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Opinions in Arizona that cite Summerfield v. Superior Court, Maricopa Cty., 698 P.2d 712.

105 citing documents.

Diaz v. Magma Copper Co. 950 P.2d 1165 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Diaz v. Magma Copper Co. 950 P.2d 1165 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
the court discussed at length the basis for judicial application of common law to the interpretation of the wrongful death statutes.
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Superior Court 938 P.2d 98 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Superior Court 938 P.2d 98 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
In Re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-120171 905 P.2d 555 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
In Re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-120171 905 P.2d 555 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
Contrary to DES’s argument, , requires a different conclusion as to the meaning of “child” or “person.” There the supreme court, acknowledging evolving common law in the area of tort recovery, held that “person” within the meaning of Arizona’s wrongful death statute includes a viable fetus.
Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz County Fair & Rodeo Ass'n 866 P.2d 1342 Ariz. 1994
Estate of Hernandez v. Bd. of Regents 866 P.2d 1330 Ariz. 1994
Estate of Hernandez v. Bd. of Regents 866 P.2d 1330 Ariz. 1994
(“[Tjhis court has an obligation to participate in the evolution of tort law so that it may reflect societal and technological changes.”) ( , ).
Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz County Fair & Rodeo Ass'n 866 P.2d 1342 Ariz. 1994
State Compensation Fund v. Symington 848 P.2d 273 Ariz. 1993
State Compensation Fund v. Symington 848 P.2d 273 Ariz. 1993
First Phoenix Realty Investments v. Superior Court 841 P.2d 1390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
First Phoenix Realty Investments v. Superior Court 841 P.2d 1390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Cardon v. Cotton Lane Holdings, Inc. 841 P.2d 198 Ariz. 1992
Cardon v. Cotton Lane Holdings, Inc. 841 P.2d 198 Ariz. 1992
See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(4) (supreme court has jurisdiction over special action if there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy by appeal); , (jurisdiction accepted if “ ‘justice cannot be satisfactorily obtained by other means’ ”)
Vo v. Superior Court 836 P.2d 408 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Vo v. Superior Court 836 P.2d 408 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Bledsoe v. Goodfarb 823 P.2d 1264 Ariz. 1991
Bledsoe v. Goodfarb 823 P.2d 1264 Ariz. 1991
See Kelley v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, -78 , -5 (1987)
Carrow Co. v. Lusby 804 P.2d 747 Ariz. 1990
Carrow Co. v. Lusby 804 P.2d 747 Ariz. 1990
City of Flagstaff v. Mangum 793 P.2d 548 Ariz. 1990
City of Flagstaff v. Mangum 793 P.2d 548 Ariz. 1990
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Superior Court 796 P.2d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Superior Court 796 P.2d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
State Ex Rel. Ross v. Nance 798 P.2d 1295 Ariz. 1990
State Ex Rel. Ross v. Nance 798 P.2d 1295 Ariz. 1990
WALKER BY PIZANO v. Mart 790 P.2d 735 Ariz. 1990
WALKER BY PIZANO v. Mart 790 P.2d 735 Ariz. 1990
Andrew S. Arena, Inc. v. Superior Court 788 P.2d 1174 Ariz. 1990
Andrew S. Arena, Inc. v. Superior Court 788 P.2d 1174 Ariz. 1990
We granted review because we conclude that relief by appeal is inadequate under the circumstances of this case, , and because the issue presented is one of general and statewide importance, see Summerfield, v. Superior Court
Frongillo v. Grimmett 788 P.2d 102 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
Frongillo v. Grimmett 788 P.2d 102 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
plained of.” , (quoting Bar-ragan v. Superior Court, 12 Ariz.App.
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Arizona Corp. Commission 773 P.2d 455 Ariz. 1989
City of Phoenix v. Superior Court 762 P.2d 128 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
City of Phoenix v. Superior Court 762 P.2d 128 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Law v. Superior Court of State of Ariz. 755 P.2d 1135 Ariz. 1988
Law v. Superior Court of State of Ariz. 755 P.2d 1135 Ariz. 1988
James v. Phoenix General Hospital, Inc. 744 P.2d 695 Ariz. 1987
James v. Phoenix General Hospital, Inc. 744 P.2d 695 Ariz. 1987
the legislature explicitly recognized the legal right of the survivors to be compensated for their loss resulting from the victim’s death.” 17 Summerfield v. Superior *604 Court
Katz v. Filandro 739 P.2d 822 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1987
Katz v. Filandro 739 P.2d 822 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1987
the supreme court stated the legislative intent to allow full recovery for survivors: In enacting the wrongful death statute of 1887, and in returning to its terms under the present statute, the legislature explicitly recognized the legal right of the survivors to be compensated for th
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Commission 730 P.2d 219 Ariz. 1986
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Commission 730 P.2d 219 Ariz. 1986
(“to defer to some assumed legislative intent is to abdicate judicial responsibility”).
Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 730 P.2d 186 Ariz. 1986
Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 730 P.2d 186 Ariz. 1986
Chamberlain v. Mathis 729 P.2d 905 Ariz. 1986
Chamberlain v. Mathis 729 P.2d 905 Ariz. 1986
HOWARD FRANK, MD, PC v. Superior Court 722 P.2d 955 Ariz. 1986

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