Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Anderson v. Gobea, 501 P.2d 453.

29 citing documents.

Aaron Engler v. Gulf Interstate Engineering Inc 280 P.3d 599 Ariz. 2012
Aaron Engler v. Gulf Interstate Engineering Inc 280 P.3d 599 Ariz. 2012
(b) was commonly done by the employee, (c) occurred within the employee’s working hours, and (d) furthered the employer’s purposes or fell outside the employer’s “enterprise.” See Higgins v. Assmann Elec., Inc., ¶¶ 29-32, (citing Restatement (Second) § 229); Anderson v. Gobea, 18 Ariz. App. 277, 280, (citing Restatement (Second) § 228).
Engler v. Gulf Interstate Engineering, Inc. 258 P.3d 304 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Engler v. Gulf Interstate Engineering, Inc. 258 P.3d 304 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
-83 , -59 (1972) (applying the “dual-purpose” exception to the going and coming rule and recognizing that “there are instances when [workers’ compensation] principles are particularly apropos and can be invoked” in tort cases).
Carnes v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 251 P.3d 411 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Carnes v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 251 P.3d 411 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
BRYSTAL McCLOUD v. THOMAS MAX KIMBRO Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
BRYSTAL McCLOUD v. THOMAS MAX KIMBRO Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
An employee‟s conduct is within the scope and course of employment “only if (a) it is the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; and (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer].”
Ortiz v. Clinton 928 P.2d 718 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Ortiz v. Clinton 928 P.2d 718 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
See, e.g., Robarge, 131 Ariz. at 283 , 640 P.2d at 214
Bruce v. Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc. 801 P.2d 456 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Auto-Owners Insurance v. Moore 750 P.2d 1387 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
Auto-Owners Insurance v. Moore 750 P.2d 1387 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
The trial court found that it was not material whether Scott left from his father’s office or from the school to run what it characterized as an “errand.” -82 , -58 (1972).
Robarge v. Bechtel Power Corp. 640 P.2d 211 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
Robarge v. Bechtel Power Corp. 640 P.2d 211 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
pany, , we are urged to apply the above stated rule in the present case because workmen’s compensation cases have consistently been used as supporting authority in tort cases and, also, according to the language of a recent tort case, “there are instances when the [workmen’s compensation] principles are particularly apropos and can be invoked.”
Rimondi v. Briggs 606 P.2d 412 Ariz. 1980
Rimondi v. Briggs 606 P.2d 412 Ariz. 1980
91 , , Winchester v. Palko, 18 Ariz.App.
Faul v. Jelco, Inc. 595 P.2d 1035 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
Faul v. Jelco, Inc. 595 P.2d 1035 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 233 Comment a, supra.
Manhattan-Dickman Construction Co. v. Shawler 558 P.2d 894 Ariz. 1976
Manhattan-Dickman Construction Co. v. Shawler 558 P.2d 894 Ariz. 1976
r or both of the plaintiffs were negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries, then your verdict should but need not be in favor of the Defendants and against the contributorily negligent Plaintiff or Plaintiffs as the case may be.” Manhattan-Dickman argues that the proper instruction requires the use of the word “should” alone, , where the instruction simply stated that in the event of plaintiffs’ negligence proximately contributing to their injuries the
State v. Superior Court, in & for County of Maricopa 524 P.2d 951 Ariz. 1974
State v. Superior Court, in & for County of Maricopa 524 P.2d 951 Ariz. 1974
It terminates only when the master no longer has a right to control it.” , (emphasis added).
Rhind v. Kearney 521 P.2d 1148 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1974
Rhind v. Kearney 521 P.2d 1148 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1974
Purchase v. MARDIAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. 520 P.2d 529 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
Purchase v. MARDIAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. 520 P.2d 529 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
(emphasis in original) We find no merit to appellant’s , review denied January 2, 1973, wherein we stated at p. 279, 501 P.2d at p. 455 : “In our opinion both the Law Review writer and appellants read too much into the case of Heimke v. Munoz, supra.
Winchester v. Palko 504 P.2d 65 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
Winchester v. Palko 504 P.2d 65 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
Div. 2 of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s use of the Dayton type “should” instruction on contributory negligence, holding that Heimke did not outlaw the continued use of such an instruction.