Cited by

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶ 14 (App. 2003) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709–10 (1974)).

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶ 43 (App. 2003)) (“Arizona has a long-favored practice of allowing full cross-examination of expert witnesses, including inquiry about the expert’s sources, relations with the hiring party and counsel, possible bias, and prior opinions.”).

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶ 39 (App. 2003)).

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶ 11 (App. 2003); see also Ariz. R.P.

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶ 11 (App. 2003).

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, –42, ¶ 36 (App. 2003) (quoting Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 76(1) (2000)).

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶ 11 (App. 2003).

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶¶ 15-16, 21 (App. 2003) (explaining basis for common- law legislative immunity).

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶ 39 (App. 2003) (“[T]he work-product privilege is designed to protect mental impressions and theories of attorneys or other client representatives concerning actual or prospective litigation involving the client.” (citing State ex rel.

Legislative privilege—as set forth in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), (the “Gravel/Fields framework”)—exists to protect the integrity and functioning of the legislature.

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, to argue Slaughter’s statements cannot be privileged because she uttered them at a political campaign event.

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶¶ 15–16 (App. 2003); U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl.

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶ 17 (App. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Redistricting Comm’n (AIRC) v. Fields, ¶ 15 (App. 2003); U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl.

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, –38 ¶¶ 15–19 (App. 2003).

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶ 43 (App. 2003))).

Comm’n v. Fields, ¶ 43 (App. 2003)).

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶ 39 (App. 2003).

Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, ¶ 17 , (stating the privilege is intended “to support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

at 37 , 932 P.2d at 302 (attorney work-product privilege waived where expert was retained as both consulting and testifying expert); see also Ariz. Independent Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields (“Redistricting I"), -45, ¶¶ 47, 50 , -03 (App.2003) (legislative privilege waived where Independent Redistricting Commission designated its consulting experts as testifying experts).

¶ 17 The level of judicial review afforded Commission enactments depends in large part on whether we regard the Commission as a “legislative body” or as a “constitutional administrative body.” In Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission v. Fields (Legislative Immunity Opinion), the court of appeals treated the Commission as a “legislative body,” , 139 ¶ 24, but in Redistricting II, the court of appeals referred to the Commission as a “constitutional administrative agency.” 6 219 Ariz. at 52

Before that hearing was held, however, two critical events occurred: (1) on May 26, the respondent judge approved a stipulation of the parties that resolved the distribution of liquid assets pendente lite and 1 In her petition, P.3d 1088 (App. 2003), P.3d 465 (App. 2006), in support of her argument that the required production was limited to those documents related to the subject of Fox’s testimony.

2 ¶ 22 , this court determined that the legislative privilege, like the work-product immunity, may be waived by designating a consulting expert as a testifying expert.