Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Dixon, 622 P.2d 501.

64 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Nicolas Luviano 530 P.3d 388 Ariz. 2023
State of Arizona v. Nicolas Luviano 530 P.3d 388 Ariz. 2023
State v. Carter 429 P.3d 1176 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
State v. Carter 429 P.3d 1176 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
Indeed, in identifying legislative intent to define a single unified offense-through a statute like § 13-1802 that "defines a specific crime and provides ways in which the crime may be committed," State v. Dixon , , 561, , 508 (App. 1980) -we have commented, "[H]ad the legislature intended to create two separate offenses, it could easily have done so by enacting separate statutes or, at least, separate subsections," State v. Manzanedo , , ¶¶ 7, 9, , 1028 (App. 2005) (concluding A.R.S.
State v. Hon kalauli/kroll 414 P.3d 690 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Hon kalauli/kroll 414 P.3d 690 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
See Cotten, 228 Ariz. at 107-08, ¶¶ 4, 6 (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to submit special verdict forms to distinguish between two subsections of theft); (concluding that jury unanimity is not required for theft cases “as to the means by which the 4 To clarify, embezzlement and false pretenses were not common-law crimes under English law.
State v. Mack Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Mack Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
See Brown, 217 Ariz. at 620, ¶ 7; ("[T]here is a class of criminal statutes that defines a specific crime and provides ways in which the crime may be committed, and another class that may set forth several distinctive acts and make the commission of each a separate crime, all in one statute.").
State v. Gulley 382 P.3d 795 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Gulley 382 P.3d 795 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
§ 13-1802 (Supp. 2015); , ¶¶ 14-15 & n.6, , 906 & n.6 (App. 2009) (distinguishing unitary offense of theft from subsections of assault statute, which define different crimes); , (concluding that A.R.S.
State of Arizona v. Bruce Wayne O'Laughlin Jr. 372 P.3d 342 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
State of Arizona v. Bruce Wayne O'Laughlin Jr. 372 P.3d 342 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
¶¶ 5, 9, 904 (App. 2009); -65, -32 (App. 1985), see also Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 500-01 (1898) (indictment not duplicitous where murder may have been accomplished by different means).
State of Arizona v. Penny Ann West 362 P.3d 1049 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
State of Arizona v. Penny Ann West 362 P.3d 1049 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
conducting this analysis, we may consider: “(1) the title of the statute, (2) whether there was ‘a readily perceivable connection between the various acts’ listed in the statute, (3) whether those acts were ‘consistent with and not repugnant to each other,’ and (4) whether those acts might ‘inhere in the same transaction.’” Manzanedo, 110 P.3d at 1028
State of Arizona v. Robert Francisco Borquez 307 P.3d 51 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Robert Francisco Borquez 307 P.3d 51 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
-62, -09 (App. 1980) (finding that § 13-1802 defines single offense—theft—that can be committed in multiple ways).
State of Arizona v. Manuel Alejandro Delgado 303 P.3d 76 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Manuel Alejandro Delgado 303 P.3d 76 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
acterized: “‘[T]here is a class of criminal statutes that defines a specific crime and provides ways in which the crime may be committed, and another class that may set forth 10 several distinctive acts and make the commission of each a separate crime, all in one statute.’” Paredes-Solano, 222 P.3d at 904
State v. Valentini 299 P.3d 751 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State v. Valentini 299 P.3d 751 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
§ 13-1304 defines one offense of kidnapping that might be committed with more than one purpose or intent; defendant was not denied unanimous jury verdict even though jurors might not have agreed on manner in which kidnapping was committed); -62 , -09 (App.1980) (similar for theft).
State v. Cotten 263 P.3d 654 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Cotten 263 P.3d 654 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
.2006); ¶ 8 , , -65 , -32 (App.1985)
State of Arizona v. Maxamilano Paredes-Solano Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
State of Arizona v. Maxamilano Paredes-Solano Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
6 criminal statutes that defines a specific crime and provides ways in which the crime may be committed, and another class that may set forth several distinctive acts and make the commission of each a separate crime, all in one statute.”
State v. Brown 177 P.3d 878 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Brown 177 P.3d 878 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
“there is a class of criminal statutes that defines a specific crime and provides ways in which the crime may be committed, and another class that may set forth several distinctive acts and make the commission of each a separate crime, all in one statute.” The question here is whet
Pamela Manic v. Tucson City Attorney's Office Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Pamela Manic v. Tucson City Attorney's Office Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
See Dennis v. Jordan, 71 Ariz. 430, 439, (acts prescribing rights and duties may include punishment even if not included in title); (rights related to trial by jury not included in title of act are reasonably part of criminal code).
State of Arizona v. Matthew Erich Manzanedo 110 P.3d 1026 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State of Arizona v. Matthew Erich Manzanedo 110 P.3d 1026 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
we relied on the tests suggested by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Arndt, 87 Wash.2d 374 , and determined that Arizona’s theft statute, A.R.S.
State v. Shuler 780 P.2d 1067 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
State v. Shuler 780 P.2d 1067 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
State v. Bedoni 779 P.2d 355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
State v. Bedoni 779 P.2d 355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
State v. Ransom 764 P.2d 1162 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
State v. Ransom 764 P.2d 1162 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Court recently stated that “the preferred method for complying with Rule 609 is a specific on-the-record finding that the probative value of using a prior conviction for impeachment outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.” , (emphasis added), ( , , ), aff'd, Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 , 106 S.Ct.
State v. Smith 762 P.2d 509 Ariz. 1988
State v. Smith 762 P.2d 509 Ariz. 1988
In re the Appeal in Yavapai County Juvenile Action No. J-9365 759 P.2d 643 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
In re the Appeal in Yavapai County Juvenile Action No. J-9365 759 P.2d 643 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
State v. Mohr 724 P.2d 1233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
State v. Mohr 724 P.2d 1233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
State v. Coleman 711 P.2d 1251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
State v. Coleman 711 P.2d 1251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
State v. Winter 706 P.2d 1228 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
State v. Winter 706 P.2d 1228 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Under the analysis above and the decisions of this court, , our theft statute constitutes one, rather than multiple, offenses.
State v. Poland 698 P.2d 183 Ariz. 1985
State v. Poland 698 P.2d 183 Ariz. 1985
State v. Gillies 691 P.2d 655 Ariz. 1984
State v. Gillies 691 P.2d 655 Ariz. 1984