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Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Sanchez, 579 P.2d 568.

25 citing documents.

Walsh v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered 258 P.3d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Walsh v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered 258 P.3d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
a jury to award such damages.” White, 216 Ariz. at 143, ¶ 33 , 163 P.3d at 1093 (Espinosa, J., dissenting) ( , ).
Havasupai Tribe of the Havasupai Reservation v. Arizona Board of Regents 204 P.3d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Havasupai Tribe of the Havasupai Reservation v. Arizona Board of Regents 204 P.3d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
§ 12-820.04 (barring punitive damages against a public entity or "a public employee acting within the scope of his employment”); -66 , -70 (App.1978).
White v. Greater Arizona Bicycling Association 163 P.3d 1083 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
White v. Greater Arizona Bicycling Association 163 P.3d 1083 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
¶ 13 GABA additionally contends the word “shah” in § 12-613 is not mandatory, but permissive, and therefore does not require the jury to award damages, , (§ 12-613 “merely authorized] but d[oes] not mandate ...
Arizona Libertarian Party v. Schmeral 28 P.3d 948 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Arizona Libertarian Party v. Schmeral 28 P.3d 948 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
See Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen’s Found.
Hampton v. Glendale Union High School District 837 P.2d 1166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Hampton v. Glendale Union High School District 837 P.2d 1166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
In addition, “shall” does not render a provision mandatory if the context of the provision indicates that it should be read as “must” or “may.”
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Arizona Corp. Commission 773 P.2d 455 Ariz. 1989
Wiper v. Downtown Development Corp. 732 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1987
Wiper v. Downtown Development Corp. 732 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1987
The appeals court in this case justified the award of punitive damages against DDC by claiming that “the allowance of such damages will encourage employers to exercise closer control over their servants for prevention of outrageous torts.” 152 Ariz. at 308, 732 P.2d at 199
Hall v. A.N.R. Freight System, Inc. 717 P.2d 434 Ariz. 1986
Hall v. A.N.R. Freight System, Inc. 717 P.2d 434 Ariz. 1986
See, , (“statutory changes in procedures or remedies may be applied to proceedings already pending except when the statute effects or impairs vested rights”), , (“a statute can not be applied retroactively to impair a vested right.”) The rule that legislation may not retroactively disturb vested rights is simple enough; the difficulty arises in defining a vested right, and determining when a right actually vests.
Wiper v. Downtown Development Corp. 732 P.2d 197 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
Wiper v. Downtown Development Corp. 732 P.2d 197 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
our court said that the reason for allowing punitive damages against the employer is the sup *308 posed deterrent effect, that the allowance of such damages will encourage employers to exercise closer control over their servants for prevention of outrageous torts.
Summerfield v. Superior Court, Maricopa Cty. 698 P.2d 712 Ariz. 1985
Summerfield v. Superior Court, Maricopa Cty. 698 P.2d 712 Ariz. 1985
Wilson v. Riley Whittle, Inc. 701 P.2d 575 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
Wilson v. Riley Whittle, Inc. 701 P.2d 575 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
we stated: “The reason for allowing punitive damages against the corporation is the supposed deterrent effect.
Pruitt v. Pavelin 685 P.2d 1347 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
Pruitt v. Pavelin 685 P.2d 1347 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
as recognizing that one purpose of awarding punitive damages against an employer is to encourage the employer *208 to exercise close control over employees.
Welch v. McClure 598 P.2d 980 Ariz. 1979
Welch v. McClure 598 P.2d 980 Ariz. 1979

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