Cited by

of Denton, 190 Ariz. at 157

Although voter intent may be relevant to an implicit repeal analysis, we need not consider it here because there is no conflict between the pro-debtor purpose and effect of Prop.

§ 15-910(L) to fund desegregation expenses through secondary property taxes, “the more recent, specific statute governs over the older, more general statute.”

“When a final judgment is involved one superior court judge has no jurisdiction to review or change the judgment of another superior court judge.”

(“Whenever possible a court should construe the meaning of several statutes so that effect can be given to all.”); State ex rel.

Dunlap, 169 Ariz. at 66, 817 P.2d at 11; Powell–Cerkoney, 176 Ariz. at 279, 860 P.2d at 1332; see also Hibbs v. Calcot, Ltd., (expressing “disfavor” about judge reconsidering another judge’s order, but addressing “the substantive issue

(“When a final judgment is involved one superior court judge has no jurisdiction to review or change the judgment of another superior court judge.”) ( , ); see also Osuna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 214

10 ¶ 26 It is well settled that “a superior court judge has no jurisdiction to review or change the judgment of another superior court judge when the judgment has become ‘final.’ ” ¶ 11 , (citation omitted); , (citation omitted) (“When a final judgment is involved one superior court judge has no jurisdiction to review or change the judgment of another superior court judge.”); , (citation omitted) (stating that “the trial

In Denton, the supreme court also held that its conclusion was supported by the rules of statutory construction “that when there is conflict between two statutes, ‘the more recent, specific statute governs over the older, more general statute.’” 190 Ariz. at 157, 945 P.2d at 1288 ( , ).

Those rules provide that “when there is conflict between two statutes, ‘the more recent, specific statute governs over the older, more general statute.’ ” Denton, 190 Ariz. at 157 , 945 P.2d at 1288 ( , ).

to a jail term of “not more than thirty days.” When, as here, two statutes address the same subject matter and contain an irreconcilable conflict on a particular provision, “‘the more recent, specific statute governs over the older, more general statute.’” In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, see also Mead, Samuel & (more recent statute controls).

("Generally, a more recent, specific statute governs over [an] older, more general statute.’ ”) (brackets in Lavidas).

She also is correct that a superior court judge has no jurisdiction to review or change the judgment of another superior court judge when the judgment has become “final.” , (citation omitted).

Generally, a “more recent, specific statute governs over [an] older, more general statute.”

(court must interpret apparently conflicting statutes harmoniously if possible); , (when statutory language is not clear, court will consider the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and con

We do note, however, that when there is conflict between two statutes, “the more recent, specific statute governs over the older, more general statute.”

Id.; , -36 , -84 (1982); -76 .