Cited by

§ 12-820.02(A) did not apply to a claim for police officers’ failure to obtain medical care for arrestee, the officers were not immune from simple negligence under the statute and ordinary negligence claims could proceed); (reversing a directed verdict in favor of the City of Scottsdale on a wrongful death claim for negligence by police department); 150–51 (App. 1991) (reversing summary judgment in favor of the City of Tucson on the issue of whether the police pursuit of

n.2 (1984) (“By establishing a police department, a municipality becomes neither a general insurer of safety nor absolutely liable for all harms to its citizens.”).

As the state correctly observes, we have previously held that the establishment of a police department does not make it a “general insurer of safety.” ( n.2 (1984)).

have 'a duty to act as would a reasonably careful and prudent police department in the same circumstances,'" Hogue, 240 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 12 (-82 (1984) (duty may exist when acts by police have "narrowed the obligation owed to the general public into a specific obligation owed" to an individual)); -56, ¶ 26 (1998) (by creating 9-1-1 system, city accepted duty to 2 Beyond gross negligence by

State v. Superior Court (Donaldson), 4 reversed on other grounds, to support her argument that the City may be liable for simple negligence.

In Arizona, if police endeavor to provide specific protection to a particular person, they generally only have “a duty to act as would a reasonably careful and prudent police department in the same circumstances.” –82, –54 (1984).

at 318, ¶ 49 , 206 P.3d at 767 (citing Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 145, ¶ 18 , 150 P.3d at 232 ) (-82 , -54 (1984)); ¶ 7

And the court has stated that once a municipality has “opted to provide police protection, [it] ha[s] a duty to act as would a reasonably careful and prudent police department in the same circumstances.” -82 , -54 (1984).

We merely hold that, under the particular circumstances here, where the Sanchezes’ inability to remedy the violation of § 12-2604 within the deadline arose from Old Pueblo’s approximate six-month delay in raising a challenge on that basis, such a drastic sanction is not supported by the record before us. 15 579, 581, (sanction of dismissal “‘harsh and not to be invoked except under extreme circumstances’”)

P.2d 449 (1998),2 P.2d 151 (1984), addressed allegations that 911 operators had negligently responded to emergency calls by either failing to act on a reported threat (Austin) or assigning a low priority to an eventual murder victim’s call for help (Hutcherson).

That court has also observed that simply because “children are not named plaintiffs but are merely beneficiaries does not preclude them from being ‘parties’ to the litigation.” -81 , -53 (1984).

¶ 14 Although a police officer’s responsibilities do not include road maintenance per se, Prescott, “having opted to provide police protection, had a duty to act as would a reasonably careful and prudent police department in the same circumstances.” -82 , -54 (1984).

They cite Ryan , where the State negligently allowed an inmate to escape; , where a dispatcher negligently processed a phone call; , vacated on other grounds, , where a 911 operator negligently processed a phone call.

Ariz. 579, 581, quoting Buchanan v. Jimenez, 18 Ariz.App.

-82 , -54 (1984); Grimm v. Arizona Bd.

-81 , -53 (1984) (“That children are not named plaintiffs but are merely beneficiaries does not preclude them from being ‘parties’ to the litigation.”); see also A.R.S.

to establish that Maricopa County owed them such a duty.

is harsh and not to be invoked except under extreme circumstances.”