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Under that standard, “we uphold a decision if there is ‘any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’” ¶ 28 (App. 2012) ( ¶ 77 (2007)).

We will affirm the court’s decision to admit evidence if there is “any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.” ¶ 28 (App. 2012) (citation omitted).

See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 21; ¶ 25 (App. 2012).

We affirm if there is “any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.” ¶ 28 (App. 2012).

“[I]f hearsay evidence is admitted without objection, it becomes competent evidence admissible for all purposes.” ¶ 25 (App. 2012).

See State v. (Antonio G.) Hernandez, –06 (App. 1991) (“As long as it is not based upon race, perceived sympathy on the part of a prospective juror toward a defendant is a legitimate basis for a peremptory strike.” (internal citation omitted)); ¶¶ 41–43 (App. 2012) (affirming strike of drug counselor based on potential sympathy for defendant even though prosecutor struck the only two Black jurors).

See, –76 ¶ 43 (App. 2012) (similarly distinguishing Lucas where the only justifications for the peremptory strikes were race-neutral).

¶ 33 (App. 2012) (citing authority).

“When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a Batson challenge, we review de novo the court’s application of the law but defer to its findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.” ¶ 36 (App. 2012).

Applying this standard of review, “we uphold a decision if there is ‘any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’” ¶ 28 (App. 2012) ( ¶ 77 (2007)).

A duplicitous charge “alleges multiple crimes due to the presentation of evidence at trial[.]” ¶ 13 (App. 2012).

See Jimenez, 130 Ariz. at 140; ¶ 10 (App. 2007) (holding that collateral estoppel did not prohibit the State from introducing BAC results in a DUI retrial on the DUI-impaired charge following an acquittal of per se DUI); ¶ 29 (App. 2012) (stating that intrinsic evidence “is not evidence of another crime”).

Because the "[superior] court's finding is entitled to great deference," ¶ 40 (App. 2012), we must defer to those determinations here.

Applying this standard of review, “we uphold a decision if there is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.” ¶ 28 (App. 2012) (citation and quotations omitted).

103(a)(1); ¶ 21 (App. 2012).

Applying this standard of review, “we uphold a decision if there is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.” ¶ 28 (App. 2012) (internal quotation omitted).

A duplicitous indictment is “one that, on its face, alleges multiple crimes within one count.” ¶ 13 (App. 2012).

Intrinsic evidence, however, “is not evidence of another crime.” -73, ¶ 29, –82 (App. 2012).

Under that standard, “we uphold a decision if there is ‘any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’ ” ¶ 28 , ( ¶ 77 , ).

Under that standard, “we uphold a decision if there is ‘any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’ ” ¶ 28 , ( ¶ 77 , ).