Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Jelks, 461 P.2d 473.

30 citing documents.

  • Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office v. Ybarra 182 P.3d 1166 Ariz. 2008
  • Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office v. Ybarra 182 P.3d 1166 Ariz. 2008
    Cf. Manic, 213 Ariz. at 254, ¶ 12 , 141 P.3d at 734 (observing that although § 22-320(A) provides that a jury trial is deemed waived if not timely requested, "[gjenerally, waiver of a jury trial does not occur by default”) ( , and Rule 18.1).
  • Pamela Manic v. Tucson City Attorney's Office Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
  • Pamela Manic v. Tucson City Attorney's Office Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
    (right to jury trial must be voluntarily and intelligently waived); Ariz. R. Crim.
  • State v. Smith 687 P.2d 1288 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
  • State v. Moreno 655 P.2d 23 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
  • State v. Masengill 518 P.2d 560 Ariz. 1974
  • State v. Masengill 518 P.2d 560 Ariz. 1974
  • State v. Koker 513 P.2d 674 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
  • State v. Koker 513 P.2d 674 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
  • State v. Cochran 509 P.2d 220 Ariz. 1973
  • State v. Cochran 509 P.2d 220 Ariz. 1973
    “In view of the importance of the right of a trial by jury as a fundamental right, it is doubtful that a written waiver signed only by the attorney or an oral waiver by counsel out of the defendant’s presence would be sufficient waiver without something of record to show authorization or ratification by the defendant.”
  • State v. Watson 507 P.2d 981 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
  • State v. Watson 507 P.2d 981 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
    1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), , cert.
  • State v. Brady 493 P.2d 939 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
  • State v. Brady 493 P.2d 939 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
    ” ( 485 P.2d at p. 825 ).
  • State v. Ritchey 490 P.2d 558 Ariz. 1971
  • State v. Ritchey 490 P.2d 558 Ariz. 1971
  • State v. Hooper 487 P.2d 394 Ariz. 1971
  • State v. Hooper 487 P.2d 394 Ariz. 1971
    A knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial can be exercised through counsel, and need not be made and announced by defendant personally.” , .
  • State v. Brown 485 P.2d 822 Ariz. 1971
  • State v. Brown 485 P.2d 822 Ariz. 1971
  • State v. Sutherland 483 P.2d 576 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
  • State v. Sutherland 483 P.2d 576 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
    We wholeheartedly agree with our Supreme Court in its analysis of the role of counsel in the matters of the con■stitutional rights of the defendants, an •
  • State v. White 475 P.2d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
  • State v. White 475 P.2d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
    Our *266 , has already decided this question adversely to the defendant’s contention.
  • State v. McPherson 469 P.2d 847 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
  • State v. McPherson 469 P.2d 847 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
    This very question was answered against the appellant’s position in a very recent case by our Supreme Court, , where the court stated: “When the accused is present in the court room and represented by competent counsel, he is bound by the actions and concessions of his counsel.
  • State v. Pickard 462 P.2d 87 Ariz. 1969
  • State v. Pickard 462 P.2d 87 Ariz. 1969
    See, State v. Jelks, 105 Ariz., 175