Cited by

Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 179.

[that] finally determines an issue of law sufficiently significant that the appeal may be considered as a separate unit.” Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., -94 , -49 (1985) (supplemental opinion), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Chaboya v. Am.

See Wagonseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hospital, (superseded by statute on other grounds).

14 consideration of the merits of Merrill’s and DeLong’s claims, the novelty of the legal question presented on appeal, and DeLong’s failure to file a responsive brief in this court, see Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., superseded by statute on other grounds, we grant Merrill’s request upon her compliance with Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ.

bserved that “one of the purposes of fee-shifting statutes is to ‘promote settlement of disagreements out of court’ and that ‘[ujnless each party is on notice before each stage of the law suit that its opponent intends to ask for attorney[s’] fees, [that] purpose cannot be served.’ ” 221 Ariz. at 600, ¶ 14 , 212 P.3d at 938 (alterations in original) (quoting Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., , superseded by statute on other grounds, Employment Protection Act, 1996 Ariz. Legis.

Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 392–94, –49 (1985).

See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., , (recognizing that “notice of intent to seek fees should be given before ‘each stage’ of a lawsuit, furthering the public policy of encouraging settlement”).

See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., -94 , -49 (1985) (explaining that a party who prevails on an interim appeal may be considered a “successful party” eligible for award of fees under § 12-341.01(A)) (superseded by statute on other grounds).

See Webster’s II New College Dictionary 1127 (3d ed. 2005) (defining “succeed” as, among other things, “[t]o accomplish something desired or intended”); , (holding the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract “requires that neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of them agreement”).

Bureau of Maricopa County, Inc., modified on other grounds by Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l. Hosp.

superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Chaboya v. Am.

rew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice CONCURRING: _____________________________________ Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice _____________________________________ Michael D. Ryan, Justice _____________________________________ W. Scott Bales, Justice _____________________________________ A. John Pelander, Justice Ariz. 370, 394, (holding that party establishing important point of law may be considered as successful for purposes of fee award even if it eventually does not recover in the litigation), th

.’ ” ¶¶ 8, 9 , 982 P.2d at 1289 (emphasis added), , ¶¶ 26, 30 , 238 (1999) (finding preamble to Employment Protection Act, which purported to invalidate supreme court’s , “devoid of operative effect” because “it manifested] the legislature’s intent to usurp judicial authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine”).

Our supreme court has stated that one of the purposes of fee-shifting statutes is to “promote settlement of disagreements out of court” and that “[u]nless each party is on notice before each stage of the law suit that its opponent intends to ask for attorneyls’] fees, [that] purpose cannot be served.” Wag-enseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., , superseded in other respects by A.R.S.

Laws, ch. 140, §§ 1, 3 ( P.2d 1025 (1985), and focus of § 23-1501 on “severability of employment relationships”).5 However, the bill also included a limitation provision in subsection (4) of § 12-541, setting a deadline for filing actions “for damages for wrongful termination.” Thus, when the legislature chose different, broader lang

11 ¶ 20, (citation omitted); see Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., , (superseded by statute not relevant to this ease).

-94 , -49 (1985) (superseded by statute on other grounds) (allowing fees for successful prosecution of appeal, resulting in remand to trial court for further proceedings).

Relying on our supreme court’s decision in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., , we also reasoned that it was fair to require parties to request fees earlier in the litigation process so that both sides may accurately assess the risks and benefits of litigating versus settling.

-94 , -49 (1985) (“successful party” on appeal includes party who achieves reversal of unfavorable interim order when order is central to case and issue of law decided on appeal is “sufficiently significant that the appeal may be considered as a separate unit”).

Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., -94, -49 (1985) (allowing fee award under § 12-341.01 for interlocutory appeal that “finally determine[d] an issue of law sufficiently significant that the appeal may be considered as a separate unit”).

.”); see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., (holding that “to be timely under Rule 21(c) on petitions for review by this court, the request for attorney’s fees must be made either in the petition for review, the response thereto or - 18 - by separate written motion filed

calculated to prevent others from dealing with him"); , (recognizing tort of improper interference with "valid contractual relationship or business expectancy").

In tortious interference cases, however, this Court long ago rejected the “formalistic privilege concept in favor of a requirement that an interference be ‘improper’ for liability to attach.” Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 7 This approach is consistent with the general rule that lawyers have no special privilege against 7 Although Wagenseller rejected a “formalistic privilege” approach, we subsequently noted that the requirement that the defendant’s interferenc

Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., , (recognizing that law emanates not just from statutes, but also constitutions and judicial opinions).