Cited by

(alteration in original) ().

Amparano v. ASARCO, Inc., ().

at 226 (); see Marner, (court must at least implicitly consider Gomez factors).

Gomez, 149 Ariz. at 226 ().

Severance Action No. S- 113432, (a child may assert conflicts in the trial if conflicts exist and the parent lacks standing to assert them); see also Heather A., 1 CA-JV 21-0315, at *2, ¶ 9 (a parent lacked standing when children were “represented by counsel who can assert their constitutional rights”); (“Only in extreme circumstances should a party to a lawsuit be allowed to interfere with the attorney-client relationship of his opponent.”).

Harassment ¶18 The first Gomez factor, “whether the motion is being made for the purposes of harass[ment],” Gomez, 149 Ariz. at 226 (), is not at issue in this case.

at 441 ¶ 16; (“If the client himself does not treat 5 STATE EX REL.

In Gomez and the case on which it is based, we considered the standards by which the state could disqualify defense counsel for a conflict of interest.

The burden should be upon the moving party to show sufficient reason why an attorney should be disqualified from representing his [or her] client.” (citations omitted).

the circumstances under which the confidences were divulged.” (quoting Developments of the Law— Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 Harv.

See Alexander v. Superior Court (State), (“Only in extreme circumstances should a party to a lawsuit be allowed to interfere with the attorney-client relationship of his opponent.”).

¶66 DeMocker asserts that the cited conduct gave rise to an “appearance of impropriety”

We are further mindful that “[o]nly in extreme circumstances should a party to a lawsuit be allowed to interfere with the attorney-client relationship of his opponent,” and “[t]he burden is on the party moving to disqualify opposing counsel to show ‘sufficient reason’ why the attorney should be disqualified,” Amparano v. Asarco, Inc., ¶ 24 (App. 2004) (citing Alexander, 141 Ariz. at 161).

However, the party seeking disqualification bears the burden of demonstrating why the disqualification is warranted, Simms, 234 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 8 (citing Alexander v. D’Angelo, ), which requires a limited waiver of privileged communications to the court so it may decide the issue of prejudice.

Therefore, we agree with the state that Paris- Sheldon cannot “use the attorney-client privilege as a shield to block inquiry into an issue that she raised.” (“If the client himself does not treat the particular communication as privileged, that communication will not be recognized as a confidence.”).

“ ‘An attorney-client relationship is said to exist when the party divulging confidences and secrets to an attorney believes that he is approaching the attorney in a professional capacity with the intent to secure legal advice.’ ” , (quoting Trinity Ambulance Serv., Inc., v. G & L Ambulance Serv., Inc., 578 F.Supp.

Alexander v. Superior Court (State)

at 226 , 717 P.2d at 905 ( , ).

Young & Co., -58 , -68 (1963) (privilege impliedly waived when party defended by denying negligence and claiming sudden heart attack as cause of automobile accident); , (when client does not treat information divulged to counsel “as if it were privileged,” for example, by “testifying] to the information in an affidavit, which has become a matter of public record,” any attorney-client privilege is “implicitly waived” as to that information).

Arizona courts have also recognized that a party may challenge representation of his opponent, but only “in extreme circumstances.”