Cited by

¶58 A defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation and due process “are not without limit, and states may establish rules that allow the exclusion of evidence where its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” ¶ 27 (App. 2011) (cleaned up) (quoting Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006)).

¶9 “The purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jury of the applicable law,” (), and a “party is entitled to any jury instruction reasonably supported by the evidence,”

¶30 We also disagree with Rodriguez’s claim that the flight instruction may have unconstitutionally “relieved the [s]tate of its burden of proving [the] specific elements” of the offense of unlawful flight.11 “In assessing the constitutionality of jury instructions dealing with presumptions, ‘we must first determine if the presumption is mandatory or permissive.’” (quoting State v. 10With regard to felony murder, the trial court instructed the jury: “The crime of first-degree felony murder requi

permissive in nature,” noting that, “it was within the jurors’ discretion to ‘consider’ the evidence showing that Foster had fled from the fatal crash and then concealed himself by avoiding police for two weeks.” ¶62 “In assessing the constitutionality of jury instructions dealing with presumptions, we must first determine if the presumption is mandatory or permissive.” ¶ 9 (App. 2011).

(“Conclusive or irrebuttable presumptions unconstitutionally relieve the State of its burden of proof.”); –65, ¶¶ 11, 13 (App. 2011) (similar).

STATE v. ALVAREZ Decision of the Court precluding evidence of the victim’s prior violent acts under Rule 403 when the defendant had “not established any reason the other violent acts would have been particularly probative” and “the evidence carried the risk that jurors might see the victim as a bad man who had gotten what he deserved”); ¶¶ 23–24 (App. 2011) (finding the trial court’s exclusion of evidence on cross-examination to be permissible when the evidence involved a collateral issue, might

¶20 to conclude that the self-defense justification jury instruction should not be modified to incorporate a victim’s use of force.

¶ 24 (App. 2011) (no error in limiting cross-examination going to bias where “the jury was already aware of a strong potential motivation for the [witness] to be untruthful, and the [excluded] evidence would have been cumulative at best.”).

¶ 26 (App. 2011); ¶¶ 5, 13–14 (App. 2007); –42 , ¶¶ 12–21 (2018).

at the witness had a bias or interest in testifying against a former codefendant); Fleming, 117 Ariz. at 126 (finding no abuse of discretion where the defendant could not show that further cross-examination regarding a witness’s brief stay in a mental hospital four years prior bore on his credibility where there was no indication that the witness continued to have mental problems); –67 ¶ 22–23 (App. 2011) (finding no violation in part because the record contained no evidence supporting the defen

¶ 17 (App. 2019); ¶ 18 (App. 2011) (court to address issues likely to arise on remand); ¶ 98 (App. 2007).

See State v. Abdi , , 366, ¶ 18, , 214 (App. 2011) (court to address issues likely to arise on remand); Dawson v. Withycombe , , 113, ¶ 98, , 1063 (App. 2007).

a license to run at large in cross-examination.”); ¶ 8 (App. 2013); ¶ 27 (App. 2011).

“We evaluate cross-examination restrictions on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the defendant was denied the opportunity to present evidence relevant to issues in the case or the witness’ credibility.” ¶ 22 (App. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

VI, amend XIV); ¶ 27 (App. 2011).

In doing so, we view the instructions in their entirety to determine whether they accurately reflect the law, and interpret the instruction as a reasonable juror would, (interpreting jury instruction dealing with state’s burden of proof).

This latitude includes the discretion to preclude evidence of immigration status if it is “collateral to the issues at trial and would potentially confuse the jury.”

(finding reversible error in improper jury instruction going to “heart of [defendant’s] case” when issue at core of instruction “not overwhelmingly proven by the evidence”).

(right to present defense "subject to evidentiaiy rules,” limited to relevant evidence).