Cited by

V; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 10; ¶ 16 (App. 2012).

But “when a defendant’s silence is not the result of state action, the protections of the Fifth Amendment do not prohibit the state’s comment on that defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.” ¶ 16 (App. 2012).

¶ 9 n.2 (App. 2012) (modifying a sentencing minute entry that incorrectly noted the defendant was convicted of a completed offense, rather than the attempted offense, when the court was able “to ascertain the trial court’s intent from the record”); n.2 (App. 1994) (“When we

“When we can ascertain the trial court’s intent from the record, we need not remand for clarification.” ¶ 9 n.2 (App. 2012); see also Ovante, 231 Ariz. at 188, ¶ 38 (citing Whitney, 159 Ariz. at 487).

¶ 9 n.2 (App. 2012) (“When we can ascertain the trial court’s intent from the record, we need not remand for clarification.”).

P. 26.16(a) (“The judgment of conviction and sentencing on the judgment are complete and valid at the time the court orally pronounces them in open court.”); ¶ 9 n.2 (App. 2012) (correcting sentencing minute entry to reflect the court’s oral pronouncement).

n.2, ¶ 9 (App. 2012) (“When we can ascertain the trial court’s intent from the record, we need not remand for clarification.”).

–20, ¶¶ 15–16 (App. 2012).

¶¶ 25-26, (discrepancy between oral pronouncement of sentence and minute entry may be resolved by reference to the record showing dispositive evidence of trial court’s intent); n.2, n.2 (App. 2012) (“When we can ascertain the trial court’s intent from the record, we need not remand for clarification.”).

To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, we evaluate whether “substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict[].”