Cited by

Nevertheless, we must approach our analysis of whether the presumption in the 2021 statute is procedural or substantive “with the goal of determining, absent labels, the true function of the statute.” ¶ 31 (2009) ( for the point that “a statute excluding evidence is not inevitably procedural; privilege statutes exclude highly relevant evidence but are nonetheless substantive”).

Baker also contends that whatever prejudice may have resulted from revealing J.J.’s status as a prohibited possessor was minimal, and argues “[t]he danger that the jury may improperly consider the evidence or apply it in an improper manner does not in itself provide a reason for exclusion.”

we may defer to legislative decisions regarding the use or exclusion of relevant evidence to promote substantive goals of public policy.” Readenour v. Marion Power Shovel, a Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc.

(citing Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen’s Found., ); ¶ 13 (App. 2009).

105; see also Readenour v. Marion Power Shovel, Inc., -52 (1986) (remanding for a new trial because the failure to grant a request for a limiting instruction permitted the jury to use the subsequent remedial evidence as proof that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous).

See Readenour v. Mario Power Shovel, a Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc., (“Under our constitutional rule-making power we cannot let the legislature define what is relevant; however, when it is appropriate we may defer to legislative decisions regarding the use or exclusion of relevant evidence to promote substantive goals of public policy such as accident prevention.”).

Co., ¶ 53, (“The balancing of factors under Rule 403 is peculiarly a function of trial courts, not appellate courts.”); –52 ¶¶ 17–19, –9 (2013); –50, – 66 (1986).

Co., , 266 ¶ 53, (“The balancing balfactors under Rule 403 is peculiarly a function of trial courts, not appellate courts.”); , 351-52 ¶¶ 17-19, -9 (2013); -50 , -66 (1986).

Decisions under Rule 403 involve a balancing process that is “truly discretionary with the trial judge.”

so that it does not violate the constitution.” see also In re Pinal County Mental Health No. MH-201000076, 596 Ariz. Adv.

§ 15-507 is overbroad does not end the inquiry because courts have a “duty to save a statute, if possible, by construing it so that it does not violate the constitution.” 224 Ariz. at 57 -58 ¶ 21, 226 P.3d at 1043 -44 ( , ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(holding that rejection of an inadequate instruction “should not be used as a reason for giving no instruction at all” (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 105[05]

And “it is our duty to save a statute, if possible, by construing it so that it does not violate the constitution.”

¶ 9 The rule seeks to “encourage remedial measures by freeing the defendant from concern that such steps might be used against him as an admission by conduct.”

Courts have a “duty to save a statute, if possible, by construing it so that it does not violate the constitution.” , (citing Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen’s Found., , ).

(asserting that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is “admissible for many purposes other than direct proof of negligence”) (emphasis added); Fasanaro v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 687 F.Supp.

(citing Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen’s Found., , ).

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); , (defining determinative issue as whether the statute “supplement[s] rather than contradict[s]” an evidentiary rule).

Similarly, -46 , -62 (1986), the court construed a statute forbidding the admission of evidence of post-sale changes in the design or manufacture of a product in product liability actions to be consistent with Rule 407, which permits some uses of such evidence.

449 n. 8, , 1065 n. 8 (1986) (concluding that the trial court had exercised Rule 403 discretion in excluding evidence challenged as prejudicial, although the "record reveal[ed] neither formal invocation nor application of Rule 403").

(quoting Chemetron Corp. v. Bus.