relief under the Act, it is reasonable to conclude that it would have referred to a “consumer” rather than to a “buyer.” , (noting court should interpret statute to give it sensible meaning).

6 , (court should interpret statute so as to give it a fair and sensible meaning); , (court interprets statutes to accomplish legislative purpose and to avoid absurd result).

(“special or specific statutory provisions will usually control over those that are general”).

(stating that court’s primary goal in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature).

(noting court should interpret statute so as to give it a fair and sensible meaning).

¶ 12 The cardinal rule of statutory construction “is to ascertain the meaning of the statute and intent of the legislature.”

Additionally, we will interpret § 40-254 to give it a fair and sensible meaning, , rather than a hypertechnical construction that frustrates legislative intent.

§ 1-213 (2002); , (stating that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the meaning of the statute and intent of the legislature”).

Drexel Heights Fire Dist.

See City of Phoenix v. Superior Court (Derickson), , (court should interpret statute to give it a fair and sensible meaning).

§ 1 — 211(B) (1995) (“Statutes shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice.”); , (court should interpret statute so as to give it a fair and sensible meaning).