Cited by

However, a “trial court’s determination of what constitutes the ‘fruit’ of the state’s ‘poisonous tree’ is a mixed question of fact and law implicating constitutional questions.” (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-98 (1996)).

¶7 The Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making unreasonable searches and seizures, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), and evidence obtained in violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights is generally inadmissible at trial

See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)

¶20 The Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making unreasonable searches and seizures, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), and the exclusionary rule generally prevents the introduction of evidence seized in violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights

Moreover, this court has previously applied the independent source doctrine to allow the limited admission of evidence after a violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and has further recognized in that context that “the inevitable-discovery doctrine not only depends on the validity of the independent-source doctrine, it is derived from it.” -10, -70 (App. 1997) (citations omitted).

The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions.” (internal citations omitted)); (“The exclusionary rule requires suppression at trial of evidence gained directly or indirectly as a result of a government violation of the Fourth .

As such [the court‟s determination] is reviewed de novo.”

-08, -68 (App. 1997), for the proposition that once counsel is appointed, counsel must be present for an accused to validly waive his Sixth Amendment rights.

Moreover, de novo review is appropriate because the issue of whether Sabin’s incriminating statements arose from the illegal seizure of K.’s diary is “a mixed question of fact and law implicating constitutional questions.”

2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988); , 508 & n. 3, , 868 & n. 3 (App.1997).

407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)