Cited by

“Our [C]onstitution has spoken, and it is our duty to listen.” (quoting Daugaard v. Baltic Coop.

(concluding that the clause “[c]learly and unequivocally .

is measured not from the date on which the claim accrues but instead from the date of the last culpable act or omission of the defendant.”); (reasoning that if the statute in question were tied to the date of a negligent act it would be a statute of repose).

¶82 A law is narrowly drawn if it advances a compelling state interest by using the “least restrictive means practically available.” Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984); –88 (1984) (same).

Kenyon v. Hammer , , 78, , 970 (1984) (citations omitted).

¶30 Although “the right to bring and pursue [an] action is a ‘fundamental right’ guaranteed by Article 18, § 6 of the constitution and the [Equal Protection Clause],” Ramirez, 193 Ariz. at 335, ¶ 33 (alteration in original) (), Normandin has no right guaranteed by the constitution to bring an action for simple negligence against an agent performing a governmental function for a 5 Normandin does not claim the statute violates the Equal Privileges Clause as applied to the City.

(increased risk of future fetal fatality is "damage which will sustain a cause of action in tort").

n.6, n.6 (1984) (stating § 12-542 governs general tort actions); Hatch v. Reliance Ins.

976 (1984); Ariz. Const. art. 18, § 6.

We will find an equal protection violation “only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state’s objective.” , (quoting McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425 , 81 S.Ct.

Id.; , (citations omitted).

See Redistricting I, 211 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 33, 121 P.3d at 854 ( , ).

But where our constitution has spoken, it is our duty to uphold it, , regardless of the “wisdom, necessity, propriety or expediency of the legislation in question,” Indus.

(employing strict scrutiny review of medical malpractice litigation procedures).

“A statute abrogates a cause of action if it ‘bars a cause of action before it [can] legitimately be brought.’” Fry’s Food Stores v. Mather & Assocs., Inc., -75, 966-67 (1984).

for Magma Copper Co., -07 , -86 (1984) (applying Article 18, Section 6 to a medical malpractice claim); -83 , -75 (1984) (same).

to support their contention that the ability to bring a negligence claim is a fundamental right and, thus, strict scrutiny should be applied because § 12-553 burdens this fundamental right.

We will find an equal protection violation “only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state’s objective.” , (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 , 81 S.Ct.