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However, Arizona’s qualified immunity does not apply where Survivors can demonstrate one of two things: the deputies either “knew or should have known [they were] acting in violation of established law or acted in reckless disregard of whether [their] activities would deprive another person of their rights.” (emphasis added) (treating these pathways to overcome immunity disjunctively).

He relies on our supreme court’s opinion in Chamberlain v. Mathis, which stated, “[d]riving is not a discretionary governmental function that must be shielded by immunity for government to function effectively.”

v. London, (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 114, p. 776 (footnote omitted))

555, 557-58 (1986) (recognizing police officers as “executive government officials”).

“A public official is entitled to immunity from suit for actions taken by him within the scope of his duties as a public official.” (citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959)); –560 (1986) (discussing qualified immunity for government officials from liability for acts within the scope of their public duties).

–60 (1986) (adopting a general rule of qualified immunity for executive officials and stating that absolute immunity applies only when essential to conducting public business); ¶ 10 (App. 2007) (concluding the attorney general does not have absolute immunity for issui

P. 12(b)(6); (noting that immunity is an affirmative defense which can be raised in a motion to dismiss).

¶9 Common law qualified immunity generally provides public officials, including police officers, limited protection from liability when “performing an act that inherently requires judgment or discretion.”4 558 (1986) (applying the Ryan principles in concluding a state employee is protected by qualified immunity for discretionary acts); (“It has been recognized that in Arizona a police officer acting within the scope of his authority has at least a conditio

¶25 Moreover, common-law qualified immunity applies when “officials are setting policy or performing an act that inherently requires judgment or discretion.” see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895(D)(3) (1979) (“A public officer acting within the general scope of his authority is not subject to tort liability for an administrative act or omission if (a) he is immune because engaged in the exercise of a discretionary function.”); id.

4 LANGENDORF v. BUCKEYE WATER Decision of the Court § 12-820.01(A)(2); Kohl, 215 Ariz. at 295, ¶ 16 (“Section 12-820.01(A)(2) immunizes all determinations of fundamental governmental policy, even those that can be shown to fall below a standard of reasonable care.”).

we assume plaintiffs’ allegations are true.”

Large, 148 Ariz. at 231, 714 P.2d at 401; (“[I]n considering the propriety of [defendant’s] motion to dismiss .

“If the existence of immunity turns on disputed factual issues, the jury determines the facts and the court then determines whether those facts are sufficient to establish immunity.”

MERITS ¶7 Absolute immunity insulates an individual from legal liability from “all acts, no matter how malicious,” whereas qualified immunity shields “only those acts done in good faith.” , (citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 , 79 S.Ct.

Co. v. State of Ariz., Dep’t of Ins., (in reviewing trial court’s dismissal of complaint on ground of immunity, “we assume as true the facts alleged in the complaint”); (same).2 ¶3 In his complaint, Filer alleged that, in July 2004, Gaming Enterprise employees had “furnished excessive quantities of alcoholic beverages to Douglas Michael Levitski while he was at the Desert Diamond Casino,” in violation of § 4-311.

-60 , -14 (1986) (discussing immunity generally and comparing absolute and qualified immunity).