Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Dungan v. Superior Court in & for County of Pinal, 512 P.2d 52.

31 citing documents.

Cuen v. Cuen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Cuen v. Cuen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
see Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Ariz. Tax Court (Citrus Heights), (noting that trial courts should exercise their discretion in favor of allowing defendants to participate in default hearings).
B of A/swartz v. Avwga Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
B of A/swartz v. Avwga Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Harmon v. Gaines Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Harmon v. Gaines Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Pacheco v. Miller Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Pacheco v. Miller Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Sec., ¶ 23 (App. 2007) ( ); see also Ariz. R. Fam.
Christy A. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 173 P.3d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Christy A. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 173 P.3d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
For example, in personal injury cases, “[an] entry of default constitutes only a judicial admission of liability and not of the amount of recovery when the claim is unliquidated”; therefore, the trial court should allow a defaulting party to “cross-examine and even present counterproof.” , see Mayhew v. McDougall, 16 Ariz.App.
Hilgeman v. American Mortgage Securities, Inc. 994 P.2d 1030 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
Hilgeman v. American Mortgage Securities, Inc. 994 P.2d 1030 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
at 130 , 491 P.2d at 853 (“[S]imply giving the plaintiff what he asks for may not attain that level of judicial discretion which will ■ pass appellate muster.”); , (the hearing on damages must be more than “a one-sided presentation by the party seeking the default judgment”).
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Superior Court 796 P.2d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Superior Court 796 P.2d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Tarr v. Superior Court in & for Pima County 690 P.2d 90 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
Tarr v. Superior Court in & for Pima County 690 P.2d 90 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
in discussing the right of a defaulted party to participate in a default judgment hearing, this court em *375 phasized the importance of our adversary system of justice saying: ...
Daou v. Harris 678 P.2d 934 Ariz. 1984
Daou v. Harris 678 P.2d 934 Ariz. 1984
E.g., Southern Arizona School for Boys, , 282, , 743 (App. 1978)
Hawke v. Bell 663 P.2d 1009 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
Hawke v. Bell 663 P.2d 1009 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
Mayhew v. McDougall, 16 Ariz.App.
Neis v. Heinsohn/Phoenix, Inc. 628 P.2d 979 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
Neis v. Heinsohn/Phoenix, Inc. 628 P.2d 979 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
SOUTHERN ARIZ. SCH. FOR BOYS, INC. v. Chery 580 P.2d 738 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
SOUTHERN ARIZ. SCH. FOR BOYS, INC. v. Chery 580 P.2d 738 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
Kleinsmith v. Industrial Commission 546 P.2d 346 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
Cook v. Steiner 528 P.2d 1264 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
Cook v. Steiner 528 P.2d 1264 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
again Division 2 of this court granted relief in a special action when the trial court refused to grant a defaulted defendant a continuance in a scheduled default judgment hearing to enable him to take the deposition of a witness and properly prepare for the 55(b)2 default hearing.
In Re Trull 520 P.2d 1188 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
In Re Trull 520 P.2d 1188 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
Trull v. Industrial Commission 520 P.2d 1188 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
Trull v. Industrial Commission 520 P.2d 1188 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974