Cited by

¶ 27 (App. 2005) (explaining that evidence the defendant “failed to stop or even slow down at a clearly visible stop sign and that he had entered the intersection ‘very fast’” was sufficient for jurors to find he was “aware of and had consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that other motoris

¶ 27 (App. 2005) (finding that, among other facts, evidence the defendant drove “with tires screeching” and failed to stop or slow down when required was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find recklessness).

105 (if evidence is admitted for one purpose but not for another, court must give limiting instruction upon timely request); ¶ 31 (App. 2005).

¶ 19 (2006); ¶ 27 (App. 2005).

¶ 31 (App. 2005) (“[A] trial court is not required, sua sponte, to give a limiting instruction on [other- act] evidence.”).

§§ 13-1204(A)(2), -1203(A)(1); -86, ¶¶ 8-12 (App. 2017) (finding sufficient evidence the defendant committed aggravated assault to his passenger where the injury would not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s conduct and where “the risk of harm from [the defendant’s] behavior included injuries to a passenger”); 481-82, ¶¶ 3, 24-27 (App. 2005) 2 One witness said she saw a tire blowout before the accident.

Vega, however, did not request such an instruction, and the law is well-settled that “a trial court is not required, sua sponte, to give a limiting instruction on such evidence.” ¶ 31 (App. 2005) (citing cases).

See, ¶ 27 (App. 2005) (evidence sufficient to support a finding of defendant’s recklessness when defendant failed to stop or slow down at a clearly visible stop sign and entered the intersection “very fast” with tires screeching).

¶4 Clayborn was indicted on four counts of attempted second degree murder, all class 2 dangerous felonies, twelve counts of aggravated assault, all class 3 dangerous felonies, and one count of misconduct 1 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts.” ¶ 2 (App. 2005).

1 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts.” ¶ 2 (App. 2005).

2 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts.” ¶ 2 (App. 2005) ( ¶ 2 (App. 1999)).

[a]nd as you can see it’s stained on the front.” The trial 1 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict[].” ¶ 2 (App. 2005) ( ¶ 2 (App. 1999)).

By 1 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict[].” ¶ 2 (App. 2005) ( ¶ 2 (App. 1999)).

After observing that the signature on the check did not match 1 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts.” ¶ 2 (App. 2005) ( ¶ 2 (App. 1999)).

n.1, ¶ 4, n.1 (App. 2005).

2 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict[].” ¶ 2 (App. 2005).

1 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts.” ¶ 2

Officers gained entry to the house with a key recovered from Remy-Apodaca when 1 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts.” ¶ 2

He then admitted he used methamphetamine daily for years, and explained that he used the scale to measure the drugs he purchased to ensure he did not get “ripped off.” 1 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts.” ¶ 2