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¶25 To determine the applicable standard of care here, we begin with the Arizona Supreme Court’s

Torres, 252 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 12

It becomes a superseding cause, which relieves the original negligent actor from liability, when “an intervening act of another was unforeseeable by a reasonable person in the position of the original actor and when, looking backward, after the event, the intervening act appears extraordinary.” Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 506; see also Robertson, 163 Ariz. at 546

(finding that “expert evidence may be required in those cases in which factual issues are outside the common understanding of jurors”).

independent guarantees of trustworthiness of such works.”

A jury may experiment with evidence “so long as those experiments ‘do not go beyond the lines of evidence introduced into court and thus constitute the introduction of new evidence in the jury room.’” ¶ 8 (App. 2005) ().

A duty based on foreseeability exists when a defendant realizes or should realize that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm to a “foreseeable plaintiff.”

¶¶ 12-13, (recognizing criminal standard for superseding cause same as civil); (defendant not liable only when intervening cause considered superseding cause).

(“Evidence which fails to establish the theory at which it was aimed may, nevertheless, be considered on any other issue to which it is relevant.”).

Our supreme court has even approved jury experiments with tangible evidence so long as those experiments do not “go ‘beyond the lines of evidence’ introduced in court and thus constitute the introduction of new evidence in the jury room.” quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 217, at 541 (2d ed. 1972); see also State v. Jackson, 596 N.W.2d 262, 266 (Minn. App. 1999) (jurors inking their own fingers to compare to known and latent print evidence not an improper experiment but a mere test of t

It is for the jury to decide whether the burden was a reasonable one in light of the risk of harm: “The risk/benefit analysis involved in deciding what is reasonable care under the circumstances is generally left to the jury____” -65 , -22 (1985).

(“The question is whether the plaintiff was in the foreseeable range of defendant’s negligent conduct ...

See Dobbs, supra, § 8.1(2), at 362; , (holding that diminished earning capacity is an item of general damage, as distinguished from lost earnings, which are specific damages); Mandelbaum v. Knutson, 11 Ariz.App.

See, e.g., Stroud v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., , (characterizing superseding intervening negligence of third party as defense); Knight v. Miller, 503 So.2d 120, 124 (La.App.1987) (burden on plaintiff to show that aggravation not the result of distinct intervening act for which defendant not responsible); , (assuming that plaintiff had the burden of proving that third party’s act was not superseding cause); see also generally 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence §§ 591, 602, 680 (1989).