Cited by

16 ¶¶ 1–3, 27 (App. 1998).

¶ 26 (1998) (“[T]he ‘goodwill’ developed in connection with Husband’s sole proprietorship during the marriage is 5 BROOKSBY v. BROOKSBY Decision of the Court considered a community asset.”).

¶30 This limitation on the dissolution court’s authority is illustrated by a case discussed extensively by both parties

“A single [badge of fraud] may establish and stamp a transaction as fraudulent, [but w]hen several are found in the same transaction, strong, clear evidence will be required to repel the conclusion of fraudulent intent.” ¶ 34 (App. 1998) (citation omitted).

¶ 15 n.2 (App. 1998) (enforcing a concession made during oral argument); ¶ 7 (App. 2017) (stating that appellate courts "should not attempt to analyze and decide arguments that have been abandoned and waived").

See also Arpaio v. Citizen Publ’g Co., ¶ 10 n.4 (App. 2008); ¶ 21 (App. 1998) (citing Ariz. R. Civ.

§ 25-214(A) (“Each spouse has the sole management, control and disposition rights of each spouse’s separate property.”); ¶ 40 (App. 1998) (explaining “that a fiduciary relationship between spouses does exist with respect to community assets,” and the “[r]emoval of community assets without spousal notice and/or approval can constitute a breach of that duty”).

¶ 27 (App. 1998) (the nature of the asset does not transmute “by merely changing the form of its ownership through incorporation”).

¶23 Taken together, the statutory factors have “a tendency to show the existence of fraud” and often only “a single one of them may establish and stamp a transaction as fraudulent.” ¶ 34 (App. 1998) (discussing the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the predecessor to the UFTA) ().

See Mangan, 227 Ariz. at 352-53, ¶ 27 ( ¶ 46 (App. 1998), and A.R.S.

¶ 16 (App. 1998) (superior court sits in equity).

¶ 19, (citations omitted).

Fund, ¶ 42 (App. 1998) (“The rules regarding disclosure are born out of a policy that the facts and issues to be litigated must be fairly exposed.”).

¶ 42 (App. 1998) (explaining the purpose of requiring disclosure is to provide “the parties ‘a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial or settlement—nothing more, nothing less’ and to ‘maximize the likelihood of a decision on the merits’”) (citations omitted).

See 104 Ariz. at 88, 449 P.2d at 16; (holding that fiduciary relationship exists between spouses).

§ 44- 1201(B); (suggesting judgment contingent on satisfaction of lien would be invalid, as conditional judgments generally void).