Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Evans, 454 P.2d 976.

26 citing documents.

  • State of Arizona v. John Vincent Fitzgerald 303 P.3d 519 Ariz. 2013
  • State of Arizona v. John Vincent Fitzgerald 303 P.3d 519 Ariz. 2013
    and that privilege applies to penalty-phase trials, Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (“We can discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of [a defendant’s] capital murder trial so far as the protection of 23 the Fifth Amendment privilege is concerned.”); (admitting a defendant’s incriminating statements from competency proceedings would be “fundamentally unfair”).
  • State v. Tallabas 746 P.2d 491 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • State v. Tallabas 746 P.2d 491 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • State v. Santeyan 664 P.2d 652 Ariz. 1983
  • State v. Santeyan 664 P.2d 652 Ariz. 1983
  • State v. Sanchez 659 P.2d 1289 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
  • State v. Sanchez 659 P.2d 1289 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
  • State v. Curry 617 P.2d 785 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1980
  • State v. Curry 617 P.2d 785 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1980
  • State v. Steelman 585 P.2d 1213 Ariz. 1978
  • State v. Steelman 585 P.2d 1213 Ariz. 1978
  • State v. Ramirez 569 P.2d 201 Ariz. 1977
  • State v. Ramirez 569 P.2d 201 Ariz. 1977
    In support of this contention, the appellant relies principally on Rule 11.7(b)(1), Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S.
  • State v. McDonald 571 P.2d 677 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
  • State v. McDonald 571 P.2d 677 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
  • State v. Freeman 559 P.2d 152 Ariz. 1976
  • State v. Freeman 559 P.2d 152 Ariz. 1976
    “(1) No statement of the defendant obtained under these provisions, or evidence resulting therefrom, concerning the events which form the basis of the charges against him shall be admissible at the trial of guilt or innocence, or at any subsequent proceeding to determine guilt or innocence, without his consent.” , we said: “ * * * we do think that to permit even a psychiatrist acting for the court to transmit a defendant’s incriminating statements to a jury is fundamentally unfair.” 104 Ariz. at
  • State v. Magby 554 P.2d 1272 Ariz. 1976
  • State v. Magby 554 P.2d 1272 Ariz. 1976
  • State v. Small 514 P.2d 283 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
  • State v. Small 514 P.2d 283 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
    In commenting on this . , held: “Although this statute was not in effect at the time of defendant’s trial, we cite it to show present legislative intent to construct a limited physician-patient privilege in a situation where, for the most part, none had previously existed.” It would appear that the case of Shaw
  • State v. Shaw 471 P.2d 715 Ariz. 1970
  • State v. Shaw 471 P.2d 715 Ariz. 1970
    tried before the adoption of § 13-1621.01, A.R.S., we held: “The general rule is that a physician-patient privilege does not arise when the defendant is being examined at the instance of the court or the prosecutor for ■the purpose of determining his mental or physical condition.
  • State v. Hughes 456 P.2d 393 Ariz. 1969
  • State v. Hughes 456 P.2d 393 Ariz. 1969