Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite City of Tucson v. Holliday, 411 P.2d 183.

30 citing documents.

Nyemah v. Forrer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Nyemah v. Forrer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
See Saide, 135 Ariz. at 78, 659 P.2d at 37 (medical expert’s use of “a ‘magic word’ or phrase such as 4 NYEMAH v. FORRER Decision of the Court ‘probability’ is not determinative.”); -20, -93 (1966) (error for trial court to instruct on future medical expenses where physician offered both an “optimistic” view that plaintiff would need no further treatment and a “pessimistic” view that her permanent disability would require future treatment).
Hall v. Olague 579 P.2d 577 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
Hall v. Olague 579 P.2d 577 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
The rule was applied, although not by name
Butler v. Wong 573 P.2d 86 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Butler v. Wong 573 P.2d 86 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
we held that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to permit an optometrist to express an expert opinion concerning the plaintiff’s ability to see with the glasses she was wearing at the time she fell while crossing a downtown intersection in Tucson.
McGriff v. McGriff 549 P.2d 210 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
McGriff v. McGriff 549 P.2d 210 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
Anderson v. Muniz 515 P.2d 52 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
Anderson v. Muniz 515 P.2d 52 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
which stand for the proposition that a plaintiff may recover the reasonable value of nursing care or services rendered gratuitously for his benefit by friends or relatives.
Hildebrand v. Minyard 494 P.2d 1328 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
Hildebrand v. Minyard 494 P.2d 1328 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
Chavez v. Pima County, supra
Chavez v. Pima County 477 P.2d 763 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
Chavez v. Pima County 477 P.2d 763 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
we followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496C which provides in part: “ * * * a plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to himself or his things caused by the defendant’s conduct or by the condition of the defendant’s land or chattels, and who nevertheless voluntarily chooses to ent
City of Tucson v. Wondergem 466 P.2d 383 Ariz. 1970
City of Tucson v. Wondergem 466 P.2d 383 Ariz. 1970
City of Tucson v. Wondergem 458 P.2d 361 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
City of Tucson v. Wondergem 458 P.2d 361 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
this court said: “We hold that [before there is sufficient evidence to submit issue of assumption of risk to the fact finder] there must be some element of acceptance of the defendant’s negligence which indicates a willingness on the part of the plaintiff to take his own chances as far as the pa
Hardy v. Southern Pacific Employees Association 459 P.2d 743 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
Hardy v. Southern Pacific Employees Association 459 P.2d 743 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
Rhodes v. El Rancho Markets 454 P.2d 1016 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
Rhodes v. El Rancho Markets 454 P.2d 1016 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
Nichols v. Baker 416 P.2d 584 Ariz. 1966
Nichols v. Baker 416 P.2d 584 Ariz. 1966
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corporation v. Frazier, (9th Cir.) 289 F.2d 849 , cert.
Patania v. Silverstone 415 P.2d 139 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
Patania v. Silverstone 415 P.2d 139 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
The elements of assumption of risk are that “[T]here must be either a risk or danger which the plaintiff knows of or appreciates, or the danger must be so obvious that the plaintiff will be presumed to have known and comprehended it.”
Moore v. Gray 414 P.2d 158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
Moore v. Gray 414 P.2d 158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
O'Rielly Motor Company v. Rich 411 P.2d 194 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
O'Rielly Motor Company v. Rich 411 P.2d 194 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
See The City of Tucson v. Holliday, Ariz.App., , filed February 17, 1966.