Cited by

Connolly v. Robertson, 567 S.E.2d 193, 196–97 (N.C.

Connolly v. Robertson, 567 S.E.2d 193, 196–97 (N.C.

(“Whether a contract is ambiguous or uncertain is a question of law and the mere fact that the parties disagree as to the meaning of its terms does not, in and of itself, establish its ambiguity.”).

at 417, 604 P.2d at 1128

See, e.g., Duffy, 124 Ariz. at 417, 604 P.2d at 1128; ¶ 13, (App. 2004) (stating that “[i]f the language of a restrictive covenant is judged to be ambiguous, it should be construed in favor of the free use of the land”) (citing Duffy, 124 Ariz. at 417, 604 P.2d at 1128); (“Restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed against persons seeking to enforce them and any ambiguities or doubts as to their effect should be resolved in favor of the free use and enjoyment of the property and against

Co., , ( , ); see also Burke, 207 Ariz. at 396, ¶ 13 , 87 P.3d at 84 ("If the language of a restrictive covenant is judged to be ambiguous, it should be construed in favor of the free use of the land.").

Co. Inc., , ( , (citations omitted)).

as said: “Restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed against persons seeking to enforce them and any ambiguities or doubts as to their effect should be resolved in favor of the free use and enjoyment of the property and against restrictions.” Duffy v. Sunburst Farms East Mutual Water & Agricultural Co., Inc., , ( , ) (citations omitted).

“Whether a contract is ambiguous or uncertain is a question of law and the mere fact that the parties disagree as to the meaning of its terms does not, in and of itself, establish its ambiguity.”

As is the case with clear and unambiguous agreements (see *417 , rev. den., 1974, and cases cited therein), in the absence of ambiguity, restrictive covenants will be enforced according to their terms.

Vickridge First and Second Addition Homeowners Ass’n v. Catholic Diocese of Wichita, 212 Kan.